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One sure way to determine the social conscience of a Government
is to examine the way taxes are collected and how they are spent.
And one sure way to determine the social conscience of an individ-
ual is to get his tax-reaction. Taxes, after all, are the dues that we
pay for the privileges of membership in an organized society.
—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address, Worcester,
Massachusetts (Oct. 21, 1936)
INTRODUCTION
During the past several decades the structure of our nation's
health care delivery system has changed dramatically. It has evolved
from primarily fee-for-service health care to largely managed care. It
has been marked increasingly by multi-institutional health care pro-
vider networks—horizontal networks of hospitals and integrated deliv-
ery systems—and decreasingly by independent, freestanding not-for-
profit and for-profit hospitals.' The structure of physicians' medical
practices has been altered. Increasingly, physicians have joined health
maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, and in-
dependent practice associations;2 independent practitioners and small
1 See infra notes 79-80, 377-83, 446 and accompanying text.
2 See News Brief More Doctors Joined Managed Care in 1994, Realized Financial Gains, PSY-
CHIATRIC TIMES, July 1995, at 35.
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groups of practitioners without particular affiliations are nearing ex-
tinction. Joint venture arrangements between hospitals and physicians
have formed.3
These and other modifications in our nation's health care system
have resulted from numerous factors. Medicare, Medicaid, and private
insurers have implemented new reimbursement systems. Competition
among health care providers has become fierce. Costs of developing
and implementing technological and medical advances have skyrock-
eted. Large employers, insurance companies, federal and state govern-
ments, and health care providers have demanded managed care and
managed competition . 4
New issues have surfaced as challenges to our health care system.
Medical school hospitals, once the most respected nurturers of medical
advances, technological innovations, and sources of physician training
programs, have been hit by hard economic times; 5 some have been
incorporated into for-profit hospital systems.' Religious affiliated hos-
pitals that have merged into secular health care provider systems have
faced concerns over ethical positions.'' Quality of health care issues
plague health care providers and patients.' Debate continues on re-
forming Medicare and Medicaid. 9 Legislators, scholars, commentators,
See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 93, 95 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Esther B. Fein, G.O.P. 's Grim Prognosis for Teaching Hospitals: The Pain of Medicare
Cuts Would Be Worse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1995, § 1, at 9; Esther B. Fein, Medical Schools Are
Urged to Cut Admissions by 20%, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at D2; Elisabeth Rosenthal, Competition
and Cutbacks Hurt Foreign Doctors in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1995, at Al.
6 See M. Gregg Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1035
(1992); Frank Rich, The Unkindest Cut, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, § 4, at 15; Elisabeth Rosenthal,
New Demands for Medical Affiliates, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1995, at Bl.
7 See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, With Rise in Health Units Mergers, Catholic Standards Face Challenge,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at B7.
See, e.g., Mark I. Levy, 'Opt Out' of Managed Care, PSYCHIATRIC Tim's, July 1995, at 27;
Holcomb B. Noble, Quality is Focus for Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1995, § 1, at 1; Robert
Pear, H.M.O.'s Refusing Emergency Claims, Hospitals Assert, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1995, § 1, at I.
9 See, e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., G.O.P. Blitzkrieg on Health Care Shakes Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 1995, § 1, at 1; Adam Clymer, Wary of Congress on Medicaid, Governors Try to Find Unity on
Medicaid: Cuts Are a Concern as Are Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1995, at A10; Martin Gottlieb,
In G.O.P. Plan, Some See a Widening Gap Between Sick and Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995,
§ 1, at 9; Robert Pear, Budget Cuts Stall Broader Services in Medicare Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1995, § 1, at 1; Robert Pear, Congress Preparing a Major Overhaul of Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 1995, at 137 [hereinafter Pear, Major Overhaul]; Robert Pear, G.O.P. Announces Plan to
Overhaul Medicare System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at Al; Robert Pear, Republican Governors
Working with Congress to Shift Medicaid Authority to States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, § 1, at 20
[hereinafter Pear, Republican Governors]; Hilary Stout & Laurie McGinley, Medicare Premiums Are
'faking Center Stage in Budget Battle Between Clinton, Republicans, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1995, at
Al6; Robin Toner, Warning Against Quick Medicare Cuts, N.Y. Tims, July I1, 1995, at A16. It has
been asserted that federal government spending for Medicare patients has produced too high
profits for HMOs and other managed care organizations and insufficient savings for the govern-
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and the popular media have criticized not-for-profit hospitals as too
profit motivated, too businesslike, and forgetful of their "charitable"
missions of providing health care to the medically indigent.'" These
criticisms continue at a time when a significant percentage of Ameri-
cans—recently reported as between fourteen and twenty-five percent—
do not have health insurance at any one time;" fifty-five percent of
women living at or below poverty level do not receive preventive care; 12
and forty-three percent of noncitizens living in this country lack health
insurance." Furthermore, a National Academy of Science recommen-
dation could broaden the definition of poverty, resulting in an even
larger segment of the population qualifying for benefits under the
current Medicaid system."
went. See, e.g., Erik Eckhohn, H.M.O.'s Are Changing the Face of Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1995, at Al ; Milt Frei idenh e i m, Medicare, Jot This Down: Employers Offer Valuable Lessons on Saving
Money with Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1995, at Dl.
IS See, e.g., BRAnrotto H. CRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE 61 (1991); Cyril E
Chang & Howard P. 'Dickman, The Profits of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 13 J, HEAurri Pot.., POL'Y &
LAW 547 (1988); Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1416 (1980); Kenneth W. Clarkson, Some Implications of Property Rights in Hospital
Management, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 363 (1972); Judith Feder at a]., Poor People and Poor Hospitals:
Implications for Public Policy, 9 J. HEAurrt Pot.'v & LAW 237 (1984); Bradford H. Gray,
Nonprofit Hospitals and the Far-Profit Challenge, 66 Burt.. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 366 (1990) [hereinafter
Gray, Nonprofit Hospitals"; Stanley B. Jones et al., Competition or Conscience? Mixed-Mission Dilem-
mas of the Voluntary Hospital, 24 Isiqunry 110 ( 1987); Mark V. Pauly, Nonprofit Firms in Medical
Markets, 77 Am. EcoN. Rcv. 257 (1987); Arnold S. Reiman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex,
303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980) ; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income
Taxation, 34 STAN. L. Rev. 1017 (1982); J. David Scay et al., Holding Fast to the Good: The Future
of the Voluntary Hospital, 23 INQUIRY 253 (1986); J. Michael Watt et al., The Comparative Economic
Performance of Investor-Owned Chain and Not Hospitals, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 89 (1986);
William D. White, Regulating Competition in a Nonprofit Industry: The Problem of Forprofit Hospitals,
16 trivial' 50 (1979); A "Growing Concern" of Small Business: Competition with Nonprofits, "An
Issue for the Eighties", PHILANTHROPY MosrrEux, Jan. 1984, at 5; Christina Kent, A Nonprofit or
For-Profit Health System: Does It Matter?, MED. & HEAurn, Feb. 7, 1994, at Si; Douglass Seaver, Are
Hospitals Becoming 'Pro Businesslike?, HOSPITALS, Feb. 20, 1990, at 86. For a brief discussion of
legislative consideration of these issues, see infra note 141.
II See 190 CONG. REC. H4867 (daily ed.,/tute 22, 1994) (statement of Rep. DeLauro, Democrat
fiotit Conn., indicating that approximately 14% of Americans do not have health insurance);
FDCH CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY, Oct, 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST File
(statement of Wilhelmina Robertson, Coordinator fbr Rural and Maternal and Child Health Care
in Torrance County, N.M., noting that 25% of all Americans do not have health insurance); The
MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: Harvest of Revenue? (Educational Broadcasting, Transcript #9953,
June 20, 1994) (reporting that more than 17% of Americans did not have health insurance in
1992).
12 Women Pay More for Health Care, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Mar. 1994, at 3 (citing data released
by the Women's Research and Education Institute). Women of childbearing age can expect to
pay up to 70% more than men for health care, and twice as many women as men between 15
and 44 years old spend more than 10% of their incomes on health care. M.
13 This figure was reported for 1993 and is based on the Census Bureau's March 1994 current
population survey. 43% of Noncitizens Lack Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, jail. 25, 1995, at A13.
14 See Robert Pear, A Proposed Definition of Poverty May Raise Number of U.S. Poor, N.Y. Ttiyms,
Apr. 30, 1995, § 1, at 1.
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Despite the attention focused on the revolutionary changes in the
health care sector and its structure, to some extent federal laws and
regulations impacting the health care system have failed to keep up
with the system's quickly evolving environment. Even the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") has been criticized as slow to develop and
disseminate guidance on tax exemption criteria crucial to new health
care structures.'' Those standards announced and applied by the IRS
are a conservative and narrow regeneration or revival of older crite-
ria. I ti
This article begins in part I with a brief statement about the
federal tax statutes that confer tax-exempt status on health care organi-
zations. Part II discusses the historical development of our health care
system. Parts III and IV outline the criteria applied by the IRS to the
various health care delivery structures and focus on post-1955 stand-
ards. Part V advances a tax proposal intended to promote the improve-
ment of health care delivery, quality, access, and research. It is designed
to stimulate medical personnel training and medical technological
advances. Further, it aims to enhance health care education to com-
munities' populations and consumer education about health care or-
ganizations.
It is clear that the present federal income tax scheme impacts
structural developments within the health care industry. Yet, it is not
clear that the present tax strategy fosters socially and medically bene-
ficial goals in our health care system. Nor is it evident that the current
tax regime aids health care organizations' quests for financial effi-
ciency and effectiveness. Immense challenges face the intersection of
the current health care sector and any future federal tax program. In
pursuit of our nation's daunting health care goals, it is hoped that this
article will engender further discussion of the appropriate design of
and interplay between the health care and federal tax systems.
I. BACKGROUND
The privilege of some form of tax exemption for hospitals,
the first form of health care institution, 17 predates the Revolutionary
15
 See, e.g., IRS Closing Agreement Raises Questions About Wider Application of Restrictions, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA), at J- 1, J- 1 (Oct_ 31, 1994), available in Westlaw, BNA-DTR file [hereinafter IRS
Closing Agreement].
16 See infra part 1V.F.6.
37
 Pennsylvania Hospital in Philadelphia, Pa. was the first hospital in this country. It was
formally established in 1751 to care for the mentally and physically ill. New York Hospital was
organized in 1771, but it did not treat patients until the 1790s. Massachusetts General Hospital
did not open until 1821. See CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF
AMERICA'S HOSPITAL SYSTEM 18 (1987); PAUL S'FARR, THE SOCIAL. TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
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War. 18 Nonetheless, there has never been a provision in the Internal
Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") that per se exempts hospitals or other health
care organizations from federal income taxation. Today, I.R.C.
§ 501(a) is applied to confer exemption from federal income taxa-
tion on hospitals and other health care organizations, including com-
ponent institutions of vertical and horizontal health care systems, de-
scribed under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) or (c) (4). Although certain tax
benefits are granted to I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) organizations, preferential
treatment is accorded to organizations qualifying for exemption under
I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). 1 " While these two provisions have been part of the
CAN MEDICINE 150 (1982); WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, AMERICA'S FIRST 1 -IOSPITAL: THE. PENNSYLVA-
NIA 1-IOSPITAL 1751-1841 (1976). For a brief discussion of almshouses, see infra note 21 and
accompanying text.
18 W. HARRISON WELLFORD & JANNE C. GALLAGHER, UNFAIR COMPETITION: THE CIIALLENGE
To CHARITABLE Tax ExuarrtoN 119-20 (1988); David A. Hyman, The Conundrum of Charitability:
Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 16 Asa. j.L, & MED. 327, 334 (1990).
19 After the Civil War, not-for-profit organizations received certain benefits unavailable to
for-profit organizations. For example, The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 exempted not-for-profit or-
ganizations from voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy, and as late as 1947 not-for-profit institu-
tions were exempt from involuntary bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14
Stat. 517 (1867), amended by Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 4, 36 Stat. 838, 839 (1910), repealed
by Bankruptcy Act of 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 213 (1947). Favored treatment also extended to
exemption from Social Security taxes (Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 907(c) (7), 49 Stat.
620, 643, (1935), repealed by Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No, 98-21, § 102, 97
Stat. 65, 70-71 (1983)); federal unemployment insurance (Internal Revenue Code, ch. 9, subch.
C, § 1607(c) (7), 53 Stat. 183, 187, (1939)); the minimum wage (per regulations, 29 C.F.R.
§ 779.214 (1970), and judicial interpretations of Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676,
§§ 5-8, 12, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062-64 & 1067 (1938), amended by Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2(r), 75 Stat. 65, 65 (1961)); securities registration (Securities Act
of 1933, ch. 38, § 3(a) (4), 48 Stat. 74, 76 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (4) (1994)); and
unfair trade practice rules (Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994))). Moreover, not-for-profits obtained favoritism
under the copyright statutes, Copyright Act 01'1947, ch. 391, § 1(c) & (e), 61 Stat. 652, 653 (1947),
expanded by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 110-112 & 118(d) (5), 90 Stat. 2541,
2549, 2551, 2559 & 2567 and by Act of Oct. 25, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-366, § 3, 96 Stat, 1759, 1759
(1982), and pursuant to antitrust taws, see Marjorie Webster junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Sch., Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654-55 (D.C. Cir.), (tot denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1970), Not-for-profit organizations were even protected from tort liability under the judicially
created doctrine of charitable immunity. See W. PAGE KEETON Icy Al.., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE Law OF TORTS 1069 (5th ed. 1984); Note, The Quality of Mercy: 'Charitable Thrts' and Their
Continuing Immunity, 100 HARV. L. Rev. 1382 (1987). For further discussion of the favored
treatment of nut-for-profit organizations during the period of 1850-1950, see Henry Hatismann,
The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W.
RF,S. L. Rev. 807, 810-11 (1988-89).
The list of favored treatment for not-for-profit organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
(1994) has declined over the past 30 years. For example, the charitable immunity doctrine is
largely unavailable. See Note, supra, at 1382, 1385. The antitrust laws now are applied with vigor
to not-for-profit organizations. See Hansmarin, supra, at 817. Enforcement of the antitrust laws to
mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures of hospitals and other health care institutions has been
increased and has been given much attention lately. See, e.g., Kevin J. Arquit, Developments and
Trends in FTC Antitrust Enforcement, in 2 35TH ANNUM, ANTITRUST LAIN INSTITUTE, at 653 (PLI
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statutory landscape for many years, 2° the applicability and evolution of
key IRS interpretive criteria and standards with respect to hospitals,
Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-847, 1994); William T. Lifland, Monopolies and
Joint Ventures, in 1 35TH ANNUAL ANTiTnus .r LAW INSTITUTE, at 141 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course
Handbook Series No. 8-846, 1994); Judy L, Whalley, Merge„ and Acquisitions Update, in 1 35TH
ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE, at 317 (PL1 Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No.
B-846, 1994); see also Fredric J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate
Antitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107 (1994); William G. Kopit & Robert W. McCann,
Toward a Definitive Antitrust Standard for Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, 13 J. HEALTH Poi.., Pot.'v
AN') LAW 635 (1988); Dayna B. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally: Antitrust Law and Hospital
Mergers, 31 Hous. L. REV. 813 (1994); David L. Meyer & Charles F. (Rick) Rule, Health Care
Collaboration Does Not Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 (1994);
Owen S. Mudge, Jr. & Allan Gibofsky, The Developing Application of Antitrust Laws to Hospital
Mergers, 151 LEGAL MED. 355 (1994).
However, § 501(c) (3) organizations do retain favored treatment in certain areas of the law.
For example, copyright laws, 17 U.S.C. § 110(10) (1994), and minimum wage laws, 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(r) (1994), interpreted by 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (1994), continue to favor these not-for-profit
organizations.
Among the special tax benefits currently applicable to § 501(c)(3) organizations are the
following: exemption from income taxation under 1.R.C. § 501(a) (1994); eligibility for the
receipt of charitable contributions that are deductible by donors in calculating income tax
liability, I.R.C. § 170 (1994), and gift tax liability, I.R.C. § 2522 (1994), and that reduce estate tax
liability by the value of a charitable bequest, I.R.C. § 2055(a) (2) (1994); eligibility to raise capital
through the issuance of tax-exempt "qualified § 501(c) (3) bonds" under I.R.C. § 145 (1994);
flexibility to structure certain employee compensation plans, such as tax sheltered annuities
under I.R.C. § 403(b) (1994); exemption from the federal unemployment payroll tax pursuant
to I.R.C. §§ 3301 & 3306(c)(8) (1994); and exemption from the communications services ex-
cise tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 4253(h) (1994). Although many jurisdictions continue to exempt
§ 501(c) (3) organizations from state and local sales, income, and property taxes, some jurisdic-
tions have curtailed or have begun programs of scrutinizing this favoritism, especially with respect
to "charitable" not-for-profit institutions. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18(d) (West 1995);
West Allegheny Hosp. v. Board of Prop. Assessment, 455 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 1982); School Dist. v.
Hamot Medical Center, 602 A.2d 407 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Hospital Utilization Project v.
Commonwealth, 461 A.2d 894 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983); Utah County v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985); see also Mark F. Baldwin, Legislatures, Agencies Debating
Whether Not-For-Profit Hospitals Deserve Their 7'ax-Exempt Status, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 22, 1987,
at 34; David A. Hyman & Ti. McCarthy, Property Tax Exemptions: Headed for Extinction?, HEALTH
PROGRESS, Dec. 1988, at 32; Strapped Governments Eye Nonprofit Hospitals, 47 MED. & HEALTH,
Aug. 2, 1993.
Furthermore, any § 501(c) (3) organization that is not a private foundation under I.R.C.
§ 509(a) (1994) but instead is considered a "public charity" currently is free from certain excise
taxes, levied against private foundations involved in prohibited transactions, such as "self-dealing,"
and in certain investment activities. See I.R,C. §§ 4940-48 (1994) (relating to private foundations).
Unlike the class of organizations described under LR.C. § 501(c) (3), those qualifying under
I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) (1994) are not permitted to issue tax-exempt bonds pursuant to I.R.C. § 145
(1994); with certain limited exceptions, are not eligible to provide donors the opportunity to
claim tax deductible charitable contributions under I.R.G. § 170 (1994); and often do not qualify
under state laws for property tax exemptions. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE Law OF TAX ExEmp-r
Ont;ANizArtoNs 564-68 (6th ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994).
20 The earliest history of the income tax exemption dates to an administrative ruling issued
during the Civil War, the only period prior to 1894 during which an income tax was imposed by
the United States government. Pursuant to Treasury Decision 110, "the income of literary,
December 1995]
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other health care organizations, and health care systems have been
marked by periods of progression as well as stagnation.
II. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS
A. The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
To understand the evolutionary process of tax exemption applica-
ble to health care organizations, one must begin at the roots of our
contemporary health care institutions. Just as in western Europe and
England, almshouses, which housed the ill, homeless, and poor until
their deaths, were the predecessors of hospitals in the United States. 21
scientific or other charitable institutions, in the hands of trustees or others, is not subject to
income tax." Treas. Dec. 110 (May 1863), cited in Tax Reform of 1969: Hearings on H.R. 13270
Before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1425, 1428
11.1 (1969) (Statement by Julius M. Greisman, Attorney, American Hospital Association; accom-
panied by John W. Kaufmann, Administrator, Princeton Hospital, and Chairman, American
Hospital Association Council on Legislation, and Kenneth Williamson, Deputy Director). As part
of The Tariff Act of 1894, Congress enacted the first federal income tax exemption for charitable
organizations. Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894). One year later, the
Supreme Court declared the Tariff Act unconstitutional. Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
158 U.S. 601 (1895). The Tariff Act of 1909, which generally imposed an excise tax on "every
corporation, joint stuck company, or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock
represented by shares," exempted from the excise tax, among other organizations, any corpora-
tion or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or
individual." Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-13 (1909). In 1913, Congress expanded
the excise tax exemption to include "any corporation or association organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes." Revenue Act of 1913,
ch.16, § II (G), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). As part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, organiza-
tions exempt from income taxation included any Iclorporation, and any community chest or
fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary or educational purposes or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." Internal
Revenue Code, ch. 9, subch. C, § 1607(c) (7), 53 Stat. 183, 187 (1939). The tax exemption for
these organizations was recodified as § 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L.
No. 591, 68A Stat. 3 (1954). Numerous legislative provisions expanded the reach of the tax
exemption, to include such organizations as those that provide public safety testing, Revenue Act
of 1948, ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110 (1948), and amateur sports organizations, Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). Prohibitions against legislative activities and lobbying
have long been a part of the statutory requirements for tax exemption of charitable organiza-
tions-added first as part of the Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216, 48 Stat. 680 (1934), and
expanded greatly in subsequent years, most recently in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987, Pub, L, No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987). For further detailed histories, see for
example, Kenneth Liles & Cynthia Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Charities, 39
LAw & CONTEM P. PROBS. 6 (1975); John P. Persons et al., Criteria for Exemption Under Section
501(c)(3), in RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND
PUBLIC NEEDS 1909 (U.S. Dept. of Treas. 1977).
21 As early as 1713, almshouses provided shelter to ill poor persons, foundlings, the mentally
unbalanced, the physically handicapped and even criminals. The first such almshouse was the
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But as citizens recognized the need to provide health care for the poor
suffering from physical and mental illnesses, the concept of hospitals
began to change. Newer hospitals were founded in this country as
places to treat the poor for physical and mental maladies. 22
 People of
higher incomes continued to be treated by physicians either in the
patients' homes or the physicians' clinics. Two separate health care
provider systems were established: hospitals for the poor, largely sup-
ported by government subsidies and religious organizations, and phy-
sician-provided care, supported by patient fees.°
At the end of the nineteenth century, when hospitals developed
into more sanitary places to quarantine and care for persons with
infectious diseases, and anesthesia and asepsis became available, peo-
ple other than the poor began to receive health care outside of their
homes or doctors' clinics. 24
 Nevertheless, the health care system re-
mained largely divided. Larger voluntary hospitals, typically supported
by philanthropic contributions, served the poorer population, and
small, doctor-owned, proprietary hospitals generally catered to self-pay-
ing wealthier individuals. 25
During the nineteenth century, medical education also took on
a life of its own. Lengthy apprenticeships required by the guild sys-
tem for physician training began to dissolve as medical schools were
formed.26
 Medical training of physicians shifted to these new medical
Philadelphia Almshouse. See STANLEY JOEL REISER, MEDICINE AND THE REIGN OF TECHNOLOGY
152 (1978); ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 116; STARR, supra note 17, 149-52; Robert S. Bromberg,
The Charitable Hospital, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 237, 239 (1970). From almshouses arose hospitals,
the first of which was Pennsylvania Hospital. See supra note 17.
22 See STARR, supra note 17, at 145-79; WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 2. These hospitals were
largely supported by religious organizations and government subsidies. See STARR, supra note 17,
at 145-79; WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 2; see also MARSHALL W. RAFFEL, THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM:
ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS 241-46 (1980); Rosemary Stevens, "A Poor Sort of Memory": Voluntary
Hospitals and Government Before the Depression, 60 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 551, 552-55
(1982).
23
 STARR, supra note 17, at 157, 160-61. Before the late 1800s, much of household medicine
was identical with treatment that could be provided by hospitals. ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at
5. The hospital of this era was defined mostly by need and dependency. Id.
24 See. ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 116-65.
2.5
	 ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 116; Bromberg, supra note 21, at 239; Hansmann, supra
note 19, at 813.
26 America's earliest hospital wards were the training grounds for early physicians. See ROSEN-
BERG, supra note 17, at 190-200. By 1810, there were five medical schools, including ones at the
University of Pennsylvania, Harvard University, Dartmouth, and New York College of Physicians.
Id. at 20; Carson W. Bays, Why Most Private Hospitals An? Nonprofit, 2 .). FOCI' ANALYSIS & MGMT.
366, 374 (1983). However, the curriculum at this time was entirely didactic, with a few formal
lectures required for a medical degree. ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 190-200. Clinical training
was not part of the responsibility of the medical schools at this time. Id. By 1900, there were 160
medical schools. Bays, supra, at 374.
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schools, most of which were proprietary. 27 By the latter part of the
nineteenth century, medical education was marked by reform, trig-
gered partly by the American Medical Association's success in having
all states establish licensing standards for physicians. 28 In the 1870s,
Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania expanded their
medical schools' curricula and physician training periods. In 1893,
Johns Hopkins University opened its medical school, which incorpo-
rated unprecedented entry requirements and curricula programs for
those training to be physicians, 29 A combination of education reforms
and economic influences caused the virtual elimination of proprietary
medical schools by the mid-1920s."
B. The Twentieth Century
I. Freestanding Hospitals
By the beginning of the twentieth century, hospitals had assumed
a formal character and position in American society. The number of
hospitals was divided almost evenly between doctor-owned ("proprie-
tary") and charitable ("voluntary") hospitals." The bifurcation was
largely regionally representative. Eastern and midwestern metropoli-
tan areas were marked primarily by a small number of municipal
hospitals, a few small ethnic and religious hospitals, and some larger
nongovernmental, nonsectarian voluntary hospitals operated by volun-
27 See supra note 26.
"In 1897 the American Medical Association ("AMA") began to lobby state legislatures to
adopt AMA standards for licensing physicians. Between 1880 and 1900, the AMA was successful
in accomplishing this goal. See Bays, supra note 26, at 374.
29 Johns Hopkins required all entering students to have a college degree. It was the first
medical school to institute a Four-year program. See Smut, supra note 17, at 115.
"The 1910 publication of the Flexner Report, which spurred improvements in medical
education standards, has been claimed as a major influence on the demise of proprietary medical
education. ABRAHAM FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A
REPORT To THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF .II ;ACIIING (Carnegie Found.
Bulletin No, 4, 1910), discussed in ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 209-11; STARR, Mitre] note 17,
at 118-23; Bays, supra note 26, at 374; Mark Schlesinger et al., Nonprofit and For-Profit Medical
Care: Shifting Roles and Implications for Health Policy, 12 J. HEAurti Pot.'v & Law 427, 431
(1987).
31 By 1910, America had 4359 hospitals, which did not include mental or chronic disease
hospitals, such as tuberculosis sanitariums, ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 5. Of the 4359 hospitals,
2441 were proprietary hospitals. Bays, supra note 26, at 367. Much of the growth appeared to be
in the number of proprietary hospitals, as state and local governments had begun to withdraw
some of their subsidies. See Theodore R. Marmor et al., A New Look at Nonprofits: Health Care
Policy in a Competitive Age, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 322 (1986); Schlesinger et al., supra note 30,
at 430; Stevens, supra note 22, at 565-66.
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tary boards of trustees and largely supported by philanthropy." The
government-subsidized municipal hospitals generally furnished health
care to the poor. The voluntary hospitals, which often were aligned
with medical schools, provided acute care to low-income and nonpay-
ing patients (especially for teaching purposes) as well as to some paying
patients." Frontier communities of the West, where most of this coun-
try's expansion had occurred in the late nineteenth century, were
primarily represented by small proprietary hospitals. 34
Even though the proprietary institutions were disproportionately
represented in the fast-growing western region of the country, their
relative number began to decline, and by 1928, proprietary hospi-
tals represented only thirty-five percent of all hospitals in the United
States." At the same time, the number of voluntary hospitals had
grown. Thus, between 1900 and 1930, the character of the health care
sector had started to change;" the trend moved toward a diminished
role for proprietary hospitals.r Yet, regardless of its nature, the hospital
32
 See STARR, ROM BOW 17, at 170-72, 219; ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH:
AMERICAN HOSPITALS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 20 (1989).
33 STARR, ,supra note 17, at 112-23.
34
 In large part, proprietary hospitals were found in frontier communities because there were
few funds to create not-for-profit hospitals, and a strong philanthropic tradition had not had time
to develop. See STARR, supra note 17, at 170-71; Bruce Steinwald & Duncan Neuhauser, The Role
of the Proprietary Hospital, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 817, 820 (1970). A rise in proprietary
hospitals in the 1920s and 1930s is reported to be attributable to the establishment of hospitals
by doctors who needed hospital privileges for their practice of medicine, but who were excluded
from the medical staffs of not-for-profit hospitals for professional, ethnic, religious, or other
reasons. STARR, supra note 17, at 165; Douglas M. Mancino, Income 'Mx Exemption of the Contem-
porary Nonprofit Hospital, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1015, 1024 (1988).
35
 In 1928, of 6852 hospitals in the United States, 2435 were proprietary. Bays, supra note
26, at 367. See Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 431.
As summarized by one medical historian—
By the First World War, the hospital had grown markedly different from its
antebellum predecessors, just as American Society itself had changed. Those tradi-
tional ties of deference, patronage, and social responsibility that had created an
implicit structure for the hospital in Federalist America had faded by the end of
the nineteenth century. Oversight by pious and paternalistic laymen had been
largely replaced by the seemingly impersonal and neutral categories of medical
diagnosis and the self-confident management of professional administrators and
aspiring physicians. To many physicians and increasing numbers of laymen, the
hospital had become the only appropriate place to practice medicine of the highest
quality. . . [By 1920, it] had become central to medical education and was well
integrated into the career patterns of regular physicians; in urban areas it had
already replaced the family as the site for treating serious illness and managing
death. Perhaps most important, it had already been clothed with a legitimating aura
of science and almost boundless social expectation.
RosmitERo, supra note 17, at 9-10.
37
 It has been reported that all types of proprietary health care institutions took on a
diminished role by the mid-1920s. See Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 431.
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had become firmly established as a vital health care provider in the
community."
By the mid-1940s, the number and significance of voluntary hos-
pitals had increased and proprietary hospitals had declined substan-
tially." Some of the proprietary hospitals had closed; others had con-
verted into not-for-profit institutions." By 1946, nongovernment
voluntary hospitals accounted for fifty-eight percent of all general
acute-care hospitals, while proprietary hospitals accounted for only
twenty-four percent. 41
Many factors contributed to this transformation. There were in-
numerable drug and technological innovations, as well as new devel-
opments in diagnostic and laboratory procedures. Training for nurses
and physicians became more sophisticated, and new medical special-
ties were created. Furthermore, the availability of health insurance
contributed to the growth of the not-for-profit health care sector. The
most influential forces behind this growth were limited public insur-
ance provided under the Old Age and Survivor's insurance program,"
and private hospital and health insurance, initially provided through
Blue Cross and Blue Shield." These insurance programs reinforced
the public's accessibility to hospital services." Blue Cross and Blue
58 See ROSENBERG, ROW note 17, at 9-10, 310-36; Bromberg, supra note 21, at 239.
59 See STARR, supra note 17, at 219. According to American Hospital Association ("ANA")
Hospital Statistics, by 1946, to provide general and special acute-care services, there were 2584
nongovernment voluntary hospitals, 1076 proprietary hospitals, and 785 state and local govern-
ment hospitals. Moreover, the bed capacities and actual patient admissions of the nongovern-
ment voluntary hospitals far exceeded those of proprietary hospitals and government hospitals.
AHA HOSPITAL STATISTICS, Table 4 (1994) [hereinafter AHA STATimcs]. The nongovernment
voluntary hospitals maintained 301,000 beds and admitted 9,554,000 patients; the proprietary
hospitals had 39,000 beds available and admitted 1,408,000 patients; the governmental hospitals
maintained 133,000 beds and admitted 2,694,000 patients in 1946. Id.
4° STARR, supra note 17, at 219.
41 See supra note 39.
42 1n 1935, Congress made available the federal Old Age and Survivor's insurance program,
the predecessor of Medicare. See. ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN
AMERICA: A CASE STUDY Or MEDICAID, 13-14 (1974); Steven Golub, The Role of Medicare Reim-
bursement in Contemporary Hospital Finance, 11 Am. J.L. & MED. 501, 504 (1986); Maxwell J.
Mehlman & Karen A. Visocan, Medicare and Medicaid: Are They Just Health Care. Systems?, 29
Hons. L. REV. 835, 840 n.I2 (1992).
45
 See Mancino, supra note 34, at 1023; Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 431. In 1929, the
concept of prepaid medical insurance, which initially had been opposed by the American Medical
Association, was introduced by Blue Cross. Soon thereafter, Blue Shield was established to provide
medical insurance. Both Blue Cross and Blue Shield were established as nonprofit corporations
tinder state enabling laws, which effectively sanctioned the Blues as monopolies in providing
"service benefit" plans. SYLVIA A. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 8-9 (1974).
The genesis of Blue Cross is attributed to a hospital insurance plan formed in 1929 by Dr.
Justin Ford Kimball at Baylor University Hospital. See STARR, supra note .17, at 295-98; RAFFEt„
supra note 22, at 393-94.
44
 Congressional enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified
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Shield particularly strengthened the dominant position of voluntary
hospitals by negotiating lower reimbursement rates with proprietary
hospitals.45
After 1946, the number of independent voluntary hospitals in-
creased and, by 1964, reached its zenith. 46 Perhaps the most momen-
tous event that contributed to this achievement was the 1946 enact-
ment of the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, commonly known
as the Hill-Burton Act. 47
 This legislation was intended to subsidize
construction of nonprofit and public health care facilities, allocating
billions of dollars to the construction of acute-care general hospitals,
health clinics, and nursing homes. 48
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)), which enabled workers to bargain collectively was
influential in increasing the availability of health insurance to workers as part of their employee
benefits. See Golub, supra note 42, at 504.
13y the early 1940s more than two-thirds of all health plans were provided by nonprofit plans.
Marinon et al., supra note 31, at 324 (citing Mark Schlesinger, Public, For-Profit and Private
Nonprofit Enterprises: A Study of Mixed Industries 79 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin (Madison))); Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 432.
45 Marnior et al., supra note al, at 324; Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 432.
'16 The number of voluntary hospitals increased by almost 1000 independent hospitals from
1946 through 1965. See supra note 39 (providing 1946 statistics on numbers of hospitals, beds
and patient admissions for acute care based on nongovernment voluntary, proprietary, and
government categories). In 1950, the relative percentages of acute-care hospitals were the same
as for 1946, but by 1955, nongovernment voluntary hospitals had increased by a small margin.
AFIA STansTics, supra note 39. In 1950, of the acute-care hospitals registered with the Al-IA,
2871 were nongovernment voluntary, 1218 were proprietary, and 942 were government hospitals.
Id. In the same year, nongovernment voluntary hospitals maintained 332,000 beds and admitted
11,629,000 patients; proprietary hospitals maintained 42,000 beds and admitted 1,661,000 pa-
tients; and government hospitals maintained 131,000 beds and admitted 3,374,000 patients. Id.
In 1955, nongovernment voluntary hospitals maintained 389,000 beds and admitted 13,875,000
patients; proprietary hospitals maintained 37,0{}0 beds and admitted 1,459,000 patients; and
government hospitals maintained 142,000 beds and admitted 3,766,000 patients, Id. In 1960, a
total of 3291 nongovernment voluntary hospitals maintained 446,000 beds and admitted
1(1,788,000 patients; 856 proprietary hospitals maintained 37,000 beds and admitted 1,550,000
patients; and 1260 government hospitals maintained 156,000 beds and admitted 4,632,000 pa-
tients. Id. By 1965, the number of nongovernment voluntary hospitals had peaked, although the
number of patient admissions and beds would not reach their height until 1981 and 1983,
respectively. Id. In 1965, a total of 3426 nongovernment voluntary hospitals maintained 515,000
beds and admitted 19,001,000 patients; 857 proprietary hospitals maintained 47,000 beds and
admitted 1,844,000 patients; and 1453 government hospitals maintained 179,000 beds and ad-
mitted 5,617,000 patients. Id.
47 Ch. 958, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
48 Id. The express purpose of the Hill-Burton Act was to assist the states in modernizing
health care facilities after World War II by furnishing "adequate hospital, clinic or similar services
to all their people." Id.; see also Hearings on § 191 Before the Senate Committee on Education and
!Alm-, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, 190-91 (1945). This would be accomplished through government
grants and loans. Congress authorized the Surgeon General to issue regulations requiring the
provision of uncompensated care and community assurance as conditions to the receipt of fluids
under the Hill-Burton program. Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(1), 60 Stat. 1040, 1043 (1946). These
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The availability of health insurance also affected the composition
of our nation's hospitals after 1946. As hospital and health care insur-
ance coverage reached more people, demand for health care acceler-
ated." The then-not-for-profit Blue Cross and Blue Shield continued
to reimburse voluntary hospitals at rates exceeding those paid to pro-
prietary hospitals."
Private commercial insurers had entered the marketplace, enticed
many insureds away from Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and also devel-
oped favorable reimbursement programs.5 ' Thus, private commercial
conditions effectively limited the program to voluntary health care facilities. In exchange for
Hill-Burton funds, each facility agreed to provide a "reasonable volume of free or reduced cost
care" to "individuals unable to pay" and to "make their services available to all" persons on a
nondiscriminatory basis who were residing in the general service area of the health care facility.
Id. The Hill-Burton program was successful in channeling funds for hospital projects to smaller
towns and rural areas. ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
509-10 (1971). Billions of dollars through the program were dedicated to adding hospital and
nursing home beds, public health clinics, rehabilitation centers and other medical care facilities.
Id. at 510 & n.21. For an in-depth analysis of the Hill-Burton legislative history, see James F.
Blumstein, Court Action, Agency Reaction: The Hill -Burton Act as a Case Study, 69 IOWA L. REV.
1227 (1984); Marilyn G. Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill
-Burton Act:
Realities and Pitfalls, 70 Nw. L. REV. 168 (1975); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and
Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243 (1978). For a detailed discussion of
the community service and uncompensated care obligations, see Michael A. Dowell, Hill-Burton:
The Unfitlfilled Promise, 12 J. HEALTH Pol.., POL'Y & LAW 153 (1987); Kenneth R. Wing, The
Community Service Obligation of Hill-Burton Facilities, 23 B.C. L. REV. 577 (1982).
49 As explained by one author:
World War II also indirectly promoted the popularity of health insurance as an
employee benefit, since wartime wage and price controls did not apply to fringe
benefits. Hence, between 1940 and 1950, the number of people covered by hospi-
talization insurance increased from 12 million to 77 million. During the 1940s, as
health insurance coverage increased in availability and scope, there was a concomi-
tant rise in the development and use of new medical technology. As a result, both
the demand for and cost of health care services accelerated.
Golub, ,supra note 42, at 504.
50 Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 432 n.4.
51
 Since inception, Blue Cross and Blue Shield, not-for-profit organizations, had offered
private insurance with premiums based on the average of the actuarial medical experiences of
all employee groups of different companies in an area ("community rating"). Entry of for-profit
private commercial insurers into the marketplace profoundly affected the private health insur-
ance industry. These int-profit private insurers offered health insurance at lower premiums than
available through Blue Cross and Blue Shield. They based their premiums on the use of medical
care in the community, which provided a broader base to spread their risk of loss, and hence
enabled lower premiums to he offered. By the 1960s, Blue Cross and Blue Shield virtually
abandoned community rating for experience rating based on smaller health insurance pools. See
JOHN KRIZAY & ANDREW WILSON, THE PATIENT As CONSUMER 40 (1974); STARR, StItira note 17,
at 295-310 (providing a comprehensive history of the development of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield); James R. Bruner, AIDS and ERNA Preemption: The Double Threat, 41 DUKE 14. 1115,
1120 & n.28 (1991); Marmon at al., supra note 31, at 327; Schlesinger at al., supra note 30, at
434.
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insurers and Blue Cross and Blue Shield directly contributed to the
voluntary hospital sector's growth.
2. Medicaid/Medicare and Private Insurer Reimbursement Systems
The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 dramatically
influenced the complexion of America's health care and Americans'
attitudes toward its accessibility and provision.52
 Under Medicare,
which maintains health benefits for the elderly and disabled covered
by the Social Security Act," payments to hospitals and other health care
providers were patterned after the reimbursement program used by
Blue Cross and other private insurers. At that time, the Medicare
program operated on a "cost-plus" reimbursement basis. It essentially
was an open-end entitlement system with no limits on reimbursement
amounts for covered medical services. Medicare reimbursements to
hospitals were perceived as particularly generous as a result of its
provisions for depreciation allowances for capital. 54 Under Medicaid, a
joint federal- and state-funded program that provides health benefits
52
 The Medicare Act provides hospital and medical insurance for the aged and is financed
by federal payroll taxes. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102, 79 Stat.
286, 291-332 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ l395-1395yy (1994)). The Medicaid Act
provides matching federal funds for state medical assistance to the indigent. Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 286, 343-52 (1965) (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994)). The Medicare and Medicaid programs have been subject to
much Congressional debate and discussion as of late. See, e.g., Reforming our Nation's Health Care
System: Hearings on S. .541 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 19 (1984) (statement of Dr. George Prothro, former president of the Tulsa Coalition
for Older People); Resolving Catastrophic Health Problems in the Medicare Program: Hearings on S.
401 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Government Efficiency, Federalism, and the District of Columbia
of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1987) (statement of Robert
Maxwell, Vice President, AARP); Medicaid Issues Under Health Care Reform: Hearings on S. 361
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1994) (statement of Raymond G.
Scheppach, Executive Director, National Governors Association, Washington, D.C.); Medicare
Issues Under Health Care Reform: Hearings on S. 361 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d
Gong., 2d Sess. 6 (1994) (statement of Richard J. Davidson, President, American Hospital Asso-
ciation, Washington, D.C.).
55
 The Medicare program is composed of two distinct and complementary parts: Part A, the
hospital insurance portion; and Part B, the supplemental medical insurance segment. See Beth-
Ann Schauer & David B. Nash, The Changing Face of Medicare and Medicaid, in MEDICAL PRACTICE
IN THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE ENVIRONMENT 68 (Janice C. Edwards ed., 1995) [hereinafter
MEDICAL PRACTICE]. Part A finances four basic benefits, including 90 days of inpatient care in a
benefit period, care in a skilled nursing facility for continued treatment or rehabilitation after
discharge from the hospital, visits by a home health agency, and hospice care for terminally ill
patients. Id. Medicare patients must pay a deductible for each benefit period when receiving
services covered by Part A, and co-insurance is required for certain services, such as care in the
skilled nursing facility. Id. at 68.
54
 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.134—.149 (1994). The depreciation allowance effectively adjusted the
Medicare reimbursements for inflation. See JUDITH M. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 113-17 (1977); Marmor et al., supra note 31, at 328.
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for low-income individuals,55 reimbursement to health care providers
was based on charges for medical services. An economic pattern de-
veloped: the unbridled reimbursement methods of third-party insurers
were followed by providers' increased charges for health care services,
which in turn, led to higher reimbursements from the insurers.
Perhaps proprietary health care providers recognized that profits
could be made from the public and private health insurance systems."
55 As originally designed, Medicaid was to cover persons receiving cash payments under a
welfare program, either Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") or Supplemental
Security Income. Schauer & Nash, supra note 53, at 72. Individuals who do not receive cash
assistance from one of these welfare programs are generally not entitled to Medicaid regardless
of their income levels. Medicaid currently covers three groups of people: low-income elderly;
severely mentally retarded, blind, and permanently and totally physically disabled persons; and
low-income children from single-parent families and their parents. Id. at 70-71. Single persons
and childless couples who are not aged or disabled cannot receive Medicaid benefits. Medicaid
finances health care for children of low-income families, a group composed largely of families
receiving aid through the AFDC program and of other low-income families (such as pregnant
women with children) regardless of AFDC status. Thomas W. Reilly ct al., Trends in Medicaid
Payments and Utilization, 1975-89, HEAITH CARE FINANCING REV., 1990 Ann. Stipp., at 15, 17.
In 1989, children of low-income families accounted for nearly 44% of all Medicaid recipients but
were attributed less than 13% of all Medicaid payments. Id. at 26-27. The elderly account for
approximately 75% of all persons utilizing Medicaid for nursing care. 'Wow Dmas & DIANE
ROMAND, MEDICARE POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HEALTH AND LONG TERM CARE 65 (1986).
In 1987, Medicaid paid for 36% of all expenditures for nursing home care for the elderly. Daniel
R. Waldo et al., Health Care Financing Trends: Health Expenditures by Age Group, 1977 and 1987,
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Summer 1989, at 111, 114.
Although certain federal requirements must be inet, each of the 50 states and the District
of Columbia in essence has its on Medicaid program. This means that the Medicaid program
in each jurisdiction may differ as to who is covered, the scope of services reimbursed, and the
rate of reimbursement. Although certain basic health services must be provided by the states,
they may elect to provide other services, such as intermediate care facility services, prescription
drug reimbursement, dental care and optometry services. Payments are made directly to the
health care providers rather than to the Medicaid recipient. Because the methods of payment
vary according to the jurisdiction, there are many varieties of payment However, the health care
provider Insist accept the Medicaid reimbursement rate as payment in full, even though such
payments are often less generous than Medicare payments. In 1987, Congress required states to
amend their Medicaid plans to provide a disproportionate share adjustment to hospitals that
provide health care to It large number of low inc flee inclivichaals, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4112(a), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-148 to —149 (1987) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-4, 139fis (1994)).
Federal spending on Medicaid has quadrupled in the last decade, with 1994 expenditures
totaling approximately $82 billion. It currently costs about six times the amounts paid under
AFDC. On average, states contribute 75 cents filr each dollar received porn the federal govern-
ment for Medicaid, but stales with high per capita incomes must match the federal funds
dollar-fiir-dollar. See Pear, Republican Governors, .supra note 8, at A20. Currently Congress is
considering proposals kir reducing Medicaid costs, See id,
For a general discussion of Medicare and Medicaid, see, for example, Schauer & Nash, supra
note 53, at 59-85; Thomas C.W. joe et al., Arbitrary A cress to Care; The Case for Reforming Medicaid,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1985, at 59, 59-74.
56 One feaMre of Medicare that might have contributed to this recognition by the proprietary
hospitals was the policy of paying proprietary hospitals (and not nonprofit hospitals) a return on
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During the initial period after enactment of Medicare and Medicaid,
growth accelerated in the for-profit sector of health care providers;
proprietary hospitals and nursing homes realized an increase in the
relative share of health care services. 57 However, more pronounced
growth in the for-profit sector was yet to come. 58
In an effort to curb rising health care costs, in 1972 Congress
enacted the first limits on reimbursements under Medicare's cost-plus,
fee-for-service system. 59 The Medicare "reasonable cost" limits on reim-
bursable amounts were rather arbitrary and of limited value as a de-
terrent against rising health care costs and reimbursements. 6° At the
equity payment. 42 C.F.R. § 413.157 (1995). This advantageous payment effectively was made to
compensate investors in proprietary hospitals with a return for their investment risk. Prior to the
Social Security Amendments of 1983, the return on equity payment was based on 150% of the
current interest rate earned on funds in the federal government's hospital insurance trust fund.
The Social Security Amendments of 1983 reduced by one-third the return on equity payments.
SeeJohn K. Iglehart, Medicare Begins Prospective Payment of Hospitals, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1428,
1431 (1983).
57 See Marmor et al., supra note 31, at 327 (citing Schlesinger, supra note 44, at 79, 80);
Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 933-34; Seay et al., supra note 10, at 253; see also AHA
S-rs-risTics, supra note 39 (data indicating between 1965 and 1973 a slightly declining number
of voluntary hospitals, increasing admissions and beds of proprietary and voluntary hospitals).
Nonetheless, in 1975, proprietary hospitals accounted for only 12.9% of the nonfederal acute-care
short-term hospitals and only 7.9% of the beds. Id. At the same time, voluntary hospitals ac-
counted for 56.3% of all nonfederal acute-care short-term hospitals and 70.8% of the beds. Id.
One commentator suggested that Medicare and Medicaid encouraged the growth of pro-
prietary hospitals in two ways: (1) by reducing the amount of unavoidable bad debts of hospitals,
and (2) by substituting government payments for donations to not-for-profit hospitals. Richard
W. Foster, Hospitals and the Choice of Organizational Form, 3 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT. 343,
350 (1987). He explained that the Medicare and Medicaid payments made the hospital industry
more profitable and therefore more attractive to private investors. Id. Furthermore, he suggested
that potential donors perceived a reduced need to make charitable donations to not-for-profit
hospitals when government programs and subsidies assured health care access for the poor
regardless of contribution levels. Id.
58 The number of proprietary hospitals grew rapidly in the late I970s and early 1980s, and
the character of those hospitals changed significantly during the same period. Although in 1975
proprietary hospitals accounted for 12.9% of the nonfederal acute-care short-term hospitals and
7.9% of the beds, by 1984, proprietary hospitals accounted for 13.5% of the nonfederal acute-care
short-term hospitals and for 9.4% of beds. AHA STA -mows, supra note 39. From the mid-1960s
to the mid-1980s, hospital beds operated by proprietary hospitals more than doubled. Id. During
the same time frame, the number of hospital beds operated by voluntary hospitals increased by
approximately 30%. Id. As a result of closures and the purchase of proprietary hospitals by
investor-owned chains, the number of independent (freestanding) proprietary hospitals declined
from 682 in 1975 to 303 in 1984. BRADFORD CRAY, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 28
(1986); Pearl Richardson, CB0 Report: Health Care Trends and the Tax Treatment of Health Care
Institutions, 10 EXEMPT ORG. MX Rev. 897, 90(1-01 (1994).
59 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 96-203, § 223, 86 Stat. 1329, 1393 (1972)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x, 1395cc (1994)). The amendments permitted
Medicare to retrospectively reimburse physicians and related services on a fee-for-service basis
and hospitals for any reasonable costs incurred. See Schauer & Nash, supra note 53, at 61.
6° They were based on comparables, that is, a comparison of costs for the same health care
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same time, public and private insurance benefits were being expanded
to cover new medical services."' As medical technology developed and
these new technological innovations were implemented in hospitals,
clinics, and laboratories,62
 medical insurance often paid for their use.
The availability of medical insurance was a double-edged sword: it
assured better health care while it contributed to higher health care
costs.
Health care costs and charges spiraled in the late 1960s and the
1970s, and Medicare and Medicaid became the fastest growing pro-
grams in the federal budget." This spiral led to concern for "cost
containment." In response, in the early 1980s Congress replaced Medi-
care's heretofore fee-for-service basis for reimbursing doctors and its
dollar-for-dollar "reasonable cost" basis reimbursement system for in-
patient hospital services. As part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"),64
 ceiling limits were imposed on costs
for Medicare hospitals' ancillary services, such as nursing and physical
therapy. TEFRA called for the development of a prospective payment
system ("PPS") for the Medicare program in order to cut costs and
instill new economic incentives."' This goal was rapidly pursued. As part
services among hospitals grouped according to geographic location and capacity. Those hospitals
whose costs exceeded a specific target, based on the comparables, received Medicare reimburse-
ments limited to the target rate. Similarly, a method of limiting reimbursements was designed for
the Medicaid program. See Donald W. Simborg, DK; Creep: A New Hospital-Acquired Disease, 304
NEW ENG. J. Men. 1602, 1602 (1981).
61
 For example, in 1972, Medicare was expanded to include dialysis services. During the
period of 1975 to 1980, states mandated private insurance coverage for medical services rendered
in psychiatric hospitals. Medicare coverage lin• home health agencies was added in 1981. See
Marmot-
 et al., supra note 31, at 327 (citing Schlesinger, supra note 44, at 76-78, 80); Schlesinger
et al., supra note 30, at 433-34; see also Frank A. Sloan & Robert A. Vraciu, Investor-Owned and
Not
-For-Profit Hospitals: Addressing Some Issues, HEAI:FH AFF., Spring 1983, at 25, 25-37.
62
 During the 1970s, state and local governments, patients and third-party payers increasingly
pressured hospitals to provide more sophisticated technology and services. Mancino, supra note
34, at 1027. Health care expenditures rapidly rose in excess of general inflation rates. Id. at 1027
n.40. For example, between 1965 and 1975, the percentage of gross national product spent
on health care increased from 5.9% to 8.3%. In addition, hospital expenditures as a percent of
total health care rose from 33.3% to 39.2% over the same time period. Id. (citing CALIFORNIA
ASSOCIATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS, I 986HostuTAL FACT Book 3 (11th ed. 1986)
(Table 1.1)); see also Mark S. Freeland & Carol E. Schendler, Health Spending in the 1980s:
Integration of Clinical Practice Patterns with Management, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Spring
1984, at 1, 1; Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 435.
63 See lglehart, supra note 56, at 1429.
64
 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
1.R.C.).
65 As explained in a report submitted to Congress on December 28, 1982 by former Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services Secretary Richard S. Schweiker:
Currently Medicare reimburses hospitals under a cost-based system. In cost-based
reimbursement, hospitals are paid essentially whatever they spend. There is no
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of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, 66
 Congress approved a
Medicare PPS for most inpatient hospital services. 67 Rather than mak-
ing payments on the former "reasonable cost" basis, the new PPS was
based on a predetermined price per patient discharged in accord-
ance with an assignment to one of 468 established "diagnosis-related
groups" ("DRG"). 66 By the end of the initial phase-in period, there was
a standard, fixed national price for each DRG, with payment to each
hospital adjusted in accordance with the hospital's geographic area.°
Therefore, this new payment system set certain predetermined tar-
geted amounts for reimbursement, which acted as an incentive for
hospitals to control costs. A hospital incurring medical care costs for
a patient below the target limit was reimbursed the target amount and
incentive for hospitals to operate more efficiently since all allowable costs are fully
reimbursed. In fact, cost-based reimbursement encourages just the opposite behav-
ior. The larger a hospital's costs, the larger will be its Medicare reimbursement.
`rims, there exists an incentive to spend because the current system provides no
incentive to save. It is not surprising, therefore, that hospital expenditures are
increasing. During 1982, inflation in the hospital sector increased three times faster
than the overall rate of inflation. Medicare expenditures for hospital care have
increased 19 per cent per year during the last three years.
See Iglehart, supra note 56, at 1429-30.
66
 Pub. L No. 98-21, § 601, 97 Stat. 65, 149-63 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395f, I395y, 1395ww (1994)).
°For a definition of the prospective payment system ("PPS"), see infra Glossary. The PPS
applied to inpatient hospital costs under Medicare Part A, including general routine services,
ancillary services and intensive care services. Therefore, PPS did not extend initially to hospital
outpatient expenses. Capital depreciation and graduate medical education expenses were also
exempt and reimbursed on a reasonable costs basis under Medicare's Part B. See Iglehart, supra
note 56, at 1431. However, payment for physician services, such as anesthesiology and radiology,
which previously were reimbursed under Medicare Part A, were included in the hospital's PPS.
Psychiatric, rehabilitation, and children's hospitals (or units dedicated thereto) as well as long-
term care facilities are excluded from the PPS. See Schauer & Nash, supra note 53, at 61-64.
6" For a definition of "diagnostic-related groups," see infra Glossary; j.S. Thompson et al.,
Case Mix and Resource Use, 12 INQUIRY 300 (1975). There are 467 specific DRGs and one catchall
DRG representing "other" procedures.
69 Aithough the goal of the PPS was to standardize payments to hospitals at one national rate,
there were three basic standardized payments, depending on whether the hospital was located
in a rural, large urban or other urban geographic area. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (3) (A) (1994).
The basic standardized amounts were subject to further adjustments. First, the payments were
adjusted fOr wage variances dependent on the geographic location of the hospital. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(d) (3)(E) (1994). Teaching hospitals were to receive an adjustment for the higher
"indirect" costs: of training residents and for direct medical education costs. 42 U.S.C.
§ I 395ww(d) (5) (B) (1994). Payments were also adjusted for patients whose length of stay ("LOS")
or costs of care proved abnormal relative to other cases within the same DRG. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(d) (5) (A) (1994). Hospitals treating a disproportionate share of low income patients
were to receive an increased payment per case if the calculated "disproportionate patient per-
centage" exceeded specified levels. 42 U.S.C. § I395ww(d)(5)(F) (1994). Furthermore, hospital
capital costs were excluded initially from the reimbursement rates of the PPS and were to be
folded into the PPS over time. 42 U.S.C.. § 1395 ww(g) (1994).
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therefore carried a surplus. On the other hand, a hospital that in-
curred costs for a patient in excess of the target limit, and hence below
the reimbursed amount, assumed financial losses. As one commentator
explained, this payment system was intended as:
[a] more tightfisted approach . . . [to] allow the government
to establish Medicare's annual hospital spending plan in ad-
vance, thus capping a budget that has proved uncontrollable
despite repeated efforts to hold it in check. The new policy
will also compel physicians and hospital administrators to
work together more closely to moderate expenditures be-
cause hospitals—not the government or the patient—will be
at risk for costs above Medicare's prospective rate."
In effect, Medicare's PPS was a rationing device; it shifted respon-
sibility of inpatient health care costs to hospitals. The new system
transformed acute-care general hospitals, whether not-for-profit or
for-profit, from revenue centers to cost centers. 7 '
The new Medicare reimbursement system exempted psychiatric,
rehabilitation, oncology, and pediatric hospitals (or discrete units),
and long-term care facilities, such as nursing homes, from the PPS. 72
Consequently, the structure of the new Medicare system and financial
pressures provided incentives to increase the utilization of hospitals'
outpatient services" and to develop or expand new service areas, such
Iglehart, supra note 56, at 1428.
71
 Because the new Medicare payment system shifted the risk of cost to hospitals, numerous
commentators anticipated that hospital incentives for increased profitability could lead to pro-
found changes in the structure and behavior of hospitals. See, e.g., S.E. Berki, DRGs, Incentives,
Hospitals, and Physicians, HEALTH MT., Winter 1985, at 70, 74-76; John E. Wennberg et al., Will
Payment Based on Diagnosis -Related Groups Control Hospital Costs?, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 295
(1984); Simborg, supra note 60, at 1602. The critics expressed concern that the DRG-based PPS
would entice hospitals to reduce the amount and quality of care to inpatients, shorten patients'
hospital LOS, and restructure patient case-mix through such methods as selectively granting staff
privileges to those physicians more likely to admit the more profitable case types and de-empha-
sizing special technology and support services for the management of less profitable or un-
profitable case types. For a mote detailed discussion and criticism of DRGs and Medicare's PPS,
see, for example, Berki, supra; Iglehart, supra note 56; Wennberg et al., supra.
72
 These hospitals were excluded from the mandatory PPS because of the unique group of
patients they serve. Unless the PPS is elected, these hospitals are reimbursed on a reasonable cost
basis, which is limited by costs in a base year, adjusted for inflation. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1) (B)
(1994). The base year was determined to be generally the later of 1982 or the year in which the
hospital began operations. 42 C.F.R. § 413.40 (1994). Later cancer hospitals were given the
opportunity to choose 1987 as the base year if that year resulted in increased payments. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6004(b), 103 Stat. 2106, 2159-60
(1989) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1994)). See generally Schauer & Nash, supra
note 53, at 62.
73
 See Mancino, supra note 34, at 1029 (describing third-party payers, both private and
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as ambulatory care, satellite clinics, family planning services, drug
therapy programs, home health assistance, rehabilitation services, psy-
chiatric clinics, and the like.74
 Incorporating these medical services
provided potential opportunities for increased revenues. The health
care system had new evolutionary impetus.
3. Managed Health Care and Cost Containment
Competitive pressures mounted through the 1980s. Premiums for
private health insurance escalated,75 even while private insurers were
switching from reimbursements based on "reasonable costs" to reim-
bursements based on some form of PPS. 76
 It became more difficult, but
far from impossible, for hospitals to continue to cross-subsidize patient
care and medical services for the poor and uninsured through in-
creased charges to private payers—that is, paying patients and their
private insurers." Although restrictions were imposed to impede "pa-
tient dumping"—the transfer of indigent patients, generally the sickest
governmental, and patients, as well as technological advances, as influencing the move toward
outpatient care by hospitals); Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 438-39 (describing the techno-
logical, policymaking, third-party payer and patient influences on expansions into outpatient care
and other services).
74 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
75
 From 1950 to 1979, premiums paid to private health insurance companies increased by
2900%. Marjory Smith Carroll & Rose H. Arnett, III, Private Health Insurance Plans in 1978 and
1979: A Review of Coverage, Enrollment, and Financial Experience, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV.,
Sept. 1981, at 55, 84. In 1950, total health care expenditures were 4.4% of gross national product
("GNP"). KAREN DAVIS ET AL., HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 1 (1990). By 1986, however,
such expenditures had risen to 10.8% of GNP. John Copeland & Gabriel Rodney, Federal Tax
Subsidies for Not
-For--Profit Hospitals, 46 Tax NOTES 1559, 1560 (1990) (citing STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT 01,"I'HE UNITED STATES, Tables 136, 137, 688 (1989)).
76 See JAMES C. DECHENE, PUBLIC HEALTH CARE REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMS (PLI Comm.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4428, 1993); Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler,
Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 381, 394-96 (1994); Susan E. Baker, The Nurse Practitioner in Malpractice Actions: Standard
of Care and Theory of Liability, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 329 (1992); Mark A. Hall, Institutional
Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
431, 437-38, 443 (1988).
77 See Marmot. et al., supra note 31, at 331; Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 443-45; Homer
H. Schmitz, Preferred Provider Organizations, in MEDICAL PRACTICE, supra note 53, at 43.
Studies have documented that during the 1980s and early 1990s private payers continued to
cross-subsidize hospital health care for the poor. See, e.g., Larry M. Manheim & Joe Feinglass,
Hospital Cost Incentives in a Fragmented Health Care System, 19 HEALTH CARE II4Gmr. REV. 56, 57
(1994) (citing 1991 figures of the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission indicating private
insurers pay approximately 1.3 times actual hospital costs whereas Medicare pays 10% less than
actual hospital costs); Arnold M. Epstein, US Teaching Hospitals in the Evolving Health Care System,
273 JAMA 1203, 1204 (1995) (citing 1992 data of the Prospective Payment Assessment Commis-
sion that hospital payments by Medicare beneficiaries average only 89% of their costs and that
shortfalls are covered by additional payments by private payers).
December 19951	 HEALTH CARE & MX EXEMPTION	 23
and most costly of patients, to other hospitals before treatment—pro-
prietary and voluntary hospitals continued to transfer these patients
to public institutions after providing stabilizing emergency services. 78
In an attempt to find new sources of profitable patients and to attain
financial stability, the health care sector, which previously had started
to move into multi-institutional chains, 79 began expanding into diversi-
fied networks of health care providers." These networks permitted the
consolidation of existing resources, the augmentation of equipment
and facilities, and the broadening of ranges of services. Not-for-profit
and for-profit short-term acute-care general hospitals began providing
ambulatory care or long-term care services, or both; some acute-care
general hospitals affiliated with specialty hospitals focused on such
services as drug abuse rehabilitation, alcohol therapy, orthopedics,
oncology, or pediatric care.'" Additionally, acute-care general hospitals
79 Prior to 1985, there had been persistent allegations of "patient dumping" by hospitals.
Hospitals had been accused of refusing treatment to indigents in need of emergency care. In
response, Congress enacted the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA"),
Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121(6), 100 Stat. 82, 164 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (1994)), which included a requirement that all hospitals participating in Medicare
accept nonpaying patients in their emergency rooms. Moreover, COBRA mandated that hospi-
tals with Medicaid agreements must admit Medicaid patients without discrimination. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(g) (1994).
79 Although very few proprietary hospitals were part of multi-institutional corporations dur-
ing the 1960s, most hospitals that were part of such structures were owned by investor-owned
companies such as Hospital Corporation of America, Inc., Humana, Inc., National Medical
Enterprises, Inc., American Medical International, Inc., and companies that these corporations
acquired, including American Medicorp (acquired by Humana, Inc.) and Hospital Affiliates
International (acquired by Hospital Corporation of America). See Gray, Nonprofit Hospitals, supra
note 10, at 367. Many of these multi-hospital organizations were created in part as an attempt to
reduce costs and achieve some economies of scale. Mancino, supra note 34, at 1028. By 1970,
these multi-institutional corporations were operating in earnest. Id. at 1030.
8' By the mid-1980s, 35% of all acute-care hospital beds were part of multi-institutional
fficilities. Mark Schlesinger et al., The Privatization of Health Care and Physicians' Perceptions of
Access to Hospital Services, 65 MILBANK Q. 25, 28 (1987). By 1987, multi-institutional corporations
operated 50% of the private psychiatric hospitals, 25% of the renal dialysis centers, and almost
40% of the prepaid health care plans. Id, In 1987, approximately 80% of the for-profit general
hospitals and nearly all of the proprietary psychiatric hospitals were affiliated with multi-institu-
tional organizations. Id. At that time, a single investor-owned corporation operated more than
one-third of the for-profit renal dialysis facilities in the United States. Id.
Between 1983 and 1992, the number of hospital systems as a result of horizontal mergers
increased from 243 (representing 1958 hospitals with 366,000 beds) to 300 (representing 2826
hospitals with 540,000 beds). AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, DIRECTORY OF MULTIHOSPITAL
SYSTEMS (4th ed., 1984); AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO THE HEALTH CARE FIELD
at 113 (1993).
Si See Dan Erman & Jon Gabel, Mullihospital Systems: Issues and Empirical Findings, HEALTH
AFT., Spring 1984, at 50, 52 (relating the growth of the multi-hospital systems); Mancino, supra
note 34, at 1026-31 (discussing the general trends of horizontal and vertical integration by
freestanding and multi-institutional hospitals); Robert V. Paulson & Hallie M. Katz, Investor-
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took part in alternative delivery systems. 82
 Involvement in these alter-
native delivery systems reflected a national trend toward managed
health care and cost containment strategies and an availability of pre-
paid health care plans that consolidated qualities of insurance with
medical services. For example, enrollment in health maintenance or-
ganizations ("HMO"), which were perceived as a means of channel-
ing patients to doctors, clinics, and hospitals on the basis of competi-
tive prices and costs, grew more than three-fold from 1975 to 1985. 83
Owned and Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 347 (1983) (describing the trend of
proprietary hospitals toward a multi-institutional system); Reiman, supra note 10, at 963 (describ-
ing rise in for-profit industry that supplies health care services); Stephen M. Shortell et al., The
Effects of Hospital Ownership on Nontraditional Services, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1986, at 97, 98-111
(examining the impact of the health care environment on alternative services offered by hospitals
and multi-institutional systems).
The rapid growth of the multi-institutional systems Was not only attributable to the acquisition
of financially distressed independent hospitals, but also to the acquisition of financially viable
nursing homes and psychiatric hospitals. From 1978 to 1982, multi-institutional systems acquired
nursing homes at an annual rate of 38.4% and psychiatric hospitals at an annual rate of 25.4%.
Id. at 53-54.
In the presence of highly competitive conditions, one study found that both investor-owned
system hospitals and not-for-profit system hospitals were found to offer more alternative serv-
ices, such as ambulatory care, geriatric care, long-term home health care, outpatient diagnostic
services, and health promotion educational programs. Shortell et al., supra, at 105. However,
regardless of competition, not-fur-profit system hospitals were found to offer more alternative
services than investor-owned systems. Id.
82
 Economic pressures, technological advances, the availability of capital, and demands and
expectations of patients, third-party payers, and employers influenced the creation of alternative
delivery systems. Regulatory pressures were also a contributing factor to the development of
alternative delivery systems. For example, the National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 93-691, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974) (repealed Jan. 1, 1987), provided for
the creation of state and local health planning agencies which, among other purposes, were
intended to regulate and restrict capital expenditures and the expansion of hospital services
unless certain facilities or services were needed in a community or region. See generally JAMES B.
SIMPSON & 1•:1) BROGUE, THE GUIDE TO HEALTH PLANNING LAW: A TOPICAL DIGEST OF HEALTH
PLANNING AND CERTIFICATE OF NEED Cast: LAw (4th ed. 1986); John D. Colombo, Health Care
Reform and Federal lax Exemption: Rethinking the Issues, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 215, 215-16
(1994).
83 For a definition of "HMO," see infra Glossary; GROUP HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
INC., NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF HMOs 23 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 DIRECTORY OF HMOs]; Janine
C. Edwards, Health Maintenance Organizations, in MEDICAL PRACTICE, supra note 53, at 20,
Enrollment in HMOs numbered less than six million enrollees in 1975, nine million enrollees
in 1980, and by 1985, enrollment had increased to 21 million people. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATis-rics, HEAIXII UNITED STALES 1992, 84 (1992) [hereinafter HEALTH U.S. 1992].
In 1973, Congress enacted the Health Maintenance Organization Act ("HMOA"), Pub. L.
No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (1973), amended by, Pub. L. No. 94-960, 90 Stat. 1945 (1976), Pub. L.
No. 95-559, 92 Stat. 2131 (1978), Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 572 (1981) (all codified as amended
at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which instituted federal grant and loan programs to finance
the creation of nonprofit 1:1MOs and which established structural, solvency, pricing, enrollment
and other requirements for HMOs. The HMOA represented the federal government's first
concerted effort to assist in the development of an alternative to fee-for-service medicine. See
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As a means of directing patients to a single or small group of doc-
tors and other providers, an assortment of arrangements, such as "pre-
ferred provider organizations"84 and "exclusive provider organiza-
tions,"85 were negotiated in return for price discounts. 8" Joint ventures
and partnership arrangements between hospitals and physicians
emerged in the 1980s as vehicles for providing patients to these health
care providers and for increasing revenues. 87
John K. Iglehart, The Future of HMOs, 307 NEw ENG..). MED. 451 (1982) [hereinafter Iglehart,
The Future]; John K. Iglehart, Managed Competition, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1208, 1209 (1993)
[hereinafter Iglehart, Managed Competition]. For discussion of the tax-exempt status of various
models of HMOs, see infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. See also Glossary (defining
various models of HMOs).
Numerous writings have speculated whether HMOs actually are economically beneficial. For
some earlier pieces, see generally LAWRENCE D. BROWN, POLI'T'ICS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZA-
TION: HMOs AS FEDERAL Poi,ICY (1983); HAROLD S. Lure, HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZA-
TIONS: DIMENSIONS AND PERFORMANCE (1981); Harold S. Ltift, How Do Health Maintenance
Organizations Achieve Their "Savings"?, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1336, 1342 (1978). Among the
more recent comprehensive studies, the Rand Corporation compared incidents of health care
and associated costs of two fee-for-service plans to a large HMO plan. Willard G. Manning et al.,
A Controlled Thal of the Effect of a Prepaid Group Practice on Use of Services, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1505 (1984). The study found that hospitalization rates were lower for the HMO enrollees but
that preventive visits to physicians were more numerous when enrollees did not have to contribute
to the payment of the visit. The study concluded that the HMO physicians' practices were
different in that they implemented less costly styles of practicing medicine than physicians paid
under more traditional fee-for-service plans. More recently, a study found that HMO physicians
are more likely to avoid discretionary hospital admissions than fee-for-service physicians; the
researchers indicated that this difference accounted for lower costs of health care by HMOs.
Albert L. Sin et al., Use of the Hospital in a Randomized Trial of Prepaid Care, 259 JAMA 1343
(1988).
1 1,•or a definition of a "preferred provider organization" (''PPO"), see infra Glossary;
Schnitz, supra note 77, at 42-50.
A 1994 study, which included 1191 hospital participants, reported that 85% of the partici-
pants have arrangements with PPOs, compared with 78% in 1992. DEtorrrE & ToucuE, U.S.
HOSPITALS AND THE FUTURE oF HEALTH CARE: A CONTINUING OPINION SURVEY 10, 26 (1994).
The report indicated that in 1994, 17% of the participating investor-owned hospital systems derive
15% or inure of their patients from PPO arrangements. Id. at 11. Forty-five percent of the
participant hospital systems expected to derive at least 15% of their patients from PPO arrange-
ments in 1996. Id. at 11-12. The study further reported that only a very small percentage (four
percent) of participant hospitals work exclusively with one PPO or HMO. Id. at 10-11.
For a definition of an "exclusive provider organization," see infra Glossary; Homer H.
Schmitz, The Financial Dynamics of the U.S. Health Care System, in MEDICAL PRACTICE, supra note
53, at I, 6.
8.6 For further discussion of the PPO arrangements, see Daniel Callahan, Rationing Medical
Progress, the Way to Affordable Health Care, 322 NEW ENG. J. MEn. 1810 (1990); John Gabel & Dan
Erman, Preferred Provider Organizations: Performance, Problems and Promise, HEALTH AYE., Spring
1985, at 24, 24-27, 35-37; Thomas Rice et. al., The State of PPOs: Results from a National Survey,
Hr:A1.I']t AFF., Winter 1985, at 25, 26-28, 33-39; Schlesinger et al., supra note 30, at 436; Schmitz,
supra note 77, at 42-58.
"These joint ventures and partnership arrangements varied, but typically the hospitals
participated in them to make the physician-investors content, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Issues
Health Care ISP Digest, reprinted in 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 877, 879 (1994) [hereinafter IRS
26	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 37:1
During the tail-end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, a variety of
new health care relationships formed. Competition led to new types of
compensation arrangements and recruitment incentive packages be-
tween physicians and hospitals.as The popular media reported that
physicians were selling their medical practices in record numbers to
investor-owned public corporations." Physicians and hospitals entered
innovative joint venture arrangements in a variety of forms,9° including
those formally known as physician-hospital organizations ("PHO"). 91
The prior health care provider matrix gave way to new multi-dimen-
sional and multi-specialty health care enterprises, affiliations, and hori-
zontal hospital networks created to manage the comprehensive health
care needs of a population of enrolled patients in return for a fixed
dollar amount. Vertically integrated health care systems, generically
known as integrated delivery systems ("IDS"), 92 developed not only to
Issues Health Care ISP Digest] (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS:
FOR-PROFIT VENTURES POSE ACCESS AND CAPACITY PROBLEMS (1993)). Typical of these arrange-
ments were the sale of the net or gross revenue stream of a hospital department or service (such
as an outpatient surgical unit) to be earned during a defined future time frame. The sale would
he to a joint venture between a not-fir-profit hospital (or a subsidiary) and physicians on the
hospital staff. The hospital would continue to own and operate the department or service. The
physician-investors would have financial incentive to refer more patients to the department or
service in order that the revenues from it would increase. Id.
Effective January 1, 1995, providers are prohibited from billing Medicare for certain services
rendered to patients as a result of referral by physicians having a financial relationship with the
providers. Id. This restriction has resulted in the restructuring or destruction of some of these
hospital-physician joint ventures. Id.; see infra part IV.D.I.
88
 For further discussion of this topic, see infra notes 306-29 and accompanying text.
"9
 See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Physicians Are Selling Practices to Companies as Changes Loom,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1993, at Al.
" See supra note 2 and infra note 292 and accompanying text.
91
 For definition of "physician-hospital organization: see infra Glossary. For a description,
see Priv. Ltr. Rut. (unnumbered) (Sept. 29, 1994), reprinted in 10 ExEmET ORG. TAX REV. 1323
(1994).
92
 For a definition of "IDS," see infra Glossary; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1992 IRS EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CPE TECHNICAL. INSTRUCTION PROGRAM, at Topic H4 (for fiscal year 1993),
available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file, 94 TNT 70-22 [hereinafter IRS-CPE
For general discussions, see Mark A. Hall, Managed Competition and Integrated Health Care Delivery
Systems, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1994); Gerald R. Peters, Integrated Healthcare Systems,
in 3 HEALEII LAW PRACTICE GUIDE 28-1, 28-3 (1993); Amy L. Woodhall, Integrated Delivery
Systems: Reforming the Conflicts Among Federal Referral, Tax Exemption, and Antitrust Laws, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 181, 185-87 (1995). IDSs have expanded rapidly, with many physicians selling
their practices to companies or planning on joining 1DSs. See, e.g., Freudenheim, supra note 89;
Patrick W. Philbin, From the Ground Up: Planting the Seeds of Network Development, Host'. &
HEALTH NETwoRits, June 5, 1993, at 46.
As described by one scholar, the 1DSs of the 1990s—
Differ fundamentally from the types of vertical integration and joint ventures that
arose in the 1980's in response to declining hospital occupancies and Medicare's
prospective payment system. These earlier systems were designed to replace lost
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attract patients to maximize revenues, but also to foster managed
health care or "managed competition,"" or both.
4. Summary
Dramatic changes in the health care industry as a result of the
focus on managed care and managed competition have marked the
1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s." Many factions, including large employ-
sources of revenue and to encourage physicians to send their patients to a particular
facility ....
. . . [T}he new networks cover a much broader range of services .... [T]he
affiliations of the past tended to be overlapping and nonexclusive. A physician
might have staff privileges at several hospitals and investments in a half-dozen
competing ventures. This characteristic might be shared by the new networks for a
time, but analysts anticipate that market pressures will eventually three most provid-
ers into separate health plans or contracting networks„
The most fundamental new characteristic of integrated delivery systems is the
incorporation of insurance risk. The ventures typical in the 1980's were designed
to operate within a fee-for-service system or within a form of prospective payment
that is sensitive to the number of hospital admissions, The new forms of affiliations
anticipate selling health care services in a system of capitated payment.
Hall, supra, at 4-6.
For further discussion of IDSs, see Robert S. Bromberg, The Foundation Model, 8 Exttswr
ORG. TAX REV. 335, 335-36 (1993); Harry G. Gonrevitch, 'Fax Aspects of Health Care Reform: The
Tax Treatment of Health Care Providers (Congressional Research Service Report), reprinted in 9
Exitsivr ORG. TAX REV. 1317, 1321 (1994); Hall, supra, at 8; IRS Issues Health Care ISP Digest,
supra note 87, at 880; Michael W. Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo, IRS Issues Guidance on
Integrated Delivery Systems, 7 Exrwr ORG. TAX REV. 391 (1993); Peters, supra, at 28-3 to 28-54;
Ross Stromberg & James G. Harrigan, Hospital-Affiliated Croup Practices: The Use of Medical
Foundations and Management Services Organizations, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 43 (1993). For further
discussion of the tax status of IDSs, see infra part MP.
In a 1994 study of 1191 hospitals, Deloitte & Touche reported that only 24% of participating
hospitals belonged to an IDS. qr.torrrr, & ToucHE , supra note 84, at '21. However, an additional
47% of the hospitals indicated their involvement in IDS development. Id. A major conclusion of
the report was that IDSs are the "primary vehicle" for future health system reform. Id. at 23,
93 Managed competition is price competition, with the focal point being the total annual
premium paid for comprehensive health care services, One scholar has stated that-
[t]he essence of managed competition is to present individual subscribers with a
range of enrollment options among private health plans in an environment that
manages the selection process and makes individuals pay for the differences in price
among the insurance options they choose. Managed competition attempts to
achieve universal health insurance coverage and health care cost containment via
a hybrid between the opposite extremes of a completely socialized system of health
insurance ... and a largely unregulated private insurance market, . .
Hall, supra, at 1-2 (citation omitted).
Fur a detailed discussion of managed competition, see Alain C. Enthoven, The History and
Principles of Managed Competition, Arr., Supp. 1993, at 24, 29-46; Jeff Goldsmith,
Hospital/Physician Relationships: A Constraint to Health Helium, Ulm:En Arr., Fall 1993, at 160,
166-69; Igelhart, Managed Competition, supra note 83.
94
 In pursuit of managed care and managed competition goals, several milestones were
reached in the health care sector during 1993 and 1994 alone, These landmarks include: (1) the
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ers, insurance companies, the federal and state governments, and
health care providers, have fostered these conceptual and structural
changes.95
 These changes resulted in a myriad of arrangements. 96
 Both
enrollment of a majority of privately insured Americans in managed care plans that limit choice
of doctors and treatment; (2) the enrollment of 65% of all workers in medium and large
companies in managed care plans; (3) the growth of for-profit HMOs and of their enrollments
to cover a majority of all HMOs' enrollees; (4) increased managed care physician arrangements,
with 89% of all doctors in group practices sharing in managed care contracts. See Erik Eckholm,
While Congress Remains Silent, Health Care Transforms Itself N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, at Al.
95 See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, 10 Companies join in Effort to Lower Bids by HMO's, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1995, at D2 (indicating that large companies can be effective in negotiating reduced
premiums for enrolling their employees in HMOs); Michael Quint, Health Plans Are Forcing
Change In the Method for Paying Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at Al (describing methods used
to reduce fees paid to physicians); Elizabeth Rosenthal, Hospital Agency is Striving to Adapt in a
Competitive Era, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al (indicating steps taken in New York to reduce
health care costs through negotiations); Pear, Major Overhaul, supra note 9 (indicating costs to
provide health care to Medicaid recipients and Congressional proposals to reduce federal costs);
see also Robert A. Boisture, Assessing the Impact of Health Care Reform on the Formation of
Tax-Exempt Health Care Providers and HMOs, 9 EXEMPT ORG. Tax REV. 271, 272 n.2 (1994) (citing
INTEGRATED HEALTHCARE REPORT 2 (1993) (stating insurers are acquiring or creating their own
provider networks to maximize control and deliver cost-effective benefits)). But see Freudenheim,
supra note 9, at DI (indicating that the federal government pays more than it should for Medicare
patients enrolled in HMOs and should employ negotiating methods used by large employers to
reduce health care premiums for enrollees).
A number of federal health care reforms have been proposed by the administration and
various Congressmen during the past three years in an attempt to assure health care to Americans
at affordable costs. See, e.g., Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 5.1757, S. 1775, 103d. Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (proposing a health alliance system, an employer mandate, a cap of health care expendi-
tures). Even though none of these proposed legislative reforms were enacted, the failed proposals
turned more public attention to managed competition and managed care. Yet, some affirmative
actions by the federal government have contributed to the new health care climate. For example,
the federal government's Medicare payment system for physicians has been undergoing revisions
which have contributed to the managed care climate. Under the "resource-based relative value
unit" payment system, payments to physicians are intended to decline, and funds should be
redistributed from specialized physicians to primary care physicians. See William C. Hsiao et al.,
Estimating Physicians' Wm* for a Resource-Based Relative Value Scale, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 881
(1988); John K Iglehart, Health Policy Report: The New Law on Medicare's Payments to Physicians,
322 New ENG. J. MED. 1247, 1247 (1990). Moreover, beginning in fiscal year 1992, hospitals'
capital costs are prospectively determined under Medicare, a departure from the prior method
of reimbursement on a cost basis for capital expenditures. See Prospective Payment System for
Inpatient Hospital Capital-Related Costs, 56 Fed. Reg. 43,358 (1991); DECHENE, supra note 76;
Schauer & Nash, supra note 53, at 67.
96
 For example, HMO enrollment experienced explosive growth not only from 1975 to 1985,
but also through 1994. See supra note 83 (detailing the growth of HMOs from 1975 to 1985).
From 1985, when HMO enrollment numbered 21 million people, enrollment increased to at least
34 million people in 1990 and to nearly 41.5 million enrollees in 1992. By 1994, 541 HMOs
enrolled 45.2 million people. Thus, in the decade between 1985 and 1995, HMOs experienced
a two-fold rise in enrollment. HEALTH U.S. 1992, supra note 83, at 84; GROUP HEALTH ASSOCIA-
TION OF AMERICA, HMO INDUSTRY PROFILE 1993, at 310 (1993); 1993 DIRECTORY OF HMOs,
supra note 83 at 23; see also Bruce japsen, Creation of New HMOs Picks Up Steam, Fueled by Reform
Market Forces, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 13, 1994, at 46. For discussion of other arrangements,
see supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
December 1995 . 3	 HEALTH CARE fs' TAX EXEMPTION	 29
the for-profit and the not-for-profit sectors strived for managed care
and managed competition goals and therefore participated in the evo-
lution of America's health care industry. In the for-profit health care
sector, horizontal mergers occurred, with HMO mergers representing
but one highly visible example.' 7 Investor-owned hospital companies
acquired independent, freestanding proprietary hospitals," nonprofit
teaching hospitals," and other hospital companies.m Vertical integra-
tion, even within investor-owned multi-institutional systems, was com-
mon.m Trends in the not health care sector mirrored those
in the for-profit sector. It was typical to find diversification, horizontal
mergers among hospitals, the growth of multi-institutional systems,
vertical integration, as well as managed care and managed competition
arrangements. 1 °2
In sum, the twentieth century has been marked by a change in
the architecture of America's health care. By the beginning of the
1990s, the health care system had evolved from dependence on the
97 For example, in early 1995, two California HMOs, WeIlpoint Health Networks and Health
Systems International, agreed to merge. See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, 2 California Health Care
Providers Agree to a $1.8 Billion Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995, at DI; Milt Freudenheim, New
Partners in Health Care hones on Cast: Nationwide Strategy for Lower Prices, N,Y, TIMES, Apr. 4,
1995, at D4.
98
 SeeMancirn) , supra note 34, at 1028-29; Milt. Freudenheim, Hospitals Are Tempted but Wary
As For-Profit Chains Woo Them, N.Y. TtmEs, Jan. 4, 1995, at. Al.
• 9
 During the early 1980s, investor-owned companies acquired such major teaching hospitals
as Wesley Medical Center in Wichita, Kansas, St, Joseph Medical Center in Omaha, Nebraska,
and Presbyterian-St. Luke's Hospital in Denver, Colorado, See Manch), supra note 34, at 1031.
('°Between 1978 and 1982, the number of for-profit multi-institutional hospitals increased
3.4% annually and added beds al an annual rate of 4.8%. Erman & Gabel, supra note 81, at 52.
The for-profit multi-institutional systems averaged 23 hospitals per system and tended to span
numerous states. Id. at 52. Much of the rapid growth of the for-profit multi-institutional systems
from 1975 through 1982 was attributable to the purchase of financially distressed independent
hospitals; however, after 1981, growth was also achieved by multi-institutional systems through
acquisitions of other investor-owned multi-institutional companies. See id. at 53 & n.9 (citing
Lewin & Associates, A Study of Investor-Owned Hospitals 22 (1976) (unpublished report to
Health Services Foundation)), For a brief review of the Columbia/HCA Healthcare network and
its recent acquisitions, see Allen R. Myerson, Now, Its the Rick Scott Health Plan, N.Y. TtmEs, Oct.
30, 1994, § 3, at 1,
lit See supra note 84. Among the recent multi-institutional developments, has been the
merger of some nursing home chains. See, e.g., Allen R. Myerson, $1.5 Billion Is Bid to Create Big
Nursing Home Chain, N.Y. Ti m ES, Jan. 27, 1995, at D1,
102 1n 1982, one-third of all American hospitals belonged to a multi-institutional hospital
system. Erman & Gabel, supra note 81, at 51. These hospitals accounted for 36% of all hospital
beds. Id. Between 1978 and 1982, nonprofit multi-institutional systems added hospitals at a rate
of 11.4% annually and added beds at a rate of 3.5% annually. Id. at 52. Most of the growth of
nonprofit systems was largely through the acquisition of fiscally troubled independent hospitals.
Id. at 53. The nonprofit systems were found in all regions of the United States, with individual
nonprofit systems averaging seven hospitals per system, most of which were located in one or two
states. Id. at 52.
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hospital as the vital center of health care to greater reliance on net-
works of health providers for the provision of a full array of health care
services)" As the evolutionary trend continues in the health care
sector, the mid-1990s are marked by attempts to formulate new man-
aged care options, including hybrid health care plans and horizontal
networks of physicians.'"
III. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF TAX EXEMPTION
Like the historical seeds of America's modern health care organi-
zations, which had their genesis in the hospices of Western Europe and
England in the Middle Ages and the succeeding almshouses,'°' so too
the seeds of a tax exemption for America's "charitable" health care
organizations can be traced to fourteenth-century England.lw It was
1" The new architecture of organizations of health professionals could loosely be likened to
full service gasoline stations which consumers can utilize for a variety of services related to the
same underlying purpose. in the case of the gasoline station, the services are associated with the
vehicle and its operations; in the case of the health care system, the services are associated with
the person's mental and physical being.
The ten largest IDSs in 1992 included both not-for-profit and for-profit multi-institutional
systems. Jay Greene & Judith Nemes, Not-For-Profits Lead Rise in Income Growth, Moo. HEALTH-
CARE, May 24, 1993, at 27, 27. ID% set records for profitability in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In contrast to 1991, when profit margin increases were primarily attributable to investor-owned
hospital chains, in 1992, profit margin increases were principally fueled by increased operating
profits of not-for-profit systems. Id. at 27-28. Both not-for-profit and for-profit systems increased
their surpluses by holding down expense increases, raising charges for full-paying patients, using
downsizing strategies, and increasing investment income. Id. at 27.
ImAs recently reported: "On the horizon are new efforts to improve community health
services, new service linkages and information systems, evolving hospital/physician partnerships,
further development of managed care, new products with which institutions can address local
health care delivery problems, and greater recognition of ethical issues in health care." DEDDITTE
& TOUCHE, supra note 84, at 25; see also DAVID SHACTMAN & STUART H. ALTMAN, MARKET
CONSOLIDATION, ANTITRUST, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE HEAIMICARE. INDUSTRY: AGENDA FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH (1995) (stating potential antitrust problems associated with horizontal physi-
cian networks and reasons for their formation); Milt Freudenheim, A New Formula for Health
Plans, N.Y. Ttsms, July 28, 1995, at D1 (describing new hybrid health care plans that include the
use of an HMO or network plus the ability to utilize outside physicians or hospitals).
ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 15.
In approximately 1362, William Langlancl wrote a poem, "The Vision of Piers the Plow-
man," which chronicles in one portion ;1 means for wealthy merchants to save their souls by
dedicating their fortunes to:
repair hospitals
help sick people
mend had roads
build up bridges that had been broken down
help maidens to marry or to make them nuns
find food for prisoners and poor people
put scholars to school or to some other crafts
help religious orders, and
ameliorate rents or taxes.
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not until the seventeenth century, however, that the first formal com-
prehensive list of worthy charitable uses for money and property was
enumerated. The preamble to the English Statute of Charitable Uses
enacted in 1601 107
 cited among the uses appropriate for a charitable
trust "relief of aged, impotent and poor people, . . . maintenance of
sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, ... [and] aid and help of .. .
persons decayed."'"
Relying on this enumeration of appropriate charitable uses, a
confused body of judicially created precedents developed in England
concerning the parameters of the legal concept of charity for trust law
purposes. 109 At the end of the nineteenth century, a decision written
by Lord McNaughten in the now famous Commissioners of Income Rix
v. Pernselm presented a unifying theme for conceptualizing appropriate
charitable uses under the laws of trusts:
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions:
trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of
education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts
for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling
under any of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to
are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, because
incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as in-
Persons et al., supra note 20, at. 1912 & n.8 (quoting the modern English version of the "B" text
of the poem which was edited from numerous manuscripts by the Rev, Walter W. Skeat, 1:228,
Oxford, 1886).
107
 The Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601), was enacted as a supplement to the
comprehensive system of the Elizabethan Pour Laws adopted by Parliament in 1597 and restated
in 160L Act for the Relief of the Poor, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (1601). Under the 1597 laws, which addressed
problems faced by destitute populations in urban England, responsibility for relief of poverty was
primarily imposed on local communities. The communities had the power to tax for purposes of
relieving poverty. Persons et al., supra note 20, at 1915. The Statute of Charitable Uses addressed
whether a trust which had no specific beneficiary should he recognized at common law when its
intention was to serve the poor or to maintain a local roadway rather than a specific beneficiary.
See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE U. 1415,1422 n.4 (1984). The statute deemed
that such a trust should be permitted. See Id. See generally MICHAEL CHESTERMAN, CHARITIES,
TRUSTS AND SOC/Al, WELFARE 56-57 (1979); CARETH JONES, HISTORY 01"1•11E LAW OF CHARITY
1532-1827 (1969); GEORGE W. KF.ETON & L.A. SHERIDAN, THE MODERN LAW or CHARITIES 8-9
(3d. ed. 1983).
Persons et al., supra note 20, at 1912-13 (citing GF.ORCE G. Bocrier & GEORGE T. BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 321, at 638 n,2 (1965)). This enumeration of charitable uses in the
preamble to the English Statute of Charitable Uses also included such activities as maintaining
schools of learning, repairing bridges, educating and aiding orphans, and helping the poor pay
taxes. Id. at 1912-13. The preamble was not intended to be an exclusive list of charitable purposes.
Id. at 1913. Moreover, it has been determined that the list should be viewed in the disjunctive,
so that relief of the distress of the aged is an appropriate charitable purpose per se. See Bromberg,
supra note 21, at 240-41.
"See Persons et al., supra note 20, at 1914-15; Bromberg, supra note 21, at 240-41.
"5 1891 App. Cas. 531.
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deed, every charity that deserves the name must do so either
directly or indirectly."
After the Pemsel decision, the English courts adopted this same
concept of charity for determining an organization's entitlement to
income tax exemption as a charitable organization." 2
Initially, charitable trusts were the principal form of organization
for charitable activities."' By the second half of the nineteenth century,
corporations were used increasingly for charitable activities. 114 After the
Revolutionary War, many of the first American states repealed English
statutes and rejected traditional English structures.' 15 As a result, the
accepted legal form in many states in early America for charitable
activities became the corporation. Most states encouraged the incorpo-
ration of private associations that engaged in essential public serv-
ices. 16
 Therefore, when America's first federal income tax on corpora-
tions was adopted in 1894, it exempted from income taxation those
"corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted
solely for charitable, religious or educational purposes, . [and any]
stocks, shares, funds, or securities held by any fiduciary or trustee for
charitable, religious, or educational purposes." Because American
public charitable entities continued to be formed typically as corpora-
tions rather than as trusts, subsequent income tax acts contained simi-
lar provisions. 118
The current 1.R.C. § 501(a) permits exemption from income taxa-
tion for a variety of organizations, including those that qualify under
In Id. at 583.
112
 Charitable organizations have been entitled to income tax exemption in England since
enactment of the first Income Tax Act of 1842, See Persons et al., supra note 20, at 1919.
113 Id. at 1917. The reason cited for primary use of the trust form was the flexibility available
to individuals to create trusts, whereas power to form corporations was concentrated in the State.
Id.
114 M.
118
 Some of the American states rejected English laws en masse, among them the Statute of
Charitable Uses. See Persons et al., supra note 20, at 1914. Some of the states also rejected the
charitable trust as the legal form for operating charitable activities. Id.
However, corporations had been formed to conduct charitable activities in the American
colonies as early as the seventeenth century. See. james J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit
Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY U. 617, 630 (1985).
118 Fishman, supra note 115, at 631-37; see also RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 1784-1855: BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE
DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION 255 (1982).
117 Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat., 509, 556-57 (1894).
118 See supra note 107 (discussing statutory history of income tax exemption); see also infra
notes 150, 154 (discussing whether I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) term "charitable" was intended to be
synonymous with term "charity" for trust law purposes).
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subsections (c) (3) and (c) (4). In relevant part, I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
applies to:
[c]orporations, . . or foundation [s], organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific . or edu-
cational purposes, . . . no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual,
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legisla-
tion, ... and which does not participate in, or intervene in
. . . any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for
public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) applies to "organizations not organized for profit
but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, ... and
the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable,
educational, or recreational purposes."
Both subsections of I.R.C. § 501(c) have been applied to exempt
health care organizations from federal income taxation. Although on
the face of the statutes the tests that a health care organization must
satisfy to qualify for exemption under either subsection appear similar,
the courts and the IRS have applied more stringent requirements
under I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) than under I.R.C. § 501(c) (4). Moreover, the
standards applied under the former subsection are clearer than those
utilized with respect to the latter provision.
IV. CONTEMPORARY REQUIREMENTS FOR INCOME TAX
EXEMPTION OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS
A. In General
To qualify for income tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3), a
health care organization must satisfy six general tests—five  statutory
tests and one test added by judicial gloss: [ " (1) the organizational test,
i.e., pursuant to its organizing or creating documents, such as its
articles of incorporation, it must be organized as a not-for-profit cor-
poration and its purpose must be limited to an appropriate tax-exempt
119
 It is debatable as to whether there are five or six separate tests. The statute sets forth five
tests, and the Supreme Court has articulated a public policy test. Whether the public policy test
is a separate test or subsumed within one of the statutory tests is arguable. For discussion of Bob
Jones Univ. v. United Stales, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), and the prohibition against violation of public
policy, see infra notes 330-35 and accompanying text.
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purpose, such as a "charitable" purpose;' 2° (2) the operational test, i.e.,
it must pursue and be operated "exclusively" for the same tax-exempt
purpose as that used to satisfy the organizational test;''' (3) the "private
inurement" test, i.e., no portion of the organization's net earnings may
inure to any "insider"; 122 (4) the "private benefit" test, i.e., measured
quantitatively and qualitatively, private benefit to any individual or
120 Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1 (b) (1) (as amended in 1990). See generally BORIS I. BITTKER &
LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 4 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 1 100.2 (2d ed. 1992);
HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 109-17; PAUL E. TREUSCH, TAX-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
90-91 (3d ed. 1988); IRS, Litigation Guideline Memorandum, TL-11 (1995), discussed in 70 TAX
NOTES 264-65 (1996) [hereinafter LGM TL-11J.
Most health care organizations are granted tax exemption because they satisfy the "charita-
ble" purpose standard of 1.R.G. § 501(c) (3). See infra parts IV.B.2 and IV.F (discussing charitable
purpose). However, presumably, if the health care organization, e.g., a hospital, is affiliated with
a university, as are many teaching hospitals, it should be able to qualify if operated "exclusively"
for "educational" or "scientific" purposes within the meaning of I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) (as amended in 1990) defines an "educational organization" as one that
instructs or trains a person "for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities" or
instructs the "public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." The
regulations further provide that such "educational organizations" include private and public
colleges, and professional or trade schools. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (d) (3) (ii) (as amended in
1990). IRS interpretations of the I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) term "scientific" have linked it with the terms
"educational" or "charitable" when referring to university teaching hospitals or research hospitals.
See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-45-007 (Jul. 24, 1984) (laboratory facility undertaking major industry
research projects granted tax-exemption as "educational organization" because research resulted
in 90 publications, 99 scientific presentations and 56 undergraduate and post-graduate degrees);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-36-006 (May 23, 1979) (medical college granted tax-exemption because its
research, funded by private industry, significantly contributed to school's basic purposes of
promoting and teaching mediCal science); Rev. Rut. 76-455, 1976-2 C.B. 150 (organization held
tax-exempt as educational and scientific organization because it assisted in establishing a regional
health data system, engaged in studies concerning quality, utilization and effectiveness of health
care, and educated health care professionals); Rev. Rul. 6.5-298, 1965-2 C.B. 163 (organization
held tax-exempt as educational organization because it conducted research to develop scientific
methods for diagnosis, prevention and treatment of diseases and to disseminate research findings
to physicians and public). But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-28--004 (Mar. 26, 1980) (university student
conducted research funded by commercial sponsor was primarily for benefit of sponsor, did not
significantly contribute to tax-exempt purpose of university, and considered incidental to educa-
tion of students). See generally Boris I. Bittker & George K. Randert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. '299, 333-35 (1976); John D. Colombo
& Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax Exemption for Nonprofit Hospitals and Other Health Care
Providers, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 22 (1992); James T.Y. Yang, Collaboration Between Nonprofit
Universities and Commercial Enterprises: The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Universities from
Federal Income Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 1857, 1862-63, nn.37-38 (1986).
12 ' Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (as amended in 1990). Although the statute utilizes the
term "exclusively," the courts and the regulation permit a charitable organization to engage in
activities unrelated to its charitable purpose as long as limited and "insubstantial." See generally 4
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 120, 1 100.2; HOPKINS, supra note 19, § 6.2; TREUSCH, supra note
120, at 101-07.
122 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501-1(c) (2)-1(c) (3) (as amended in 1990). See
generally 4 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 120, 1 100.4; HOPKINS, supra note 19, § 13.1-.6;
TREUSCH, supra note 120, at 241-47; infra part IV.D.
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small group must be incidental to public benefit; 129 (5) the political
lobbying and legislation test, i.e., the organization must comply with
limits on political lobbying and campaign activities; 124 and (6) the
public policy test. 125 For purposes of this article, at the heart of tax
exemption for health care organizations are four of these six tests: the
operational test, the private inurement test, the private benefit test,
and the public policy test. Subsumed within these tests are numerous
judicially and administratively created requirements and standards. 126
B. Operational Exclusivity Requirement
To be considered a tax-exempt organization within the meaning
of I.R.C. § 501(a) and (c) (3), an organization must be not only
organized "exclusively" for tax-exempt purposes, but also operated
"exclusively" for the identical tax-exempt purposes. In 1924 and again
in 1945, the Supreme Court interpreted the applicable predecessor
statutory language requiring the organization to be "operated exclu-
sively" in a less stringent manner than its plain and ordinary mean-
ing. 127 The Supreme Court determined that the "operational exclusivity
requirement" mandated only that an organization must serve "primar-
ily" the tax-exempt purpose for which it is organized. 128 This require-
ment prohibits the organization from engaging in any substantial non-
exempt purpose, but permits a "negligible" or "incidental" amount
of activity unrelated to its exempt purpose.' 29 An organization would
I 25 Treas. keg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (1)(ii) (as amended in 1990); American Campaign Acad-
emy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). See generally HOPKINS, supra note 19, § 13,7; TREUSCH,
supra note 120, at 257-61; infra notes 288-93 and accompanying text.
124 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3); see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (3) (as amended in 1990), 1.501(h)
(1990), 56.4911 (1990). See generally Brrriurat & LOKKEN, supra note 120,1 100.5; HOPKINS, supra
note 19, §§ 14.1-15.8; TRUISM!, supra note 120, at 263-329; Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organi-
zation Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. U. 201 (1987) [hereinafter Chisolm,
Exempt Organization Advocacy]; Laura B. Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful
Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308 (1990) [hereinafter Chisolm, Politics and Charity].
125 See infra part 1V.E.
125 See, fir example, the financial ability standard and the community benefit standard
discussed infra notes 157-79 and accompanying text.
127 Trinidad V. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581-82 (1924); Better Business
Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283-84 (1945).
128 Trinidad, 263 U.S. at 581; see Better Business Bureau, 326 U.S. at 286; see also North Am.
Sequential Sweepstakes v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1087, 1094 (1981) (if activity serves both
tax-exempt and nonexempt purposes, operational exclusivity test satisfied only if predominant
motivations underlying the activity is exempt purpose),
129 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(e) ( l) (as amended in 1990); see Trinidad, 263 U.S. at 581-82;
Living Faith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 950 F.2d 365, 370 (7th Cir. 1991); Scripture Press Found. v.
United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Virginia Professional Standards Review Found. v.
Blumenthal, 466 F, Stipp. 1164 (D.C.D.C. 1979); LGM TL-11, supra note 120. Whether the activity
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not be operated "exclusively" as a tax-exempt organization within the
meaning of I.R.C. §§ 501(a) and (c) (3) if a single "nonexempt pur-
pose" exists. 1 i° Although the operational exclusivity requirement ap-
plies to an organization's purposes, 1 s 1
 conformance with this requisite
is demonstrated by substantial adherence to activities performed in
furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose.'"
1. Commerciality Doctrine
Under the judicially created "commerciality doctrine,"'" the
courts and the IRS have considered that an activity conducted in a
is insubstantial commercial activity will be determined by taking into account a number of
elements. See infra note 137 and accompanying text (delineating the factors considered by the
courts under the commerciality doctrine).
13° If an organization conducts substantial non-exempt activity, the IRS will deny tax-exempt
status if the organization is initially seeking such preferred status. If the IRS previously had
granted tax-exempt status to the organization, the IRS will revoke the favored status if the
organization engages in substantial non-exempt activity. On the other hand, if an organization
that otherwise qualifies for tax exemption under 1.R.C. § 501(c)(3) engages in an insubstantial
amount of non-exempt activity, and derives net income from such "unrelated business activity,"
that "unrelated business taxable income" is subject to corporate income taxation pursuant to
I.R.C. §§ 501(6), 511-13 (1994). See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.511-1 to 1.513-6. For discussion of "unre-
lated business activity" and "unrelated business taxable income" see generally 4 BITEKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 120; HOPKINS, supra note 19, §§ 40.1-42.2; TREUSCH, supra note 120, at
331-406; Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 VA.
L. REv. 605 (1989); Marcus S. Owens, Current Developments in the Unrelated Business Area—IRS
Perspective, 4 ExENIPT ORG. TAX REV. 923 (1991).
131
 As the Tax Court has bluntly stated:
Under the operational test, the purpose towards which an organization's activities
are directed, and not the nature of the activities themselves, is ultimately dispositive
of the organization's right to be classified as a section 501(c) (3) organization
exempt from tax under section 501(a). .. . Rather, the critical inquiry is whether
petitioner's primary purpose for engaging in its sole activity is an exempt purpose,
or whether its primary purpose is the nonexempt one of operating a commercial
business producing net profits for petitioner.
Sound Health Ass'n. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 190 (1978) (quoting B.S.W. Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 358 (1978)).
I 32 Therefore, the activities of the charitable organization need not he inherently charitable,
but must he performed in furtherance of the exempt purpose. See Better Business Bureau, 326
U.S. at 283; see also Tommy F. Thompson, The Unadministrability of the Federal Charitable Tax
Exemption: Causes, Effects and Remedies, 5 VA. TAX kr.v. 1, 16 (1985).
' 55 Trinidad, 263 U.S. at 581-82 (in which the doctrine was first created in the context of a
religious order that IRS alleged engaged in activities that were not tax-exempt but "operated also
fir business and commercial purposes" and the Court stated there was no "competition" although
the 'transactions yield some profit" which was deemed "in the circumstances a negligible factor");
see also Better Business Bureau, 326 U.S. at 283-84 (in which the doctrine was formally articulated
and connected with the "exclusivity requirement" and tax exemption was denied because the
organization had a "commercial hue" and its activities were "largely animated by this commercial
purpose"); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381 (1984) (discussing and
applying doctrine to a religion founded by L. Ron Hubbard). For discussion of the commerciality
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"commercial manner" is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose and
hence is a "nonexempt activity." 134
 A major problem with the commer-
ciality doctrine is that it provides no precise guidelines for determining
when an activity crosses the line between classification as an "exempt
activity" and as a "nonexempt activity."'" The courts generally have
viewed the activity from the perspective of the consumer and have
suggested that if the activity cannot be differentiated from that of a
for-profit counterpart organization, the activity is considered commer-
cial in nature.'" The courts have enumerated a number of factors in
evaluating the facts and circumstances to determine whether the activ-
ity is "commercial in nature": 137
 (1) the scope of the organization's net
profits; (2) the extent of the organization's accumulated surplus reve-
nue (capital); (3) amounts expended for tax-exempt functions; (4) the
type of activities and whether the activities are in "direct competition"
with a for-profit enterprise; (5) the organization's pricing method; (6)
the organization's promotion method; (7) whether the organization's
hours of operation are basically the same as for-profit enterprises; (8)
whether management has "business ability"; (9) whether the organiza-
tion utilizes volunteers or employs individuals in the conduct of the
activity; and (10) whether the organization receives charitable contri-
butions. To date, although application of the commerciality doctrine
rarely has precluded the tax exemption of a health care type organi-
zation,'" General Accounting Office officials have commented on the
doctrine, see, for example, HOPKINS, supra note 19, §§ 38.2—.4; James Bennett & Gabriel Rudtiey,
A Commerciality Test to Resolve the Commercial Nonpmfit Issue, 36 TAX NOTES 1095 (1987); Bruce
R. Hopkins, The Most Important Concept in the Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations 'Way: The
Commerciality Doctrine, 5 ExEMPT ORG. Tax Rev. 459 (1992) [hereinafter Hopkins, 'The Commer-
ciality Doctrine]; Paul,]. Streer, Obtaining and Preserving Tax-Exempt Status Under Section 501(c)(3):
Judicially Developed Factors for Detecting the Presence of Substantial Nonexempt Activities, J. Aim. Tax
Ass'nt., Spring 1985, at 63.
134 See supra note 133.
133 An objective means of determining this line could be constructed, but its fairness would
be in question. For such an attempt, see Bennett & Rudney, supra note 133, at 1097-98; John D.
Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax
-Exempt? (and Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educa-
tional Institutions), 35 Aim, L. REV. 841, 849 n.51 (1993).
136 see, e.g., Living Faith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 950 F.2d 365, 372-75 (7th Cir. 1991).
137
 See, e.g., Living Faith, 950 F.2d at 372; Federation Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner,
625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980); Elisian Guild, Inc. v, United States, 412 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1969);
American Inst. fur Economic Research v. United Stales, 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Scripture
Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 803-04 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Industrial Aid for the Blind v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C, 96 (1979); Peoples Translation Serv. Newsfront Intl v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 42 (1979); B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978); Pulpit Resource v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594 (1978); see also HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 835-42; Hopkins, The
Commerciality Doctrine, supra note 133, at 462-63; Streer, supra note 133, at 64-69.
158 See, e.g., Federation Pharmacy Servs., Inc„ 625 F.2d at 809 (tax-exempt status denied an
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I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) and (c) (4) organizations' movement away from
more "traditional sources of revenue" and toward commercial activi-
ties.ls9 In light of this emerging trend, the commerciality doctrine may
assume greater importance and force in the future with respect to
health care organizations.
2. Meaning of the Term "Charitable"
As above mentioned, although I.R.C. § 501 does not pro-
vide a per se means of exempting health care organizations from
income tax exemption, the IRS has long recognized the ex-
emption of hospitals as "charitable" organizations."° Attempts
to define the term "charitable" for I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) pur-
poses has consumed much time and effort of legislators,mi the
organization whose only activity was the sale of prescription drugs to the general public, i.e., a
pharmacy); see also supra note 136.
t99
	 Organization Finance Panel's Look at AARP Foreshadows General Inquiry into Tax-
Exempt Status, Daily Tax Rep. (RNA), at G- 1, G-2 (June 14, 1995), available in Westlaw, BNA-DTR
file; accord Ryan Donmoyer, Unrelated Business Income of E0s Reached 3.4 Billion in 1991, 68 Tax
Norm 145 (1995).
110 Administrative rulings regarding the income tax exemption generally date to Treas. Dec.
110 (May 1863). See supra note 20. Administrative rulings applicable to hospitals as exempt
"charitable" organizations date at least to 1928. I.T. 2421, 7-2 C.B. 150 (1928). But see supra note
120 (discussing teaching and research hospitals that might also qualify as "educational" or
"scientific" organizations).
141 The first lengthy consideration of the term "charitable" by legislators occurred in 1924 in
the Senate, when, during debate, Senator Willis of Ohio informed his fellow senators that the
Bureau of Internal Revenue ("Bureau"), predecessor to the IRS, used the term to include only
organizations with activities limited to aiding the poor. Senator Willis considered the Bureau's
definition too narrow and sought to expand the statute (which for all intents and purposes was
identical to the current statute) to parenthetically define "charitable" to include organizations
that provide "preventive and constructive service for relief, rehabilitation, health, character
building and citizenship." 65 CONG. REC. 8171 (1924). Senators objected to the addition of the
parenthetical phrase because of its potential expansiveness and its effect of making such organi-
zations per se "charitable" and thus automatically tax-exempt regardless of services provided to
the poor. Senator Smoot objected to Senator Willis's inclusion of "health" in the proposed
definition. Id. at 8172-73. The debate resulted in Senator Willis withdrawing his proposed
statutory amendment. For further discussion of this legislative endeavor, see Marilyn G. Rose, The
Internal Revenue Service's "Contribution" to the Health Problems of the Poor, 21 LATH. U. L. REV.
35, 46-51 (1971).
More recently, in 1969, the American Hospital Association ("ANA") suggested in hearings
before the House Ways and Means Committee that not-for-prolit hospitals should he per se
tax-exempt organizations. Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearings on Hit 13270 Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 91st Gong., 1st Sess. 1425, 1432-33 (1969) (statement by AFIA attorney Julius
M. Greisman). The House granted the Al-lA request in its report. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 43 (1969). The Senate Finance Committee deleted the House provision granting per se
exemption to hospitals, which the joint committee accepted. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
61 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 782, 9Ist Cong., 1st Sess. 289-90 (1969). However, as the Senate Finance
Committee promised, the matter was again considered in connection with Medicare and Medi-
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IRs,142 the judiciary," 3
 and commentators.'" Its definition is hi-
storically based but has defied precision. The virtual absence of rel-
evant and clearly informative legislative history concerning the scope
of the term contributes greatly to this lack of precision. 14'' This
void has engendered a wealth of literature speculating on the
term's appropriate breadth and the possible rationale for exempt-
ing "charitable" organizations from income taxation. 146
 The IRS in-
raid legislation. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91sT CONC., 1st' SESS., MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID—PROBLEMS, ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 58 (Comm. Print 1970); Hearings on Medicare
and Medicaid BelOre the Senate Finance Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
The issue has surfaced more recently. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Part 111: Hearings on
S. 361 Before the Senate. Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-67 (1986) (statement of
Bernard R. Tresnowski, President, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Organization, Chicago, Mr,
Tresnowski voiced objections to repeal of the Federal tax exemption for Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans. Id. Most recently, in hearings involving the proposed Health Security Act, S. 1757,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), the Joint Committee on Taxation examined the tax treatment of'
not hospitals in the context of their role in furthering charitable purposes. STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII OF
H.R. 3600, S. 1757, AND S. 1775 ("HEALTH SEcuarry Act") (Comm. Print 1993). The Committee
recognized that a not-for-profit medical care organization, in order to qualify for tax exemption,
must demonstrate that its activities are targeted to a charitable class. Id. at 82. The Committee
further noted that the precise nature of that charitable class has been and continues to be a
source of controversy. Id.
II) See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
"'See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
t 44 See, e.g., MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 41-43 (1965);
flopioNs, supra note 19, at 123-76; Bittker & Randert, supra note 120, at 331-33; Houck, supra
note 107, at 1424-25; Persons at al., supra note 20, at 1932-49; see also infra note 146.
145 But see supra note 141 (indicating some of the legislative debate over the term "charita-
ble").
146 The rationales that commentators have proposed to explain the income tax exemption
of "charitable" organizations generally fall into two basic categories: conventional and academic
theories. The first classification is based upon the notion that "charitable" organizations relieve
the government of burdens by providing essential services which otherwise the government would
be responsible to deliver, and such organizations deserve subsidizing. This theory is labeled the
"subsidy theory." See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. RENT. 501,
605-10 (1990) (describing traditional subsidy theory as encompassing the generation of conven-
tional goods and services beneficial to the public by altruistic not-for-profit organizations, which
also produce "metabenefits," i.e., have the capacity to deliver such goods or services "more
efficiently, more innovatively, or otherwise better than other suppliers"); Note, Developments in
the Law, Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV, L. REV. 1579, 1620-21 (1992) (explaining subsidy
theory, scrutinizing its shortcomings, and suggesting a tax expenditure analysis reveals its weak-
nesses). In essence, it is a combined market and social theory based on numerous assumptions
and factors, but is premised on the notion that charitable purposes and organizations are worthy
of promotion. The theory provides that charitable organizations deliver "charity," which includes
health care services, to the poor free of charge because, in part, the provision of such services is
recognized as it community benefit under traditional trust law, and it relieves the government of
the burden of providing such services. See. Bromberg, supra note 21, at 241-56; Mark A. Hall &
John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax
Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307,332-84 (1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo, Charitable Status].
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tentionally has avoided assigning a fixed and immutable defini-
These are the same factors used by the IRS and courts in determining whether an organization
deserves tax-exempt status as a "charitable" organization.
Scholars have proposed academic theories as a response to the shortcomings of the subsidy
theory in explaining the rationale of the income tax exemption. There are basically four academic
theories: (1) the income measurement theory; (2) the capital formation theory; (3) the "altruism
theory"; and (4) the donative theory. The income measurement theory, proposed by Professor
Boris]. Bittkcr and George K. Randert in 1976, was a response to several of the practical problems
of the subsidy theory. !linker & Randert, supra note 120, at 302-04. Bittker and Randert suggested
that not-for-profit organizations are exempt from income taxation because there is no practical
and traditional accounting method of measuring their net income—it is difficult for a nut-for-
profit entity to classify certain income, such as donations, and to categorize certain expenses
which would be 1.R.C. § 102 (1994) ordinary and necessary business expenses to a for-profit
enterprise. Id. at 305-19. However, the income meastiretnent theory has not been favored by
other academics. See. Atkinson, supra, at 611-16; Hall & Colombo, Charitable Status, supra, at
385-86; Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate
Income 'taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 59-62 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Rationale].
The capital formation theory was formulated by Professor Henry Hausmann in response to
perceived inadequacies of the income measurement theory. Hansmann, Rationale, supra, at 55.
In his capital formation theory, Professor Hansmann suggests that the income tax exemption is
appropriate for not-for-profit organizations because it compensates them for their inadequate
access to capital. Id. at 72-75. Moreover, he argues that not-for-profit organizations are the most
efficient providers of goods and services as a result of "contract failure," which more often occurs
within the framework of for-profit enterprises because consumers of for-profit businesses may not
have ready access to information and may have difficulty evaluating for-profit providers. Id. at
86-91; Henry B, Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835, 848-54 (1979)
[hereinafter Hausmann, Nonprofit Enterprise]. He suggests that the income tax exemption may
encourage the development and growth of not-for-profit organizations in industries characterized
by contract failure. Hausmann, Rationale, supra, at 74. However, Professor Hansmann admits that
such contract failure assumptions do not apply in the case of most hospital services because
physicians assist patient-consumers in making health care service decisions. Hansmann, Rationale,
supra, at 89; Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise, supra at 866-68,
Academicians criticized Professor Hansmann's capital formation theory for numerous rea-
sons, among which was a lack of historical consistency, a deficiency in strong supportive evidence,
the absence of consideration of concepts of philanthropy and charity, and the treatment of all
consumers, patrons, customers, and donors alike. See Atkinson, supra, at 623; Ira Mark Elliman,
Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REV. 999, 1000, 1008-18 (1982); Hall &
Colombo, Charitable Status, supra, at 387-89. However, the capital formation theory as well as the
subsidy theory served as a foundation on which others could build theories. First, Professor Rob
Atkinson developed an "altruism theory." Atkinson, supra, at 618. The altruism theory rests on
the premise that the favorable tax treatment of altruistic not-for-profit organizations demonstrates
an affirmative preference for something those entities provide, including direct primary benefits
to consumers and "metabenefits," (above discussed) i.e., broader benefits beneficial to society
such as pluralism and diversity. Id.; see also James Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism: Appli-
cations to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, 97 J. Por. Ecort. 1447 (1989) (concluding that
people derive some utility and "warm glow" from the act of contributing, which makes govern-
ment subsidies imperfect substitutes for gifts).
Relining and expanding these prior theories, Professors Mark A. Hall and John D. Colombo
developed the donative theory. Hall & Colombo, Charitable Status, supra, at 388, 390 n.300; Mark
A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 Ottio ST.
LJ. 1379, 1383-84 (1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo, Donative Theory]. The donative theory
suggests that the primary rationale for the income tax exemption for "charitable" organizations
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Lion 147; consequently, its development has depended on judicial and
administrative decisions. The IRS and judicial interpretations have
referred to types and categories of endeavors entitled to be considered
"charitable" and to such themes as redistribution of wealth and serv-
ices. 148
 As will become apparent through the following discussion, how-
ever, the term's inexact, but somewhat fluid, definition over the past
forty years has been neither totally stagnant nor consistently progres-
sive.
a. Broad Construction
Since the turn of the twentieth century and the enactment of the
federal tax statute permitting tax exemption to "charitable" organiza-
tions, 149
 debate has persisted as to whether Congress intended the term
"charitable" to be limited to its narrow, "popular and ordinary" con-
struction—that is, relief to poor, disadvantaged, and distressed per-
sons—or to be accorded the broad, common law meaning—that is,
"everything that is within the letter and spirit of the [Statute of Chari-
table Uses], considering such spirit to be broad enough to include
whatever will promote, in a legitimate way, the comfort, happiness, and
improvement of an indefinite number of persons."'" Early Treasury
is to subsidize those capable of attracting substantial donative support. Hall & Colombo, Charitable
Status, supra, at 316, 390; Hall & Colombo, Donative Theory, supra, at 1390-1416, 1446-50.
Professors Hall and Colombo also reason that the exemption is a response to market failure
resulting in free-rider problems and to the government's inability to provide all necessary services.
Hall & Colombo, Charitable Status, supra, at 391-94. However, they suggest that the exemption
is appropriate because charitable donations alone cannot satisfy the organizations' financial
ability to deliver all public needs; however, they recommend that not-for-profit entities should
attain certain threshold levels of donations (30% donation levels for hospitals) before qualifying
for tax-exempt treatment. Id. at 394-409.
147 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Edwin S. Cohen, stated in hearings
before the House Ways and Means Committee: 'We have tried to avoid interpreting the word
'charitable' in a fixed, immutable fashion. As the courts have done in many nontax settings, we
have tried to give it meaning that changes and expands as the needs of society change and
expand." Legislative Activity by Certain Types of Exempt Organizations: Hearings before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972).
148 See infra parts IV.13.2 and IV.F (describing IRS pronouncements and court cases that
interpret the term "charitable" and the 1.R.C. § 501(c) (3) requirements); see also STAFF OF SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE, 89Th CONG., 1ST SESS., TREASURY DEP'T REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDA-
noNs 12-13 (Comm. Print 1965) (asserting that federal government benefits from charitable
endeavors).
tai See supra notes 107, 120 (describing the history of the income tax exemption applicable
to charitable organizations).
15u Harrington v, Pier, 82 N.W. 345, 357 (1900); see GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT,
LAW OF TRUSTS 200 (5th ed. 1973); HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 69-70. The argument that
Congress intended a broad interpretation was promoted in 1958 by Assistant Chief Counsel of
the IRS, Herman T. Reiling. See Herman T. Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable
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pronouncements consistently interpreted the term in its "popular and
ordinary" sense.''' Over time this sentiment of the Treasury changed,
and by 1959, the Treasury regulations reflected a broader construe-
tion.' 52 Since that time, the regulations have continued to provide that
the term be used broadly in "its generally accepted legal sense." 155
Because the term "charitable" when used in its legal sense can be
traced to English antecedents of American law—that is, the common
law of charitable trusts—it is perhaps natural that interpretations for
our federal income tax purposes have drawn on the broad common
law principles of charitable trusts and charity.' 54 The American judici-
Organization?, 44 A.B.A. J. 525 (1958) (suggesting that the statutory list as a whole is meant to
expand to the outer reaches of the common law legal definition of "charity"). Not surprisingly,
the 1959 Treasury Regulations reflected Reiling's perspective. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(2) (1959) (reproduced infra note 152 in relevant part); see also Chisolm, Exempt Organiza-
tion Advocacy, supra note 124, at 256-59 (discussing the broad and narrow potential interpreta-
tions of the term). For a recent judicial discussion of reasons for adherence to a broad
interpretation, see Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1287-89 (D.C. Cir.
1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See also infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
151 I.T. 1800, 2-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1923); Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 517 (interpreting provision under
Revenue Act of 1924); Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 517 (interpreting provision under Revenue Act of
1926); Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 527 (interpreting provision under Revenue Act of 1928); Treas. Reg.
77, Art. 527 (interpreting provision under Revenue Act of 1932); Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 101(6)-1
(interpreting provision tinder Revenue Act of 1934); Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 101(6)-1 (interpreting
provision tinder Revenue Act of 1936); Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 101(6)4 (interpreting provision
under Revenue Act of 1938); see HOPKINS, supra note 19, at 75 & n.32; Chisolm, Exempt Organi-
zation Advocacy, supra note 124, at 257 n.240; see also Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz,
370 F. Stipp. 325, 331-32 (D.D.C. 1973) (in which the district court stated that Congress intended
the term to be interpreted in its narrow sense), rev'd sub nom. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v.
Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974) vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
' 5tTreas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-I (d) (2) (1959) in relevant part provided:
Charitable defined.—The term "charitable" is used in section 501(c)(3) in its
generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as and limited
by the separate enumeration in 501(c) (3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may
fall within the broad outlines of "charity" as developed by judicial decisions. Such
term includes: Relief of the poor and distressed and underprivileged; advancement
of religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government;
and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the
above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice
and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv)
to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.
For a brief discussion of the position asserted in support of this broad interpretation, see supra
note 150.
155 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (d) (2) (as amended in 1990) (using the same language as the
Treasury regulations promulgated in 1959).
154 See supra notes 107-18 (discussing the Statute of Charitable Uses and the development
of corporations as the generally accepted form for charitable entities in America after the
Revolutionary War); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1983)
(expressly adopting view that common law of charitable trusts guided enactment of I.R.C.
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ary and the IRS have indicated that a strong similarity exists between
charitable trust law and tax law)" However, the judiciary and the IRS
appear to recognize that the analogy is limited and does not control
entirely the meaning of the term "charitable" for tax exemption pur-
poses; other elements must be considered) 56
b. Revenue Ruling 56-185: Financial Ability Standard
Applied to Hospitals
Because under I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) health care providers were not
considered per se "charitable" according to an exact formula arising
from charitable trust law,' 57 in 1956 the IRS issued a revenue ruling to
guide hospitals as to the applicable tax exemption criteria. 158 Pursuant
to Revenue Ruling 56-185, the IRS indicated that in addition to satis-
fying the private inurement and private benefit prohibitions,'" a hos-
pital must be organized and operated exclusively to care for the sick,
and it must comply with a "financial ability standard." 16° In accordance
with the financial ability standard, to be deemed "charitable," a hospi-
§ 501(c) (3) and that when interpreting a statute, courts should not look merely to a particular
clause, but should take in connection with it, the whole statute and the objects and policy of the
law). But see Miriam GaIston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable Organizations, 3 VA. TAx REV,
291,297-316 (1984) (arguing distinctions exist between trust law and federal tax statutes, indi-
cating that trust law definitions of charity merely overlap and should not be equated with intended
meaning for federal tax purposes).
155 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585-88; Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F,2d
108,110 (3d Cir. 1941); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Stipp. 1150,1157-61 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd num.,
sub. nom. Coit v, Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Rev. Rul, 67-325,1967-2 C.B. 113; see also Calston,
supra note 154, at 298.
1 g' See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585-99 (purposes and practices of charitable organi-
zation cannot violate local law nor public policy); Girard Trust Go., 122 F.2d at 110; MX Exemptions
for Charitable Organizations Affecting Poverty Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employ-
ment, Manpower and Poverty of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 9Ist Cong., 2c1 Sess.
54 (1970) (testimony of Randolph W. Thrower, Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service);
Statement by Randolph W. Thrower Before the Ways and Means Committee on Tax-Exempt
Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools, reprinted in 35 Tax LAw. 701 (1982); see also
Gaiston, supra note 154, at 298. But see Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 612-17 (Rehnquist, j.,
dissenting) (arguing that I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) should be construed as setting forth sole criteria
Congress established for tax-exempt status and disagreeing with interpretive gloss requiring
organization to comport. with public policy).
' 57
 See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
158
 Rev. Rul. 56-185,1956-1 C.B. 202. Although revenue rulings do not have the force and
effect of Treasury regulations, they reflect at least the current position and policies of the IRS.
See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (authorizing promulgation of regulations); see also Linda Caller, Emerging
Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 841 (1992).
159 Rev. Rul. 56-185, supra note 158, at 202. The revenue ruling also specified that the
organization must be a public charitable organization chartered as a nonprofit charitable corpo-
ration. Id.
160 Id. at 202.
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tal must be "operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not
able to pay for the services rendered and not exclusively for those who
are able and expected to pay. "161
 The revenue ruling effectively stated
that a hospital cannot refuse to accept patients needing care but
unable to pay; however, the "fact that [the hospital's] charity record is
relatively low is not conclusive that a hospital is not operated for
charitable purposes to the full extent of its financial ability." 162 There-
fore, a hospital would be under no obligation to engage in a high level
of charitable activity to qualify for exemption.'" In fact, the IRS recog-
nized that the lack of demand for services at below cost should not
disqualify the hospital from eligibility for tax-exempt status.'" 4 In the
context of hospitals, the IRS described the concept of charity as (1)
the provision of health care services at either below cost rates or free
of charge, and (2) the earmarking of funds to improve facilities.'"" In
specifically addressing a community hospital, although enunciated in
terms of the financial ability standard, the IRS hinted at a forthcoming
policy concern. In particular, it suggested that a community hospital
will need to confer benefit on the general community:
[A community hospital] is formed for the purpose of furnish-
ing hospital facilities to all persons in the community at the
lowest possible cost and necessarily accepts patients who are
unable to pay for hospital facilities in order to retain the
support of the community. A nominal charity record for a
given period of time, in the absence of charitable demands
of the community, will not affect its right to continued ex-
emption. 16"
Over the next thirteen years, this policy signal would develop into
the "community benefit standard."'"
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 However, in several private letter rulings issued soon after Rev. Rul. 56-185, the IRS stated
that the provision of free care to fewer than five percent of a hospital's patients was insufficient
for it to grant tax-exempt status to a hospital. See Richardson, supra note 58, at 904.
However, over the next several years, the financial ability standard was interpreted sufficiently
broadly to permit hospitals that did not refuse to admit indigents to satisfy the operational test
of I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) even in the absence of local demand for below cost or free of charge health
care services. See id. at 904 n.26 (citing Note, Federal Income Tax Exemption for Private Hospitals,
36 FORDHAM L. Ray. 758 (1968)).
164 Rev. Rul. 56-185, supra note 158, at 202.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See infra parts IV.B.2.c-h and 1V.F (describing evolution of community benefit standard).
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c. Revenue Ruling 69-545: Community Benefit Standard
Applied to Hospitals
In 1969, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 69-545, 1 " which enunci-
ated the community benefit standard as applied to hospitals. 169
 The
revenue ruling described nonprofit Hospital A, which failed to provide
free or reduced rate nonemergency inpatient or outpatient services to
indigents.'" The IRS ruled that Hospital A qualified as a tax-exempt
charitable organization. In support of its decision, the IRS relied on
the general law of charity, 171
 which considers the promotion of health
care to be per se a "charitable purpose." 172 Although not referring to
Treasury regulation section 1.501(c) (3)-1 (d) (2),m which requires the
not-for-profit organization to be "charitable" in the "generally accepted
legal sense" of the term, the IRS presented the essence of the regula-
tion:
In the general law of charity, the promotion of health is
considered to be a charitable purpose. A nonprofit organiza-
tion whose purpose and activity are providing hospital care is
promoting health and may, therefore, qualify as organized
and operated in furtherance of a charitable purpose. If it
meets the other requirements of section 501(c) (3) . . . it will
qualify for exemption from Federal income tax under section
501 (a) .
Since the purpose and activity of Hospital A, apart from its
related educational and research activities and purposes, are
providing hospital care on a nonprofit basis for members of
163 1969-2 C.B. 117.
169
 The IRS previously had applied the community benefit standard in other contexts. See,
e.g,, Rev. Rul, 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113, 115 (discussing issue of deductibility under I.R.C. § 170
of contributions to a recreational facility operated by township without charge to local residents
but racially restricted).
170 The IRS described this practice in the facts, as follows:
The hospital operates a full time emergency room and no one requiring emer-
gency care is denied treatment. The hospital otherwise ordinarily limits admissions
to those who can pay the cost of their hospitalization, either themselves, or through
private health insurance, or with the aid of public programs such as Medicare.
Patients who cannot meet the financial requirements for admission are ordinarily
referred to another hospital in the community that does serve indigent patients.
Rev. Rul. 69-545, supra note 168, at 117.
171 /d. at 118 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §l 368, 372, and IV Sctrr-r ON
TRUSTS §§ 368, 372.2 (3d ed. 1967)).
172
 Rev. Rul. 69-545, supra note 168, at 118.
173 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (citing language of Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-
1(d) (2)).
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its community, it is organized and operated in furtherance of
a purpose considered "charitable" in the generally accepted
legal sense of that terrn.' 74
The IRS enunciated its community benefit standard in the context
of a balancing approach:
The promotion of health care, like the relief of poverty and
the advancement of education and religion, is one of the
purposes in the general law of charity that is deemed bene-
ficial to the community as a whole, even though the class of
beneficiaries eligible to receive a direct benefit from its activi-
ties does not include all members of the community, provided
that the class is not so small that its relief is not of benefit to
the community.' 75
Applying this standard, the IRS found the class of persons benefited
in the community sufficiently broad because the hospital operated
a generally accessible emergency room open to all persons, regard-
less of ability to pay.' 76 However, the IRS did not require that the hos-
pital accept indigent patients on an inpatient basis for any purpose
other than its emergency room.' 77 At the end of the revenue ruling,
the IRS modified Revenue Ruling 56-185 "to remove therefrom the
requirements relating to caring for patients without charge or at
rates below cost." 178 The ruling further noted several factors, none
of which were controlling, to indicate that the hospital served a
public rather than private interest: (1) the board of trustees repre-
sented the community at large because its composition included
independent civic leaders; (2) the hospital operated with an open
medical staff; and (3) the hospital utilized surplus funds to improve
the quality of patient care, expand its facilities, and advance medical
training, education, and research. 179
d. Controversy over Community Benefit Standard
This new revenue ruling proved controversial. Less than one year
after its publication, the staff of the Senate Finance Committee recom-
174 Rev. Rul. 69-545, supra note 168, at 118 (citation omitted).
175 Id. (citation omitted).
176 The IRS also determined that Hospital A satisfied the private inurement and private
benefit tests. See infra parts IV.C-D (discussing private inurement and private benefit tests).
177 See supra note 170 (quoting language of revenue ruling to this effect).
178 Rev. Rul. 69-545, supra note 168, at 119.
"9 Id. at 118. Several of these factors seem to address the prohibitions against private
inurement and private benefit as much as or more than the issue of community benefit.
December 1995]	 HEALTH CARE &' TAX EXEMPTION	 47
mended that it be revoked and that Revenue Ruling 56-185 be re-
stored until Congress could act. 18° Congress did not act on the Senate
Finance Committee staff's suggestion.
Several years later, the Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion, representing a group of indigents who had been refused treat-
ment in tax-exempt hospitals because of their inability to pay, brought
a class-action lawsuit challenging the community benefit standard.'"'
The plaintiffs sought to have Revenue Ruling 69-545 declared invalid
and to enjoin its implementation. The District Court for the District
of Columbia upheld the challenge and stated that Congress intended
the term "charitable" to be limited to its narrow, ordinary and "popu-
lar" sense—that is, relief to the poor. 182 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
district court's decision, declaring the revenue ruling valid.' The
circuit court found that the term "charitable" should not be restricted
to its narrow meaning and considered the law of charitable trusts to
support a broad interpretation of the term. 184 It regarded a narrow
construction of the term as "inflexible" and as failing to "recognize the
changing economic, social and technological precepts and values of
contemporary society."'" Finally, the circuit court concluded that Reve-
nue Ruling 69-545 "rather than overruling Revenue Ruling 56-185
simply provides an alternative method whereby a nonprofit hospital can
qualify as a tax-exempt charitable organization."'" On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear
the case because the plaintiffs lacked standing. 187 Therefore, the district
court and circuit court judgments were nullified, leaving the opinions
open to debate. 188
188 STAFF OF SENATE. COMM. ON FINANCING, 91ST CONG., 1 wr SESS., MEDICARE AND M EDICA DE:
PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND ALTERNATIVES (COMM. Print 1970).
181
 Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 325 (D.D.C. 1973), we'd sub
nom. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S.
26 (1976),
"2 1d. at 330.
I 83 Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated,
426 U.S. 26 (1976).
184 1d. at 1287-88.
188 Id. at 1288. The court indicated that health care had evolved dramatically over the years
and that the rationale fur a narrow definition of "charitable" had largely disappeared. Id.
188 Id. at 1289 (emphasis added).
187
	
V. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
188
 In a case before the Sixth Circuit, not long after the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia rendered its opinion in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, Chief judge Harry
Phillips declined to entertain the question of the validity of Revenue Ruling 69-545. Harding
Hospital, Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1076 OM Cir. 1974). He stated that the issue was
neither before the court on argument nor was it briefed. However, he noted that it would have
been unnecessary to address the issue because the court would have held the psychiatric hospital
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e. Revenue Ruling 83-157: Modification of Community Benefit
Standard Applied to Hospitals
In 1983, the IRS faced the community benefit standard in the
context of a hospital that did not operate an emergency room. Under
the facts of Revenue Ruling 83-157, 1 " the nonprofit hospital was iden-
tical to Hospital A described in Revenue Ruling 69-545 except that
because a state or local government planning agency determined it
would be duplicative of emergency service facilities otherwise provided
in the community, the hospital did not operate an emergency room.
The IRS recognized that the operation of an emergency room and the
community access to it is merely one factor evidencing a hospital's
benefit to the community. It suggested that other "significant factors"
enter into the community benefit determination. These included "a
board of directors drawn from the community, an open medical staff
policy, treatment of persons paying their bills with the aid of public
programs like medicare and medicaid, and application of any surplus
to improving facilities, equipment, patient care, and medical training,
education, and research." 19° In recognition that certain specialized
hospitals, such as eye hospitals and oncology hospitals, may not need
to maintain an emergency room, the IRS extended this ruling to cover
those institutions.''' Finally, the IRS instructed that Revenue Ruling
83-157 was intended to "amplify" Revenue Ruling 69-545. 192
in the instant case to be undeserving of tax-exempt status. Id. The court based this conclusion
on several factors: (1) sufficient evidence to find that the hospital did not hold itself out to the
public as a charitable institution; (2) the absence of a specific plan or policy for the treatment
of charity patients, regardless of its statistical records showing the provision of up to 7.78% of
"uncompensated care"; (3) physicians practicing at the hospital derived substantial private
benefits from the hospital's existence and operation; and (4) the medical group partnership
benefited from the hospital. Id. at 1077-78. Although part of the reasoning for denial of the lax
exemption was violation of the prohibitions against private inurement and private benefit, clearly
the circuit court did not consider the hospital to serve sufficiently the general community.
In 1980, the Sixth Circuit considered a case in which a group of low income persons brought
a class action against the Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and
seven Ohio hospitals challenging Revenue Ruling 69-545 and the hospitals' tax exemptions. Lugo
v. Miller, 640 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981). Although the plaintiffs in this case had sought to overcome
the difficulties encountered by the plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, the
court found that these plaintiffs also did not have standing to challenge the validity of Revenue
Ruling 69-545 nor to enjoin the grant of tax-exempt status to the defendant hospitals. Id. at 831.
189 1983-2 C.B. 94.
199 Id. at 95.
191 Id.
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f. Summary of Revenue Rulings
It is clear from the revenue rulings that many factors enter into
the determination of whether a hospital's purposes and activities are
deemed to serve a sufficient community benefit. It appears that no one
factor is controlling and that all facts and circumstances must be
weighed. The revenue rulings provide no guidance as to a means of
quantitatively or qualitatively measuring the factors present in any
given situation. Numerous attempts by legislators and suggestions by
academicians have been made for the purpose of clarifying, quantify-
ing, and qualifying the community benefit standard in some way.'"
195
 Proposed legislation has attempted to modify or abandon the current community benefit
standard. See, e.g., H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced by Representative Edward
R. Roybal to move toward relief of poverty or charity standard); H.R. 1374, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (introduced by Representative Brian J. Donnelly to move toward relief of poverty or charity
standard); Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600/S. 1757, § 7601(a), 103d Cong., 1st Sess, (1993)
(attempting io establish that at least annually, the health care organization assess, with the
assistance of community leaders, the health needs of its community and develop a plan to meet
those needs); see 171.511 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT Com-
m rrrEE ON AGING, HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS: BETFER STANDARDS
NEEDED FOR TAX EXEMPTION (1990) [hereinafter GAO, BETFER STANDARDS]; see also Colombo,
supra note 82, at Addendum; Colombo & Hall, supra note 120 at 22-25; J. David Seay, Community
Benefit Prevails, 73 11Ent;rn PROGRESS 42 (1992); J. David Seay, Tax Exemption for Hospitals:
Thwart's an Understanding of Community Benefit, 2 HEAmt MATRIX 35 (1992); J. David Seay &
Robert M. Sigmond, Community Benefit Standards for Hospitals: Perceptions and Performance, 5
FRobrriEtts HEAurn SERVS. MGMT. 3 (1989); Renee Blnnkenau, Measuring Up: Congress
Reconsiders Tax-Exemption Standards Under Reform, 68 Host, . & HEALTH NETWORKS, Jan. 5, 1994,
at 14.
Organizations and academicians have proposed community benefit standards that involve
self-assessment activities and reflect a means of assisting hospitals to define and attain community
benefit goals. Fur example, pursuant to a W.K. Kellogg Foundation grant, two professors have
developed the Hospital Community Benefit Standards Program ("HCBSP"), an approach that is
subjective and not quantifiable. Anthony R. Kovner & Paul A. Hinds, Benefiting  Communities,
HEAI:111 MGMT. Q., 4th Q. 1990, at 6. The HCBSP sets forth the following four standards for
hospitals to follow: (I) a hospital must show evidence of the hospital's formal commitment to a
community benefit program for a designated community; (2) the scope of the hospital programs
would include hospital-sponsored projects for the designated community in each of the following
areas: (a) improving health status, (b) addressing health problems of minorities, the poor and
other medically underserved populations, and (c) containing the growth of community health
care costs; (3) the hospital's programs would include activities designated to stimulate other
organizations and individuals to join in carrying out a broad health agenda in the designated
community; and (4) the hospital must Foster an internal environment that encourages hospital-
wide involvement in the program. Id. at 7.
Another approach has been developed by the Catholic Health Association ("CHA"). See
David Hyman, Catholic Health Association Standards for Community Benefit, 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
REV. 1254, 1254-57 (1994). The CHA takes the position that its health care provider organizations
should;
(I) Issue mission statements that reflect a commitment to benefit the community and the
policies and practices consistent with the statements, including "[c]onsideration of operational
and policy decisions in light of their impact on the community served, especially the poor, the
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Some individuals have suggested that the community benefit standards
adopted by state courts and legislatures should serve as models for a
federal standard.t`}4
frail elderly and the vulnerable. Adoption of charity care policies that are made public and are
consistently applied. Incorporation of community healthcare needs into regular planning and
budgeting processes." Id. at 1254.
(2) Have the organization's governing board adopt, make public and implement a commu-
nity benefit plan that—
Defines the organization's mission and the community being served.
Identifies unmet healthcare needs in the community, including needs of the poor,
frail elderly, minorities and other medically underserved and disadvantaged per-
Sons.
Describes how the organization intends to take a leadership role in advocating
community-wide responses to healthcare needs in the community.
Describes how the organization intends to address, directly and in collaboration
with physicians, other individuals and organizations:
— particular or unique healthcare problems of the community;
— healthcare needs of the poor, frail elderly, minorities and other medically unders-
erved and disadvantaged persons.
Describes how the organization sought the views of the community being served
and how community members and other organizations were involved in identifying
needs and the development of the plan.
Id. at 1254-55.
(3) Provide community benefits to the poor and the broader community that are designed
to comply with the community benefit plan, improve health status in the community, promote
access to healthcare services to all persons in the community, and to contain healthcare costs. Id.
at 1254.
(4) Make available to the public an annual community benefit report describing the scope
of community benefits provided directly and in collaboration with others. Id. at 1257-58.
154 Historically many states have permitted tax exemptions, whether income, property or sales
tax exemptions, based on a not-for-profit organization's obtaining a tax exemption from the IRS.
See. James P. Buchele, fustibing Real Property Tax Exemptions in Kansas, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 252
(1988); William R. Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations: A
Perspective, 53 TEMP. L.Q, 291 (1980); Note, Nonprofit Hospitals and the State Tax Exemption: An
Analysis of the Issues Since Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 9 VA. TAX REV. 599,
599 (1990); Roger C. Nauert at al., Hospitals Face Loss of Federal Tax-Exempt Status, HEALTHCARE
FIN. Mwsr. REV., Sept. 1988, at 48, 52. However, the near automatic state grant has been curtailed
in some states, and some states' laws regarding tax exemption now diverge significantly from that
of 1.R.C. § 501(c) (3). See. Baldwin, supra note 19; Hyman & McCarthy, supra note 19; John W.
O'Donnell & James H. Taylor, The Bounds of Charity: The Current Status of the Hospital Property-
Tax Exemption, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 65 (1990); Margaret A. Potter & Beaufort B. Longest, Jr.,
The Divergence of Federal and State Policies on the Charitable Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Hospitals,
19 J. 11KAI:111 Pot.., PoL'y & LAW 393 (1994). For example, the Texas legislature recently enacted
new provisions significantly restricting the property tax exemption for charitable nonprofit
organizations and narrowly defining the terms "nonprofit hospital" and "charitable" in connec-
tion with care for indigents. TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a) (1995); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18
(West 1995); TEX. HEALTH & SAFITI'Y CODE ANN. § 311,043 (West 1995).
In other states, based on existing statutes, the judiciary has established specific criteria for
the determination of whether hospitals are "charitable" and entitled to some type of tax exemp-
tion. For example, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted a clause in the Utah Constitution to
require that hospitals prove entitlement to a property tax exemption on an annual basis. Utah
County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). Now, not-for-profit hospitals in
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All of this concern has returned to and largely focused on the no-
tion presented by the plaintiffs in the Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization case—that is, a "charitable" health care organization
should provide a certain amount of charity care as a form of commu-
nity benefit required for tax exemption.'° A popular expectation and
Utah must submit annual financial and operating information for examination by county tax
assessors to determine whether the hospitals satisfy the Utah Supreme Court's multi-factor test
of charitability and thus warrant tax exemption for the year. The multi-factor test set forth by the
court is used to measure the size of the hospitals' charity levels to their communities. To warrant
property tax exemption, the levels of charity must exceed the property taxes that the hospitals
would otherwise be obligated to pay. The Utah Supreme Court's multi-factor lest of charitability
includes the following: (1) whether a hospital's governing instrument identifies as its purpose
activities and services to others that are consistent with a "charitable" use and which preclude
inurement of financial benefit to others; (2) whether and to what extent the hospital is supported
by donations and gifts; (3) whether recipients of the hospital's services are required to pay, in
whole or in part, for the assistance received; (4) whether income from all hospital sources exceeds
its operating and maintenance expenses (and if so, this suggests the hospital is not "charitable"
even if the surplus is used for capital improvements and new equipment); (5) whether beneficiar-
ies of the hospital services are restricted in any way, and if so, whether the restriction bears a
reasonable relation to the hospital's charitable objectives; (6) whether dividends or other forms
of financial benefit, or assets on dissolution, are available to private interests; and (7) whether
the hospital is organized and operated so that any commercial activities are subordinate to or
incidental to the charitable activities. Id. at 269-70.
For a discussion of these factors and the Utah Supreme Court opinion, see, for example,
Jerry J. McCoy, Health Care and the Tax Law: Reorganizations, Structural Changes, and Other
Contemporary Problems of Tax-Exempt Hospitals, 44TH ANN. N.Y.U. TAx INST, § 58.04 (1986);
O'Donnell & Taylor, supra at 66; Phelon S. Ramtnell & Robert J. Parsons, Utah County v.
Intermountain Health Care: Utah's Unique Method for Determining Charitable Property Tax Exemp-
tions—A Review of its Mandate and Impact, 22 J. limurn & H ost'. L 73, 77-80 (1989); Note,
supra at 618.
Other state judiciaries have reacted similarly to the Utah Supreme Court. See., eg„ Hospital
Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985); West Allegheny Hosp. v. Board
of Property Assessment, 455 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 1982); School Dist. of Erie v. Hamot Medical Cir.,
602 A.2d 407 (Pa. Commw, Ca. 1992); Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vt, v, City of Burlington, 566 A.2d
1352 (Vt. 1989).
195 Numerous studies and articles have been produced concerning a suitable definition of
"charity care" for not,for-prolit hospitals, the appropriate amount of charity care to be deserving
of tax-exempt status, and the means of measuring whether the obligation of providing charity
care has been satisfied. Generally, charity care is equated with the term "uncompensated care";
however, not all persons agree on how t6 define this term nor on how to measure it. See IN sm ry,
OF MEDICINE, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE (RFIldlord H. Gray ed., 1986); Barbara
Arrington & Cynthia Carter Haddock, Who Really Profits from Not
-For-Profits?, 25 HEAcrti SERVS,
RESEARCH 291 (1990); Bradford H. Gray & Walter J. McNerney, For-Profit Enterprise in Health
Care: The Institute of Medicine Study, 314 NEW ENC. J. MED. 1523 (1986); Regina E. Herzlinger,
Setting the Record Straight: Are Voluntary Hospitals Caring for the Poor?, lb the Editor, 319 NEW
ENC. J. MED. (1988); Lawrence S. Lewin et al., Setting the Record Straight: The Provision of
Uncompensated Care by Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1212 (1988); Susan M.
Sanders, Does Mission Really Matter? Measuring and Examining Charity Care and Community
Benefit in Nonprofit Hospitals, in HEALTH INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: RISK, ALLOCATION AND
EQUITY (Miriam K. Mills & Robert Fl. Blank, eds. 1992) I hereinafter Sanders, Does Mission Really
Matter]; Susan M. Sanders, Measuring Charitable Contributions: Implications for the Nonprofit
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perception is that voluntary hospitals are not business enterprises and
thus should be providing charity care to warrant tax-exempt status as
a "charitable" organization.' 96 As will be discussed below in part IV.F.,
the IRS recently has seized upon the concerns for charity care. It now
incorporates charity care as part of the community benefit test for an
IDS. 197
Nonetheless, the IRS's stance with respect to the charity care
element does not appear to have been adopted universally. The Third
Hospital's Tax-Exempt Status, 38 Host. & HEAralt SERVS. Amittx. 401,403-05 (1993) [hereinafter
Sanders, Measuring Charitable Contribution); Frank A. Sloan et al., Identifying the Issues: A Statis-
tical Profile, in UNcomPENsAmo HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND REsPoNstisi tam 16 (Frank A.
Sloan et al. eds., 1986); Steinwald & Neuhauser, supra note 34, at 817; Regina E. Herzlinger &
William S. Krasker, Who Profits from Nonprofits?, 65 HAtrv, Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 1987, at 93; Uwe
E. Reinhardt, Flawed Methods Cripple Study on Not HOSPITALS, Apr. 20,1987, at 136.
Commentators and studies differ on the aggregate amount of charity care that not-for-profit
hospitals as opposed to for-profit hospitals provide, whether the poor actually receive charity care,
the characteristics of hospitals supplying the greatest amount of charity care, the impact of charity
care on a hospital's efficiency or inefficiency, and a host of other considerations. In addition to
the above cited works, see Richardson, supra note 58, at 910-13; Kenneth E. Thorpe & Charles
E. Phelps, The Social Role of Not-For-Profit Organizations: Hospital Provision of Charity Care, 29
Econr. 1NquiFtv 472, 481-82 (1991); GAO, BETTER STANDARDS, supra note 193; U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE SAM NUNN, UNITED STATES SENATE, PUBLIC
HOSPITALS: SALES LEAD TO BETTER FACILITIES RUT INCREASED PATIENT COSTS 38-49 (1986).
L96 These expectations and perceptions stem from the legal distinctions between the not-for-
profit corporate form and the for-profit corporate form. The common perception is that for-profit
corporations, including hospitals, have an obligation to shareholders to maximize their profits,
which generally would be inconsistent with the provision of charity care. Providing free or below
cost care to indigents would only serve to reduce profits. On the other hand, a popular perception
(albeit incorrect in the author's opinion in that not-for-profit corporations can make profits which
are referred to as a surplus in traditional accounting terms) is that not-for-profit entities, including
hospitals, are not supposed to make a profit. (Part of this viewpoint stems from legal prohibitions
which arise from the structure of not-for-profit entities—that is, the prohibition against (1) raising
capital by offering equity interests; (2) disbursement of any revenues in excess of debt costs and
production costs to members in the form of dividends, liquidated assets, or otherwise; (3)
payment of surplus revenues to managers in excess of reasonable salaries; and (4) violating
fiduciary duties to members and the public.) These persons believe that not-for-profit hospitals
generally should be altruistic in nature. Therefore, providing charity care to the poor would be
consistent with this perception. Moreover, because not-for-profit organizations are granted fa-
vored tax treatment, it is commonly believed that the provision of charity care is a quid pro quo
for the preferred tax-exempt status. Finally, although the perception is changing or has changed,
a common belief was that not-for-profit hospitals are riot business enterprises and therefore
should not compete with one another nor with for-profit hospitals for patients. See Kenneth J.
Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. Rev. 941 (1963); Bays,
supra note 26, at 367-73; Clarkson, supra note 10, at 363-70; Eugene E Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 2611... & ECON. 327 (1983); Foster, supra note 57, at 343-49;
Gray & McNerney, supra note 195, at 1524-25; Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 146,
at 837-40; Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 146, at 55-71; Stanley B. Jones et al., supra note 10,
at 113-18; Marmor et al., supra note 31, at 315-17; Pauly, supra note 10, at 257-60; Schlesinger
et al., supra note 30, at 427-29.
197 See infra notes 408-09 and accompanying text.
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Circuit in Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner ("Geisinger r') 158
 ex-
plained that "no clear test [of community benefit] has emerged to ap-
ply to nonprofit hospitals seeking [federal income] tax exemptions"m
and that the alternative standards of Revenue Ruling 56-185 and
Revenue Ruling 69-545, as amplified by Revenue Ruling 83-157, per-
sist.m Thus, the provision of nonemergency inpatient charity care by
hospitals is not yet an absolute and undisputed requirement pursuant
to the community benefit standard for tax exemption under I.R.C.
§ 501 (c) (3).
g. General Counsel Memorandum 39,862: Other Factors Influencing
Community Benefit Standard Applied to Hospitals
In 1991, the IRS issued General Counsel Memorandum 39,862
("GCM 39,862"), 2ifi which involved joint venture arrangements be-
tween hospitals and physicians. 2"2
 In discussing the major issue—
whether the joint venture arrangements jeopardized the hospitals'
tax-exempt status as a "charitable" organization under I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3)—the IRS listed four community benefits that might arise
from those arrangements deemed compatible with the hospitals'
"charitable" purposes. The four contributing factors enumerated were:
(1) the improvement of patient convenience; (2) increased accessibil-
ity of physicians to patients; (3) the creation of new or improved
providers to meet the health care needs of the community; and (4) the
improvement in, or reduction of cost of, treatment modalities. 2"3 Per-
haps more importantly, the IRS indicated that several characteristics
potentially arising from such joint venture arrangements would not be
deemed to benefit the community and would be considered incompat-
ible with any hospital's "charitable" purpose. Those factors rejected by
the IRS included: (1) the enhancement of the hospital's financial
health; (2) increased efficiencies; (3) greater utilization of facilities;
(4) increased referrals; and (5) limiting or avoiding competition. 2°4
Therefore, the IRS clearly took the position that hospital activities
19g985 r.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993).
09
 Id. at 1217.
21K/ Id.
201
 Gen. Cowls. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file,
1991 IRS GCM LEXIS 39.
21:1'2 See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text and part rv.ai (discussing Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,862).
203 Gen. Cowls, Mem. 39,862, supra note 201.
2114
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conducted for the purpose of contributing to the hospital's efficiency
and survival are not deemed community benefits.
h. Community Benefit Standard Applied to I.R. C. § 501(c)(3)
Health Care Organizations
As far as the IRS and courts are concerned, the community benefit
standard and concepts enunciated in Revenue Rulings 56-185, 69-545,
and 83-157 apply as a starting point to consider whether any freestand-
ing or affiliated health care organization pursuing initial tax-exempt
status or seeking to retain tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
deserves such tax-exempt treatrnent. 205 However, as illustrated by GCM
39,862, and as indicated in the following discussion of stand alone
HMOs, as well as in the later discussion of IDSs, horizontal hospital
networks, and physician-hospital arrangements, the IRS has extended
its inquiry beyond the four walls of these revenue rulings when deter-
mining whether a health care organization deserves I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3)
tax-exempt status. The expanded inquiry necessitated by an evolving
health care environment reflects a revival or regeneration of certain
concepts leading to a more refined definition of the community bene-
fit standard.
(1) Stand Alone HMOs and I.R.C. §§ 501(c) (3) and (c) (4)
For the most part, contemporary HMOs are for-profit enterprises.
As of 1993, approximately 180 enjoyed tax-exempt status under either
I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) or (c) (4). 206 0f those HMOs that have been granted
2°5 See, e.g., Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 394 (1993), affd 30 F.3d 494
(3d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Geisinger II] (HMO seeking I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status); Sound Health
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158 (1978) (HMO seeking I.R.C. § 50I(c) (3) status); University
of Mass. Medical Sch. Group Practice v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1299 (1980) (incorporated faculty
practice of medical school seeking I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status); B.H.W. Anesthesia Found., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 681 (1979) (incorporated anesthesiology department within teaching
hospital of Harvard Medical School seeking I.R.C. § 50I(c) (3) status); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828
(Aug, 30, 1990), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library GCM file, 1990 IRS GCM LEXIS 24; Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 95-11-035 (Dec. 19, 1994) (merging hospitals seek to retain I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status); Priv.
Ltr. Rul, (Mar. 31, 1993) [hereinafter Facey Ruling], reprinted in 7 ExEatrr ORG. TAX REV. 828
(1993) (Facey Medical Foundation, a foundation model IDS seeking I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. (Jan. 29, 1993), reprinted in 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 490 (1993) [hereinafter
Friendly Hills Ruling] (Friendly Hills Healthcare Network, a foundation model IDS seeking I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3) status).
2°6 Philip S. Neal & Suzanne M. Papiewski, Taxation of HMOs Novi and Under Health Care
Reform—Separating Fact From Fiction, 8 INs. Tax REV, 637, 640 (1994) (citing 1993 DIRECTORY
OF HMOs, supra note 83; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CUMULATIVE LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS
DESCRIBED IN SECTION 170(c) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 (Pub. No. 78) [herein.
after CUMULATIVE LIST']).
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tax-exempt status, 130 have been granted tax exemptions as "social
welfare" organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c) (4), 207
 while fifty HMOs
enjoy the more favorable treatment of tax-exempt "charitable" organi-
zations under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3).208
 HMOs seeking exemption either
as I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) or (c) (4) organizations must demonstrate that
they satisfy the community benefit standard. Although satisfaction of
the community benefit standard is a requisite for either type of tax-ex-
empt HMO, the standard appears to be stricter for HMOs seeking
to qualify initially for or retain I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) tax-exempt status.
Assuming that a not-for-profit HMO satisfies the community benefit
standard for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(a), it must also satisfy
the requirements of I.R.C. § 501(in). To do so, no "substantial part"
of the HMO's activities can be "commercial-type insurance." I.R.C.
§ 501(m) is untested to date with respect to § 501(c) (3) HMOs.
In 1978, in Sound Health Assn v. Commissioner," a case of first im-
pression, the Tax Court was confronted with the issue of whether a not-
for-profit HMO qualified for tax exemption as an I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
"charitable" organization. Sound Health Association ("SHA"), had as
its primary, but not sole, purpose the provision of health care services
to members on a prepaid basis. 21 ° It served only members who could
afford to pay a set premium plus a $200 capital dues levy. 211
 In order
to become a member of the HMO, an individual was required to pass
a physical examination, even if the individual belonged to SHA
through a group membership. 2 ' 2
 SHA employed only two physicians
2'7 Neal & Papiewski, supra note 206, at 640. For approximately 60 years, the IRS has
recognized the tax-exempt status of prepaid health care plans. Boisture, supra note 95, at 282.
The IRS had recognized Blue Cross and Blue Shield, which introduced the concept of prepaid
medical insurance, as tax-exempt social welfare organizations until 1986. At that time, Congress
withdrew the tax-exempt status of Blue Cross and Blue Shield because they were considered
"commercial-type" insurers. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1012(a), 100 Stat.
2085, 2390 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. § 501(m) (1994)). However, as part of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Congress accorded special tax accounting treatment of reserves to Blue Cross and Blue
Shield. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1012(b) (1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2391 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. § 833
(1994)). For a discussion of Blue Cross, see supra notes 45, 50-51; infra note 258.
For a definition and an explanation of the purpose and functions of HMOs, see infra
Glossary. For discussion of the explosive growth of HMOs in recent years, see supra note 83 and
accompanying text.
2°8 Neal & Papiewski, supra note 206, at 640.
209 71 T.C. 158 (1978).
210 1d. at 168-69.
211 Id. at 169-70. This fee structure might have prohibited low income individuals from
joining the HMO; however, the Tax Court considered the potential class of members of the HMO
as the entire community. Id. at 185.
212 Id. at 169-70. The physical test requirement for group members was a means of screening
for any "pre-existing condition." Id. at 170. The physical examination requirement for members
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and was considered a staff model HMO. However, SHA physicians were
able to refer patients to an SHA "courtesy staff," initially consisting of
sixteen physicians, who worked on a fee-for-service basis for SHA but
did not exclusively treat SHA patients. 213
 Membership on the "courtesy
staff' was open to all physicians who applied, and no physicians had
been refused privileges.'" Consistent with a long line of cases and
general counsel memoranda, 215 the IRS argued that SHA provided
preferential treatment to members and failed the organizational and
exclusive operational requirements. To this end, the IRS suggested that
SHA was not formed to provide medical services to the community-at-
large. The IRS further alleged that the HMO failed the community
benefit test because it failed to deliver medical services to the commu-
nity-at-large.
The Tax Court rejected the IRS's arguments. The court indicated
that one need not conclude that because an HMO is a membership
organization it necessarily is organized and operated for private benefit
rather than public benefit.''' The court stated, "[The] requirement
that the community must benefit from a charity's activities has, as its
natural corollary, that private interests must not so benefit in any
substantial degree."217 Relying on the community benefit standard of
desiring to join the HMO on an individual basis had the potential of excluding "high risk"
individuals and individuals with pre-existing conditions. Id. at 169, For group members, the
pre-existing condition clause could be waived upon satisfaction of four requirements, one of
which was passing the entrance physical examination. Id. at 170.
213 Id. at 172.
214 Sound Health Ass'n, 71 T.C. at 172.
215 See, e.g., American Women Buyers Club, Inc. v. U.S., 338 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1964); Com-
missioner v. Lake Forest, Inc., 305 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v. La Societe Francaise
De Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 152 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 793 (1946); Hassett
v. Associated Hosp. Serv. Corp., 125 F.2d 611 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 672 (1942); New
York State Ass'n of Real Estate Bds. Group Ins. Fund v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1325 (1970),
nonacq., 1974-2 G.B. 5; Gen. Couns. Metn, 36,734 (May 19, 1976); Gen. Courts, Mem. 22,554,
1941-1 C.B. 243.
216 Sound Health Ass'n, 71 T.C. at 184-91. In Sound Health Ass'n, the Tax Court indicated
that the HMO was not precluded from tax-exempt treatment as a membership organization.
Contrary to the IRS's position, the court found that the private benefits to members were
insubstantial when compared to the public benefits. The court considered the "extension of the
[private benefit] 'insider test'" of Treasury Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1(d) (1) (ii) inappropriate for ap-
plication to a membership based HMO representative of the community. 71 T.C. at 186.
In 1976, in Gen. Comas. Mem. 36,734, supra note 215, the IRS concluded that a prepaid
medical service plan did not qualify for tax exemption because it failed the community benefit
test. Although the IRS incorporated into the community benefit standard consideration of
whether the plan's prepaid premiums were based on a community rating, the failure of the plan
to satisfy the community benefit standard was based on the plan's service to members only; it did
not provide services to nonmembers,
217 Sound Health Ass'n, 71 T.C. at 181.
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Revenue Ruling 69-545, 218
 the court concluded that the HMO satisfied
the community benefit test and did not violate the prohibition against
excessive private benefit. 21" The court reviewed the factors listed in
Revenue Ruling 69-545, assigning the most importance and the great-
est weight to the community benefited. 22° It considered the potential
eligible membership class of the HMO to be sufficiently broad. In its
view, for all practical purposes HMO membership was open to the
entire community because the HMO had a subsidized dues program. 221
The court considered a number of other factors: (1) the HMO
provided emergency and nonemergency medical care to individu-
als unable to pay; 222 (2) the HMO had an open medical staff policy; 223
2114 See supra part IV.13.2.c.
219
 Sound Health Ass'n, 71 T.C. at 184-91; see infra part 1V.1] (discussing the private benefit
test).
Sound Health Ass'n, 71 'EC. at 187.
221 The court stated:
M he class of persons eligible for membership, and hence eligible to benefit from
the [HMO's] activities, is practically unlimited. The class of possible members of
the IRMO) is, for all practical purposes, the class of members of the community
itself, The major barrier to membership is lack of money, but a subsidized dues
program demonstrates that even this harrier is not intended to be absolute. The
subsidized dues program seems designed for such persons as Medicare and Medi-
caid recipients, and all those of lesser means.
Id. at 185. For an explanation of the subsidized dues program and treatment of nonmembers on
a reduced fee-for-service basis, see id. at 172-75. Moreover, the court noted that in "an action
snore charitable than any undertaken by Hospital A [in Revenue Ruling 69-545], the [HMO]
adopted a plan to establish a fund to receive contributions which would be used to help subsidize
persons who wanted membership but who could not make the full monthly payments required
for membership." Id. at 184. The court considered a "substantial benefit" to arise from the HMO's
community rated fee structure because it appeared to assure the spreading of the risk of illness
throughout the HMO's full membership. Id. at 189. In a summary statement, the Tax Court
stated, "[w]hen possible membership is so broad, benefit to the membership is benefit to the
community." Id. at 190.
222 The coon found that—
the [HMO) offers an open emergency room, has a subsidized dues program for
the "near poor," and has provided some free care to the poor. It is clear that those
latter services go far beyond the mere emergency room services offered by respon-
dent's hospital A [in Revenue Ruling 69-545].
If the charitable hospital can, except for emergency cases, restrict its treatment
to paying patients, the tHMOI should be able to restrict itself to paying members.
If the charitable hospital can obligate itself to treat only the financially responsible
ill, the Association should be able to obligate itself to treat only the financially
responsible, when and if they become In neither the case of the [HMO] nor
the hospital [in Revenue Ruling 69-545] can the emergency patient be refused
;rid.... If anything, the [HMO] has a stronger claim to public benefit than hospital
A [in Revenue Ruling 69-545].
Id. at 187-88. The facts in the case indicated that the HMO provided medical care at its clinic
and in its emergency room to patients unable to pay the full charges. Id. at 172-73.
223 ld. at. 184. The court noted that the courtesy staff was open to all qualified physicians and
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(3) the HMO's board of directors was composed of prominent citizens
of the community; 224 and (4) the HMO offered a public educational
program."' Thus, for purposes of determining whether SHA was a
"charitable" health care organization under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3), the Tax
Court essentially adopted the factors that the IRS had established as
its guidelines for the community benefit standard applicable to hospi-
tals under Revenue Ruling 69-545. 226
Approximately two years later, the IRS issued General Counsel
Memorandum 38,735 ("GCM 38,735"), 227 which relied on Sound Health
Ass'n and modified another general counsel memorandum. 228 In GCM
38,735, the IRS conceded that an HMO membership organization such
as SHA may be considered a "charitable" organization under I.R.C.
§ 501 (c) (3) if: (1) it has a "truly open" membership program; 229 (2) it
directly provides medical services to members and nonmembers, in-
cluding Medicare and Medicaid patients; (3) it is not actively engaged
in providing insurance because its salaried physicians and secondary
health care providers are compensated a fixed amount without vari-
ance for the nature or frequency of services performed during a
contract period; (4) it has an emergency room open to members and
nonmembers;2" (5) it has health research and education programs
open to the members and nonmembers; and (6) it has a subsidized
dues program."'
no one had been denied admission to that staff. The court did not address the policy with respect
to the employed physicians.
224 Id. at 171-72, 184-85.
229 Sao nd Health Ass'n, 71 T.C, at 174,
2"See supra part IV.B.2.c.
227 Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,735 (May 29, 1981), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file,
1981 IRS GCM LEXIS 190.
2" Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,043 (Mar. 14, 1977), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file,
1977 IRS GCM LEXIS 386.
229 The Tax Court had ignored in Sound Health Ass'n that the HMO's membership practices
seemed rather restrictive and had the potential for "cherry picking,"—that is, refusing enrollment
to high risk individuals. For a discussion of the Tax Court view of the open membership, see
supra note 221. In Gen, Courts, Mem, 38,735, citing facts relied upon by the Tax Court, the IRS
appears to accept the Tax Court's view of Sound Health Association as an "open membership"
organization. However, in this general counsel memorandum, the IRS emphasizes that "truly
open" membership is a requisite for considering an HMO to be a "charitable" organization. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 38,735, supra note 227, at *18.
23°The IRS weighed the benefits to the community and found them to be substantially
greater than any private benefits served by the HMO. The IRS stated that the determination as
to whether the private benefits are sufficiently incidental both quantitatively and qualitatively is
"measured in the context of the overall benefit conferred by the activity." Id. at *16—*I7 (citing
Gets. Coons. Mem. 37,889 (March 20, 1979), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file, 1979
IRS GCM LEXIS 309).
2" Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,735, supra note 227, at *16—*24.
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Several years thereafter, the IRS issued General Counsel Memo-
randum 39,057 ("GCM 39,057") . 232 That memorandum involved a not-
for-profit HMO which proposed to arrange for health care for pre-
paid members through an affiliated individual practice association
("IPA"). 233
 The IPA would assure availability, accessibility, and continu-
ity of medical care through agreements with an established network of
health care centers. The IRS compared this HMO to SHA and found
it lacking numerous qualities present in SHA." 4 Emphasizing that the
instant IPA model HMO was not a health care provider but merely an
arranger of health care, the IRS found that it did not satisfy the criteria
of Revenue Ruling 69-545. 235
 It concluded that as a health care ar-
ranger, rather than a provider, this HMO's operations and activities
served substantial private benefits that were not incidental compared
to the community benefits. 2'" Therefore, once again, the IRS firmly had
stated its position: for an HMO to be considered a "charitable" organi-
zation within the meaning of I.R.C. § 501(c) (3), among other things,
it must directly provide health care services. The IRS had considered
SHA to be such a provider-type HMO even though it had employed
merely two physicians who used the HMO facilities to treat enrollee-
patients (representative of a staff model HMO 29 and had contracted
on a fee-for-service basis with a "courtesy staff' to provide medical
services on a referral basis.
In 1990, the IRS issued General Counsel Memorandum 39,828
("GCM 39,828") as an elaboration on GCM 39,057. 2" The IRS listed
numerous important features under the community benefit standard
relevant to HMOs seeking I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status: (1) direct provi-
232 Gen. Couns. Mein. 39,057 (Nov. 9, 1983), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file,
1983 IRS GCM LEXIS 105.
233
 For a definition of an IPA, see infra Glossary.
254
 For example, the IRS found that the HMO would not serve nonmembers and would not
maintain any program to assist the nonmember-poor in obtaining emergency medical care. Gen,
Couns, Mem. 39,057, supra note 232, at *10.
235 The IRS compared the HMO to Hospital B described in Revenue Ruling 69-545. It
indicated that control of the HMO rested exclusively in the members of the IPA rather than in
an independent body representing the community at large. Id. at *10—*11. The IRS concluded
that the HMO was essentially a shell entity that promoted the business interest of the WA, which,
in turn, was controlled by health care providers. Id. at *13.
236 Id.
237
 See infra Glossary (defining a staff model HMO).
236
 Gen. Courts. Mem. 39,828, supra note 205. One commentator has suggested that Plan B,
discussed in Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 likely was Geisinger Health Plan ("GHP"). See Kenneth L.
Levine, Geisinger Health Plan Likely to Adversely Affect HMOs and Other Health Organizations, 79
J. TAx'N 90, 91 n.2 (1993). For a discussion of GHP, see infra notes 242-56 and accompanying
text.
60	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vot. 37:1
sion of health care services and maintenance of health care facilities
and staff; (2) delivery of services on a fee-for-service basis to nonmem-
bers; (3) maintenance of a truly open enrollment without restric-
tions, as evidenced by such facts as whether individuals and small
groups comprise a "substantial portion of membership" and whether
the HMO has an "overt program" to attract individuals as potential
members; 239
 (4) usage of a community rating system and similarity of
rates charged to individuals and groups; 24° (5) operation of a "mean-
ingful" subsidized membership program; (6) provision of health edu-
cation and research programs; (7) operation of an open emergency
room and communication to the community of its availability; (8)
treatment of patients covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and similar pro-
grams; (9) payment of health care providers, such as physicians, on a
fixed fee basis; and (10) utilization of surplus funds to improve facili-
ties, equipment, patient care, and educational programs for the public.
The IRS seemed to take the position that certain characteristics, in-
cluding the direct provision of health care services, truly open enroll-
ment, and the delivery of care through reduced rates to the medically
indigent, are mandatory for an HMO to achieve I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
tax-exempt status. 241
More recently, in Geisinger 1, 242 Geisinger Health Plan ("GHP"),
a non-staff model HMO, which the IRS recognized as an I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (4) "social welfare" organization, sought I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
tax-exempt status.243
 GHP contracted with more than 400 physicians
for their services. 244
 The Tax Court held in favor of GHP. Using the
community benefit standard that it had enunciated in Sound Health
239 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828, supra note '238, at *16.
240 This factor, along with open membership and the provision of services on a fee-for-service
basis to nonmembers is an apparent means of distinguishing an HMO from a provider of
"commercial-type" insurance within the meaning of I.R.C. § 501(m) (1994), discussed infra notes
257-74 and accompanying text.
241 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828, supra note 238, at *14—*15.
242 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993).
243 See Brief for the Appellee [Commissioner], Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 30
F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994) (No. 93-7699), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT File, 94 TNT
97-43 [hereinafter Geisinger II Brief]; Geisinger HMO Denied 501(0(3), Not Integral Part of System,
4 MANAGED CARE WEEK ATLANTIC INFO, SERV., INC., available in Wesdaw, MCAREWK database,
1994 WL 2622523. GHP sought I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status in order to obtain preferential tax
treatment accorded those organizations. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing
preferential tax treatment of I.R.C. § 50I(c) (3) organizations).
244 The courts described CHI' as an entity that arranged for health care to be provided to its
subscribers by contracts with hospitals, radiologists, laboratories, clinics, and pharmacies. See
Geisinger 1, 985 F.2d at 1213; see also, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656, 1661, 1663 (1991), reu'd, 985 F.2d
at 1210. It seems likely from the facts that GHP was an IPA model HMO, which was part of a
foundation model IDS. For discussion of the HMO models, and IDS models, see infra Glossary.
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Ass 'n215 and comparing GHP to SHA, the Tax Court ruled that the class
of possible members in GHP is "practically unlimited."24" The Tax
Court found that GHP had no substantial limitation on the class of
individuals eligible for membership nor on persons eligible for mem-
bership in GHP's planned, but unimplemented, dues program. 2" The
court supported this decision by reciting the following factors: (1)
individuals alone and through groups could enroll for the same pre-
paid premium based on a community rating system; 243 (2) groups with
at least 100 eligible enrollees within GHP's service area could enroll
without completing a medical history questionnaire, but question-
naires were required of enrollees through smaller groups; 249 (3) Medi-
care recipients were offered medical services at a reduced rate on a
wraparound basis; and (4) the HMO would cover Medicaid patients
when it reached an agreement with the State for coverage. The Tax
Court concluded that the community benefited and the prohibition
against excessive private benefit was not violated."" Focusing on the
IRS's argument that qualification as a charitable health care organiza-
tion under I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) requires the entity to be a "provider" of
medical services—which GHP was not, but rather was merely an ar-
ranger of health care services—the Tax Court responded, "[t]he fur-
nishing of medical care or the operation of a hospital or an HMO is
not specifically listed as a qualifying exempt activity under section
501(c) (3). The provision of medical services must therefore fall within
the words 'charitable purpose' to be exempt. "251 The court concluded
that actual provision of medical services by the HMO is not required
to qualify, but "it is the purpose toward which an organization's activi-
ties are directed that is ultimately dispositive." 252 The Tax Court then
held that "it is the organization's ability to ensure that adequate health
care services are actually delivered to a sufficiently large class in the
community that it serves that is critical." 2'3
The Third Circuit disagreed with the Tax Court's holding, but,
while insisting on a facts and circumstances analysis, agreed that Sound
245 See supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
2411 Gei,singer 1, 62 T.C.M. (CCI-1) at 1663.
247m.
248 Id. at 1657.
248 Id. at 1659.
251IThe Tax Court focused on the prohibition of excessive private benefit to "insiders," but
found none. Id. at 1663. For a discussion of the prohibition of private inurement, see infra part
251 Geisinger I, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1661.
2521d.
253 1d. at 1663.
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Health Ass'n, Revenue Ruling 69-545, and the revenue ruling's prog-
eny provided appropriate precedents as an analytical starting point. 254
The appellate court asserted a narrower approach than the Tax Court
in analyzing GHP's purpose and activities. It concluded that GHP, on
its own, did not satisfy the community benefit test. The Third Circuit
stated:
GHP cannot say that it provides any health care services itself.
Nor does it ensure that people who are not GHP subscribers
have access to health care or information about health care.
According to the record, it neither conducts research nor
offers educational programs, much less educational programs
open to the public. It benefits no one but its subscribers.
. . . The community benefited is, in fact, limited to those
who belong to GHP since the requirement of subscribership
remains a condition precedent to any service. Absent any
additional indicia of a charitable purpose, this self-imposed
precondition suggests that GHP is primarily benefiting itself
(and, perhaps, secondarily benefiting the community) by pro-
moting subscribership throughout the areas it serves.
In sum, GHP does not qualify for tax-exempt status under
section 501(c) (3) since it does no more than arrange for its
subscribers, many of whom are medically underserved, to
receive health care services from health care providers. . .
Arranging for the provision of medical services only to those
who "belong" is not necessarily charitable, particularly where,
as here, the HMO has arranged to subsidize only a small
number of such persons. GHP, standing alone, is not entitled
to tax-exempt status under section 501(c) (3). 255
As interpreted by the Third Circuit, the community benefit stand-
ard requires that an I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) stand alone HMO be an actual
provider of health care rather than merely an arranger or deliverer of
health care. The Third Circuit did not articulate a means for differen-
tiating a health care provider from a health care arranger. Reading
between the lines of the Third Circuit opinion, it appears that the court
may have distinguished the two classifications based on whether the
254 Geisirtger I, 985 F.2d at 1216 (discussing the weight to be given to revenue rulings generally
and the appropriateness of using a ruling involving a hospital).
255 Id. at 1219-20.
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organization employs the physicians actually delivering the medical
care. Assuming this distinction, network model HMOs, IPA model
HMOs, and dedicated and ordinary group model HMOs would be pre-
cluded from qualifying for tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
on a stand alone basis. 256 In that event, only staff model HMOs would
remain capable of obtaining and retaining "charitable" organization
status.
Although the Third Circuit ruled that GHP was ineligible for
I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status, GHP was left with its previously conferred
status as a "social welfare" organization. Neither GHP nor the Commis-
sioner had questioned on brief or during argument GHP's entitlement
to I.R.C. § 501(c) (4), and consequently the Tax Court and the Third
Circuit did not address the issue.
(2) Stand Alone HMOs and I.R.C. § 501(m)
It appears that as a first step for qualification as a tax-exempt
"charitable" organization under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3), an HMO must be
an actual provider of health care services—that is, a staff model HMO.
Additionally, its membership must be truly open to the entire commu-
nity, as evidenced by all facts and circumstances. An HMO that satisfies
these conditions then must overcome another hurdle. Pursuant to
I.R.C. § 501(m) (1), "no substantial part" of the activities of an other-
wise qualifying I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) or (c) (4) organization may consist
of "providing commercial-type insurance." 257
For a discussion of the HMO models, see infra Glossary. Two commentators forcefully
argue that the only type of HMO that is a "provider" of health services is the staff model. Neal
& Papiewski, supra note 206, at 640. They suggest that to be a provider of health care, an HMO
must employ physicians and not merely contract with physicians to provide medical services.
Merely contracting for others to directly provide health care services is the equivalent of arranging
services, not directly providing them. The commentators suggest. that even a dedicated group
model HMO is not a "provider" because, like an ordinary group model HMO, the physician-
providers are employed by a taxable entity other than the HMO that contracts for their services.
Id.
257
	 provision was added by § 1012(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-519,
100 Stat. 2085, 2390-91 (1986) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 501 (1994)). The I.R.C. does
not define the term "substantial." The Explanation of Provisions section of the I-louse Report and
the joint Committee on Taxation General Explanation refers to Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d
1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974), and Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955). See H.R. REP.
No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 664 (1985); STAFF or THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH
CONG., 2o SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF' 1986, at 585 (Comm. Print
1987) [hereinafter 1986 Acr BLUE BooK]. The 	 defines "commercial-type insurance" only
by reference to cost. The I-louse Report defines the term as "any insurance of a type provided by
commercial insurance companies." H.R. REP. No. 426, supra, at 465.
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I.R.C. § 501(m) (3) (B) provides that "commercial-type insurance"
shall not include "incidental health insurance provided by a health
maintenance organization of a kind customarily provided by such
organization." I.R.C. § 501(m) was enacted primarily to subject Blue
Cross and Blue Shield, previously tax-exempt as I.R.C. § 501(c) (4)
"social welfare organizations," to taxation as insurance companies. 258
The conference committee report to the Tax Reform Act of 1986
indicates that I.R.C. § 501(m) is not intended to affect the exemption
of any HM0. 259 This sentiment is reiterated in the conference commit-
tee report to the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988. 260
However, as commentators have pointed out, the statutory language
is ambiguous because I.R.C. § 501(m) (3) (B) appears superfluous to
I.R.C. § 501 (m) (1) . 261
The IRS's own pronouncements have indicated confusion as to
the effect of I.R.C. §§ 501(m) (1) and (m) (3) on the tax-exempt status
258 1986 Act . BLUE BOOK, supra note 257, at 584-88; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 257, at
664-65. Congress repealed the tax exemption of Blue Cross and Blue Shield because they were
viewed as direct competitors to commercial health insurance companies which did not have the
same preferred tax-exempt treatment. 1986 ACT BLUE BOOK, supra note 257, at 584-88; H.R. REP.
No. 426, supra note 257, at 664-65. However, Congress recognized that although health insurance
was available through commercial insurers, the competitive environment might result in coverage
becoming too expensive or unavailable to small and high risk groups. 1986 Act . BLUE BOOK, supra
note 257, at 584-88; H.R. Rim, No. 426, supra note 257, at 664-65. Therefore, wishing to
distinguish between typical commercial insurance companies and Blue Cross and Blue Shield
organizations, as well as to provide some tax equity, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Congress enacted 1.R.C. § 833. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1012(b)-(c), 100
Stat. 2085, 2391 (1986) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 833 (1988)). That statute provides certain
tax-favored treatment to existing Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations, as well as other
organizations that tweet strict requirements. See I.R.C. § 833(c) for a definition of the qualifying
organizations to which the statute applies.
In general, I.R.C. § 833(a) provides that a qualifying organization will be treated as a stock
property-casualty insurance company, but it exempts the qualifying organizations from the re-
quirement of including in income 20% of additions to their unearned premium reserves. 1.R.C.
§ 833(b) permits qualifying organizations to take a special deduction for regular tax purposes,
but not for alternative minimum tax purposes. This special deduction is equal to the excess, if
any, of 25% of the sum of claims incurred during the taxable year, and expenses incurred during
the taxable year in connection with the administration, adjustment or settlement of claims, over
adjusted surplus as of the beginning of the year. I.R.C. § 833(b). However, this deduction is
limited to the organization's regular health-related taxable income, determined according to
specified rules, Id.
259 1i.R. CONF. Rio'. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 11-345-46 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.G.C.A.N. 9075, 4433-34.
26(4-1.R. Cour. REP. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., II-9 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5269; S. REP. No. 445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 120-21, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 45 i 5, 4637-38.
261 See Neal & Papiewski, .supra note 206, at 644 (suggesting that Congress must have intended
the HMO exception to have a broader meaning as a result of the repeated language of I.R.C.
§§ 501(11)(1) and (m) (3)).
December 1995]	 HEALTH CARE & TAX EXEMPTION	 65
of HMOs. In 1968, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 68-27, which indi-
cated that a staff model HMO would not be considered an "insur-
ance company" because it provided preventive health care, which did
not involve insurance risk but merely business risk. 262
 Thereafter, in a
release purportedly involving Geisinger Health Plan, the IRS took
the position that a non-staff model HMO was not entitled to I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3) status because it engaged in substantial activities as a com-
mercial-type insurance company in violation of I.R.C. § 501 (m). 26'
More recently, the IRS issued General Counsel Memorandum
39,829 ("GCM 39,829") ;264 to amplify and clarify GCM 39,828. GCM
39,828 presented the IRS's legal approach for determining under
LR.C. § 501(m) whether an I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) HMO engages in "com-
mercial-type insurance" and whether the HMO at issue provided more
than incidental health insurance of the kind customarily provided by
HMOs, The HMO in GCM 39,829 was a not-for-profit IPA model HMO
that was considered tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c) (4). It was not a
point-of-service plan nor an open-ended HMO, and members were
locked into care through the HMO's affiliated providers so that none-
mergency treatment could not be obtained outside the HMO's provid-
ers. The IRS did not wholly rely on Revenue Ruling 68-27. 265 Instead,
it also reviewed general counsel memoranda, 266 cases,267 and legislative
history26" in its attempt to determine whether the principal activity of
modern HMOs is the provision of health care or the provision of
commercial-type insurance.
262 Res'. Rul. 68-27, 1968-1 C.B. 315. In the revenue ruling, the IRS emphasized that a staff
model HMO was not an insurance company because it directly provided medical services to
members through salaried physician-employees in the HMO's clinic. The HMO provided preven-
tive medical care which the IRS considered to be not equivalent to an insurance risk but to be
merely a business risk. The 1RS reasoned that when illness occurs in member patients, generally
no extra expenses must be incurred by the HMO, The HMO is required to pay the salaries of its
employed physicians, nurses, and technicians regardless of the illness status of the HMO mem-
bers.
263 Gen. Corms. Mem. 39,828, supra note 238. On brief before the Tax Court in Geisinger II,
IRS abandoned its earlier position that the HMO was a commercial-type insurance provider in
violation of I.R.C. § 501(m). Geisinger II Brief 30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994) (No. 93-7699), available
in LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT File, 94 TNT 97-43.
264 Gen. Coons. Mein. 39,829 (Aug. 30, 1990), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file,
1990 IRS GCM LEXIS 25.
265 Supra note 262.
266 Gen. Coons. Mem. 39,703 (Feb. 26, 1988), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM
1988 IRS GCM LEXIS 15; Gen. Colitis. Mem. 39,828, supra note 205.
267 	Helvering v LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941); Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d
239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1068, 1073 (1976), aff'd, 572
F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1978).
268 S. Rio'. No. 313, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986); 1.1.R. CONF. REP. NO. 841, supra note 259,
at 11-346, reprinted in 1986 U.S,C,C.A.N. at 4434; H.R. km. No. 426, supra note 257.
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The IRS took a facts and circumstances approach in GCM 39,829.
It reviewed the following factors with respect to the HMO at issue: ( I)
whether the HMO transferred and distributed an insurance risk; (2)
whether the HMO operated in a manner similar to for-profit insurers
or Blue Cross and Blue Shield; (3) whether the HMO marketed a
product similar to for-profit insurers or Blue Cross and Blue Shield;
(4) whether the HMO provided health care services directly to pa-
tients; and (5) whether the HMO shifted any risk of loss to serv-
ice providers through salary or fixed-fee arrangements. The IRS con-
cluded that regardless of the model-type label attached to an I.R.C.
§ 501 (c) (4) HMO, if the HMO compensates some primary care phy-
sicians exclusively on a salary, capitation, or other fixed fee basis, it is
considered to be principally a health care provider and to provide
insurance only incidentally. This last attribute brings the HMO within
the exception of I.R.C. § 501(m) (3) (B). Hence, even if the HMO pays
additional health care providers on a fee-for-service basis, under GCM
39,829, it is deemed not disqualified from tax-exempt treatment by
virtue of I.R.C. § 501(m) (1). 2" In the instant case, the IPA model HMO
qualified under the stated criteria for I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) treatment and
was not disqualified by I.R.C. § 501(m).
(3) HMO Summary
In summary, there is considerable confusion and variation in the
treatment of stand alone not-for-profit HMOs. The clear message of
GCM 39,829 is that I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) staff and non-staff model HMOs
that compensate a number of primary care physicians on a salary,
capitation, or other fixed fee basis are considered medical service
providers and not commercial-type insurers for purposes of I.R.C.
§ 501(m). Consequently, such I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) HMOs can qualify for
tax-exempt treatment under I.R.C. § 501(a).270
By contrast, in Geisinger I, the Third Circuit held that GHP, as
a stand alone IPA model HMO, did not qualify for I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3) treatment because it did not directly provide health care
services. 27 ' Therefore, as a first step, to qualify as a "charitable" health
care organization within the meaning of I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3), the com-
munity benefit standard requires an HMO to satisfy health care
269 Cf. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-12-002 (Dec. 17, 1993) (for-profit IPA model HMOs treated as
insurance companies).
270
 See Neal & Papiewski, supra note 206, at 644.
271 See supra notes 242-56 and accompanying text.
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provider status.272 It appears that only staff model nonprofit HMOs will
so qualify.2"
As a second step for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 501(a), pursu-
ant to I.R.C. § 501(m), an I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) HMO must prove that
"no substantial part" of its activities consists of "commercial-type insur-
ance." The question arises as to whether this determination is super-
fluous because under the community benefit standard, an I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3) HMO must have already proved that it was a health care
provider. 274 Although untested to date, it seems unlikely that such an
HMO would again need to demonstrate that it is a health care provider
in the context of I.R.C. § 501(m). However, if the HMO were required
to do so, it is unclear whether the standard would be the same as that
for demonstrating compliance under the community benefit test for
"charitable" organization status. What does appear clear is that under
I.R.C. § 501(m) such an I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) HMO would need to prove
that no more than an incidental portion of its activities are insurance
related and that any insurance activities are of the kind common to all
HMOs.
In conclusion, not-for-profit stand alone staff model and non-staff
model HMOs might still enjoy the potential of qualifying for tax-ex-
empt status under I.R.C. § 501(c) (4). By contrast, assuming incidental
health insurance activities of a type common to HMOs, not-for-profit
staff model HMOs are the only type of stand alone HMO with the
opportunity to qualify under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). Of course, even these
staff model stand alone HMOs must satisfy the I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
public policy doctrine and the prohibitions against private inurement
and excessive private benefit.
C. Prohibition Against Private Inurement
I.R.C. §§ 501(c) (3) and (c) (4) contain a prohibition against pri-
vate inurement. 275 This proscription is intended to ensure that an
organization's funds are dedicated to its exempt activities by forbid-
ding individuals "in a position to do so from siphoning off any .. .
income or assets for personal use" or benefit.Z7' The aim is to prevent
272 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
275
	 supra note 256 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
276 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides that no part of the net earnings...inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual," 1.1t.C. § 501(c) (4) has ;I similar prohibition: "[t]he net
earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes."
M GM. Couns. Mein. 39,862 .supra note 201, at *17. At an earlier dine, the Office of Chief
Counsel of the IRS explained that Inurement is likely to arise where the financial benefit
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distributions of charitable assets in any form by terms that would not
be considered arms length and would not be identical to ordinary
business practices—such as payment in excess of fair market value of
assets purchased or payment of more than reasonable compensation—
with respect to persons having an opportunity to control or influence
the organization's activities.'" Therefore, the prohibition applies to
"insiders" having a personal or private interest in the organization. 278
It is clear from the intent of the private inurement prohibition that
directors and officers of a not-for-profit organization will be considered
insiders. 279 The Office of General Counsel of the IRS has taken a broad
view, and in the context of not-for-profit hospitals, it consistently has
regarded all physicians on a hospital's medical staff as "insiders," 28°
even if they are not employed by the hospital but have a close profes-
sional working relationship with the hospita1. 281
Because the proscription is an absolute prohibition with no exist-
ing de minimis exception and the exclusive sanction for its violation
is revocation of tax-exempt status, this statutory prohibition is formi-
represents a transfer of the organization's financial resources to an individual solely by virtue of
the individual's relationship with the organization, and without regard to accomplishing exempt
purposes." Gen. Coups. Mem. 38,459 (July 31, 1980), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM
File, 1980 IRS GCM LEXIS 71, at *18; see Treas. Reg, §§ 1.501(c) (3)-I (c) (2), 1(d) (1) (as amended
in 1990); American Campaign Acad. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053, 1065-66 (1989). For a
detailed discussion of the private inurement concept, see Homus, supra note 19, at 264-99.
277 See Priv. Ltr. RM. 91-12-006 (Dec. 20, 1990); Gen. Coons. Mem. 39,598 (Dec. 8, 1986),
available in Westlaw, FTX-GCM file, GCM 39598; HOPKINS, supra note 19 at 264-66; Bernadette
M. Broccolo & Michael W. Peregrine, Bad Doctor Deals Place Hospitals at New Risk, Part II—The
Lac Facilities, Inc. Revocation, I I Exawr ORG. TAX REV. 267, 268-69 (1995). But see Kenneth L.
Levine, Guidelines on Donations of Medical Practices to Tax-Exempt Hospitals, 57 TAX NOTES 1059
(1992) (discussing possible means of outright and deferred gifts of medical practices to tax-ex-
empt hospitals by retiring physician not considered an "insider" and without violation of Medi-
care/Medicaid fraud and anti-abuse laws).
278 See Gen. Cowls. Mem. 39,598, supra note 277, at *18–*19; HOPKINS, supra note 19, at
266-74; see also American Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1066.
279 See Treas. Reg. §§ I .503(c) (3)-1 (c) (1), –1(d) (1).
281/ Gen. Coitus. Mein. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file,
1986 IRS GCM LEXIS 35, at *7; Gen. Courts. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201, at *18.
281 Gen. Coons. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201, at * 19. This position has roots in a prior general
counsel memorandum in which the IRS broadened die concept of an "insider" to the point of
including "all persons performing services for an organization 'because, in the opinion of the
IRS, those individuals] have a personal and private interest and therefore possess the requisite
relationship necessary to find private benefit or inurement." Gen. Coons. Mem. 39,670 (Oct. 14,
1987) available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file, 1987 IRS GCM LEXIS 76, at *8. Two com-
mentators have aptly labeled the IRS position that all hospital-alliliated physicians are considered
"insiders" as a rebuttable presumption. Broccolo & Peregrine, supra note 277, at 269.
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dable. 282
 It may be eluded only by the complete absence of private
benefit.'"
As explained by the Tax Court, the prohibition against private
inurement shares common and overlapping elements with the prohi-
bition against excessive private benefit. 284
 Private inurement and pri-
vate benefit must be evaluated independently. The presence of private
inurement violates both the proscription against excessive private ben-
efit and private inurement. 285
 The absence of private inurement how-
ever, does not mean that private benefit can go unevaluated. 2s6 In fact,
private benefit can exist without private inurement. 287
D. Prohibition Against Excessive Private Benefit
The statutory prohibition against excessive private benefit applies
to prevent the tax-exempt organization from being organized or oper-
ated primarily for the benefit of a small, identifiable group of individu-
als. The group of individuals is not limited to "insiders," but can
include unaffiliated "outsiders" as well. Thus, the intent of the prohi-
bition is to assure that the tax-exempt organization is operated for
public, and not private, purposes.
Unlike the absolute prohibition against private inurement, de
minimis private benefit is tolerated. If private benefit exists, it must be
incidental to public benefit in both a qualitative and a quantitative
2s2 Few hospitals have lost their tax-exempt status once granted. Those that have lost their
tax-favored status have done so on the basis of violating the prohibitions against private inurement
or private benefit. For examples of the revocation of the tax-exempt status of hospitals and clinics
based on violation of private inurement, see Harding Hosp. v. United States, 505 F.2(1 1068 (6th
Cir. 1974); Anclote Psychiatric Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 374 (1992); Lowry Hosp. Ass'n
v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 850 (1976); Lorain Ave. Clinic v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 141 (1958);
Wendy L. Parker Rehabilitation Found,, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 51 (1986); Internal
Revenue Service, Hospital Challenges Exemption Revocation in U.S. Court of Federal Claims: Tech-
nical Advice Memo Underlying Revocation of Hospital's Exempt Status, 10 EXEMPT Oat:, TAX REV.
1314 (1994) (revoking tax-exempt status of LAC facilities); see also Gem Coons. Mem. 39,862,
supra note 201; Gen. Coons. Mem. 39,598, supra note 277; Gen, Couns. Mem. 39,646 (June 30,
1987), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file, 1987 IRS GCM LEXIS 52.
255
 See infra notes 284-87 and accompanying text (discussing Tax Court's view of overlapping
elements of the two prohibitions).
284 American Campaign Acad. v. Commisioner, 92 T.C. 1053, 1068 (1989); Church of Ethereal
Joy v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 20, 21 (1984); Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
337, 345 n.10 (1980).
285
 American Campaign Acad. 92 T.C. at 1068-69.
286 Id.
287 1d. at 1069. Thus, the prohibition against private inurement could be considered a subset
of the prohibition against excessive private benefit. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201, at
*32.
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sense. 288 To be considered qualitatively incidental, a private benefit
must occur as a necessary concomitant—that is, natural, indirect, or
unintentional—to the activity that benefits the public at large. 289 To be
classified as quantitatively incidental, the benefit must be insubstantial
when compared to the public benefit that arises from the activity. 29°
Thus, the two-prong test balances the private benefit resulting from a
particular activity against the public benefit accruing from that same
activity. 291
Similar to the prohibition against private inurement, the sole
sanction for violation of the private benefit standard is revocation of
an organization's tax-exempt status. In recent years, the issues of pri-
vate inurement and private benefit in the health care setting have
arisen primarily in the context of hospital-physician joint ventures,
physician retention and recruitment, and health care provider net-
works, including the formation of IDSs as well as reorganizations of
hospital networks. 292 The IRS has taken the position that some amount
of private benefit is present in "all typical hospital-physician relation-
ships. "293
I. Hospital-Physician Joint Ventures
Joint venture arrangements between tax-exempt hospitals and
physicians are highly suspect. 294 In determining whether a hospital's
28H Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201 at *35—*37; Gen. Cowls. Mem. 37,789 (Dec.
18, 1978), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file, 1978 IRS GCM LEXIS 42, at *7—*11.
2" Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201, at *35—*37.
290 Id,
411 The overall public benefit accruing from the tax-exempt organization as a whole does not
enter into the balancing process. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789, supra note 288, at *7—*11; Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201, at *36.
292 For a discussion of the standards applied to IDSs and hospital networks, including their
reorganizations, see infra part IV.F. In a general counsel memorandum, the IRS stated that it may
consider whether not-for-profit hospitals and their parent corporations deserve I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
treatment based on the relationship between the parent corporation and other public charitable
organizations controlled by the same persons who control the supporting parent. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,508 (May 27, 1986), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file, 1986 IRS GCM
LEXIS 45.
293 1d. at *35. The IRS offered the following statement as an explanation of its position:
Physicians generally use hospital facilities at no cost to themselves to provide
services to private patients for which they earn a fee. The private benefit accruing
to the physicians generally can be considered incidental to the overwhelming public
benefit resulting from having the combined resources of the hospital and its
professional staff available to serve the public. Though the private benefit is com-
pounded in the case of certain specialists, such as heart transplant surgeons, who
depend heavily on highly specialized hospital facilities, that fact alone will not make
the private benefit more than incidental.
Id. at *36 (citation omitted).
2 `14 The IRS scrutiny focuses on potential violations of the prohibitions against private inure-
December 1995)	 HEALTH CARE TAX EXEMPTION
	 71
participation in a joint venture should jeopardize its exemption, the
IRS considers four questions: (1) How are the hospital's tax-exempt
purposes furthered by the arrangement?'" (2) Is any private benefit
received by the persons involved in the joint venture merely incidental
to the tax-exempt purposes of the tax-exempt organization? (3) Do any
assets of the tax-exempt organization inure to the private benefit of
any insider? and (4) Is any public policy violated as a result of the
arrangement?'"
Focusing on the prohibitions against private inurement and ex-
cessive private benefit, GCM 39,862 is perhaps the most infamous of
the IRS releases applicable to physician-hospital joint ventures.297 In
that general counsel memorandum, the IRS reconsidered and reversed
the position it took in three previously issued private letter rulings. 2's
Each situation involved the transfer of a hospital department or labo-
ratory, such as an outpatient surgical unit or gastroenterology labora-
tory, to a joint venture organization formed by the hospital arid staff
physician-investors. The IRS took the position that the tax-exempt
status of the hospital would be jeopardized if the hospital transferred
or sold the future net income stream of its department or laboratory
to the joint venture organization. 299
 This stance was based on the
prohibitions against private inurement and excessive private benefit.sw
meat and excessive private benefit and on the lack of Medicaid patients serviced by roost joint
venture providers. See U.S. GIN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONPROFIT HosPrrars: FOR PROFIT VEN-
TURERS Posr; Accs:ss AND CAPACITY PROBLEMS (1993).
""This question addresses not only the prohibition against private benefit, but also the
"operational exclusivity" requirement. See Gen. Courts. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201, at *39
(discussing the question). Fur a brief discussion of the "operational exclusivity" requirement and
the community benefit standard as applied by the IRS to physician-hospital joint ventures, see
supra part 1V.B.2.g.
2•' 1 For in discussion of the public policy issue, see infra part N.E.
2"7 See supra note 201. One commentator stated that the general counsel memorandum
"threw into turmoil a type of relationship that had developed between many physicians and
tax-exempt hospitals." Richard M. Lipton, IRS Attacks Hospital Joint Ventures, 70 Taxes 59, 59
(1992), Not only did journals directed at tax practitioners perceive GCM 39,862 as tax worthy,
but popular news media such as The Wall Street Journal had prominent articles with sensational-
ised headlines or lead lines. See, Paul Streckfus, Recently Released CCM .Serves as Yellow Flag for
Exempt Hospitals, 53 Tax Num 1456 (1991); Ron Winslow, IRS Stance May Force Some Hospitals
To End Ventures, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1991, at BI. For law review articles discussing GCM 39,862,
see Patrick H. Lucas, The Service's Latest Attempt to Regulate Hospital-Physician Relationships: A
Critical Analysis, 9 AKRON Tax J. 13 (1992); Theodore T. Myre, Jr., Significant Tax Issues in
Hospital Related joint Ventures, 75 Ky, L.J. 559 (1986-87).
298 Gen. Corms. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201, at *1 (citing Priv. Ur. Rul. 88-20-093 (May 31,
1988); Priv. Ltr. Rut. 89-42-099 (Oct. 30, 1989); unpublished Priv. Ltr. Rut. (issued Sept. 13,
1984)).
'‘499 Id. at *43—*44,
maThe ILLS also discussed the distinct possibility that the arrangements violated public policy.
See infra part IV.E,2-3 (discussing the Medicare and Medicaid fraud and anti abuse laws).
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The IRS noted that where a hospital retains ownership of property, it
operates the property, and it shares its net profits from designated
exempt activities with staff physicians, the venture displays attributes
of a "shell type arrangement."Th The as concluded that the arrange-
ments described in GCM 39,862 were shell type arrangements and
would confer "direct and substantial" private benefit on the physician-
investor "insiders" by the joint venture's receipt of net revenue streams
of the hospital's department or laboratory. 302 If "for any reason these
benefits should be found not to constitute inurement, they nonetheless
would exceed the tolerable bounds of prohibited private benefit." 303
After the release of GCM 39,862, the issue arose as to whether a
tax-exempt hospital's sale of the future gross revenue stream from an
outpatient surgical unit to a joint venture with staff physician-investors
would threaten its tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). 3" Based
on GCM 39,862 and its reasoning, the IRS ruled in the affirmative. The
IRS was unpersuaded by the joint venturers' assertions that the forma-
tion of the arrangement was necessary to stave off competitors and
therefore should not jeopardize the exemption. 305
Recently, the formation of hospital-physician joint ventures that
threaten the tax-exempt status of a hospital have abated to a large
degree. On the other hand, issues of private inurement and private
benefit have increased in the context of physician retention and re-
cruitment.
2. Physician Retention and Recruitment
For years, hospitals have competed for physicians and have at-
tempted to lure and hire staff physicians by offering incentives. A 1969
revenue ruling provided a framework for contesting subsequent com-
pensation arrangements between hospitals and physicians. 306 The rul-
301 Gen. Cowls. Meni. 39,862, supra note 201, at *44,
302 1d. at *43–*44.
"Id. at *36-37. The IRS balanced the public benefit resulting from the transactions—en-
hanced hospital financial health or efficiencies—and found them merely "tenuous" to the hos-
pital's charitable purpose. Therefore, private benefit far exceeded the permissible Incidental"
standard. Id.
3414 Priv. Lir. Rul. 92-33-037 (May 20, 1992), reprinted in 6 EXEMPT Oae. TAX Riiv. 838 (1992).
an Id.
316 Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.11. 113. The IRS identified a number of factors to be considered
in determining reasonableness of compensation, including: (1) whether the compensation re-
sulted from arms length negotiations; (2) the extent of control by the compensation recipient
over the payer organization; (3) the reasonableness of the compensation amount compared
to the responsibilities and activities assumed under the contract; (4) whether the compensa-
tion would (-manly for an ordinary and necessary business deduction under I.R.C. § 162(a);
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ing involved a compensation package offered by a hospital to a staff
radiologist. 307 Pursuant to the arrangement, the radiologist would re-
ceive a fixed percentage of gross billings of the radiology division. The
IRS found that the radiologist's overall compensation was reasonable
in terms of responsibilities and activities assumed by the physician
under the contract. 308 Moreover, the physician did not control the
organization and the contract was negotiated at arms length."" The
IRS found no private inurement. 31 "
In 1986, the IRS issued General Counsel Memorandum 39,498,
which addressed whether the tax-exempt status of a hospital would be
jeopardized by a physician recruitment incentive program that guar-
anteed a minimum annual income for several years without a co-exist-
ing obligation by a recipient physician to repay the subsidies after the
contract periods" As part of the arrangement, a physician could be
required to perform significant services for the hospital, including
emergency room duties. 312 The IRS took the legal position that a
recruit who became an employee of the hospital or who merely had a
close professional working relationship would be considered an "in-
sider."3' 3 The IRS accorded great significance to the parties' failure to
cap the guaranteed annual payments that could be made to a recruit. 314
It reasoned that the physicians had potential to gain substantial eco-
nomic benefit in excess of reasonable compensatory amounts. 315 The
total sums possible under the program might not quantitatively be
incidental when compared to the hospital's attempt to further the pro-
motion of health cares"' Therefore, because such unrestricted income
subsidies could violate the I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) prohibitions against pri-
(5) whether the compensation payments serve a real and discernable business purpose of a
hospital independent of a purpose to operate the hospital for the recipient's benefit; (6) whether
the compensation principally depends on incoming revenue of the hospital or upon accomplish-
ment of the objective of the compensation contract; and (7) the presence of a cap or reasonable
maximum compensation to avoid a potential windfall to the recipient. Id.; see Thomas K. Hyatt,
Physician Recruitment and Retention for Charitable Hospitals: In the Midst of a Sea Change?, 6
EXEMPT ORG. TAx REv. 1314, 1318-19 (1992) (citing specifically Gen. Coons. Mem. 38,905 (June
11, 1982), and other IRS releases generally).
9(a7 Rev. Rul, 69-383, supra note 306, at *1.
368 Id. at *1.
"J Id. at *1—*2.
316 Id. at *3.
311 Gen, Coons. Mem. 39,498, .supra note 280, at *2—*3.
312
313
 Id. at *6—*7.
314 id. at *9—*I0, *13-4'14.
315 1d.
316 Gen. Coons. Mem 39,498, supra note 280, at *9—* 10, *13—*14.
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vate inurement and excessive private benefit, the IRS concluded that
such recruitment programs would jeopardize the tax-exempt status of
a hospitals"
Over the past several years, physician incentive arrangements have
proved a "hot bed" of controversy. In December 1994, Hermann Hos-
pital, threatened by a withdrawal of its tax-exempt status, entered into
a closing agreement with the IRS. 3 ' 8 The closing agreement addressed
corrective actions to be initiated by the hospital with respect to trans-
actions conducted over a four-year period." In a rather unusual step,
the IRS disclosed the closing agreement and suggested that pend-
ing the issuance of formal guidelines on physician recruitment and
incentive packages, the closing agreement demonstrates one practical
application of IRS policy on physician recruittnent."° Although the
guidelines of the Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement are fact-spe-
cific and the agreement is not all-encompassing,32 ' it indicates an IRS
stance with respect to the recruitment of physicians who maintain
private packages.
The closing agreement delineates permissible and impermissible
recruitment incentives with respect to attracting a physician from out-
side the hospital's community. It imposes a requirement that incen-
tives not be conditioned on a physician's admitting or referring pa-
tients to the hospital, on restrictions regarding staff privileges at the
hospital, or on requisites associated with the physician's treatment or
admission of patients to another hospital. The closing agreement enu-
merates additional duties, at least one of which a physician-recipient
must fulfill as part of the contract with the hospital. Finally, the agree-
ment outlines methods for the hospital to demonstrate an existing
community need for the physician's recruitment. 322
More recently, the IRS released Announcement 95-25, which an-
nounces the content of a proposed revenue ruling addressing the
question of "whether a hospital violates the requirements for exemp-
tion from federal income tax as an organization described in
§ 501(c) (3) ... when it provides incentives to recruit private practice
317
313 Bernadette M. Broccolo & Michael W. Peregrine, Bad Doctor Deals Place Hospitals at New
Risk: Part I—Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement, 10 ExEmyr ORG. TAX REviEw 1341 (1994).
319 1d.
320 See IRS Closing Agreement, supra note 15, ati-1. Tax attorneys have criticized the closing
agreement as "overly restrictive if IRS intends to apply them beyond the facts of this case." Id.
321
 Broccolo Sc Peregrine, supra note 318, at 1341. The agreement does not address deferred
compensation packages, retention packages, or incentive programs directed at physician-employ-
ees. Id.
322 Id.
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physicians to join its non-employee medical staff or to provide services
on behalf of the hospital."'" The IRS admits that the proposed revenue
ruling does not "delineate the boundaries of either permissible or
impermissible transactions."24
 However, it has been praised as more
lenient than the Hermann Hospital Closing Agreement.'"
The announcement presents incentive packages in five scenarios,
four of which involve relocation packages and one of which addresses
a retention type package. Much is still unaddressed by the proposed
revenue ruling. Yet, two things are clear from the outlined scenarios.
First, the IRS is hesitant to rule on guidelines applicable to retention
incentive packages. Second, physician recruitment incentive packages
may not only include financial assistance in the form of interest-bear-
ing loans, but also may permit: (1) grants of start-up funds if "commer-
cially reasonable"; (2) up to three years of below-market office space
rental; (3) moving expenses; (4) up to three years of a guaranteed net
income from private practice; (5) one year of malpractice insurance
premiums; (6) guarantees of a mortgage on the physician's residence;
and (7) reimbursement of "tail" malpractice insurance coverage on a
former private practice.'26
In order not to jeopardize the hospital's tax-exempt status, objec-
tive evidence must demonstrate that the package furthers the hospital's
exempt purpose, that the community benefits from hiring the physi-
cian and that having the availability of the physician to treat patients
outweighs the private benefit to the physician." 27
 Need for the physician
can be proved by such objective data as a United States Public Health
Service designation of the hospital's community as a Health Profes-
sional Shortage Area for primary medical care professionals, including
obstetricians and gynecologists. 328
 Finally, the announcement distinctly
provides that continued qualification for tax-exempt status depends on
a hospital's compliance with the Medicare and Medicaid fraud and
anti-abuse laws—that is, the hospital's recruitment activities cannot
violate public policy.'"
525
 Ann. 95-25 (April 3, 1995), 1995-14 I.R.B. 11, available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, Rels
file, 1995 1RB LEXIS 110, at * t.
324 Id.
825 Fred Stokeld, Expeci More Closing Agreements, IRS Official Tells Tax-Exempts, 67 TAx NoTEs
1294 (1995) (citing statement by Celia Roady, partner in Washington, D.C. law firm and chair
person of American Bar Association, Tax Section, Exempt Organizations Committee).
326 Ann. 95-25, supra note 323, at *15—*20.
527 Id.
ant
322 Id.
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E. Public Policy Test
1. Bob Jones University v. United States
In 1983, in the context of education, the Supreme Court articu-
lated the community benefit standard in conjunction with a prohibi-
tion against the violation of law and public policy.uo In a sweeping
statement, the majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Burger,
stated in Bob Jones University v. United States
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the ex-
empt entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the so-
ciety or the community may not itself choose or be able
to provide, or which supplements and advances the work
of public institutions already supported by tax revenues. . . .
[A] n institution must fall within a category specified in
[1.R.C. § 501(c) (3)] and must demonstrably serve and be in
harmony with the public interest. The institution's purpose
must not be so at odds with the common community con-
science as to undermine any public benefit that might other-
wise be conferred.
We are bound to approach these questions with full aware-
ness that determinations of public benefit and public policy
are sensitive matters with serious implications for the institu-
tions affected; a declaration that a given institution is not
"charitable" should be made only where there can be no
doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental
public policy."'
Applying the critical elements of the passage and other language
throughout the majority opinion, it is clear that to be considered a
tax-exempt charitable organization, the entity's purposes and activi-
ties must (1) comport with fundamental public policy and (2) be
deemed to confer community benefit, which the Court referred to
as "public benefit.""2 However, it is not entirely clear from the
"' Bob Jones Univ, v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590-60{} (1983).
"IN. at 591-92 (footnotes omitted).
"" ! These elements are taken from statements throughout the majority opinion. One such
statement provides:
In view of our conclusion that racially discriminatory private schools violate
fundamental public policy and cannot be deemed to confer a benefit on the public,
we need not decide whether an organization providing a public benefit and other-
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opinion whether the public policy doctrine merely is one prong
of the operational exclusivity test and thus subsumed within the
determination of satisfaction of one of the eight permissible clas-
sifications of I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) organizations—that is, charitable,
educational, scientific, etc.—or whether it is a wholly separate re-
quirement added by judicial gloss to I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). 3" In other
words, the majority opinion is not clear as to whether the public
policy doctrine is an independent test or is a factor that must be
satisfied for an organization to be considered "charitable" within
the meaning of the statute. Throughout its opinion, the Court ap-
wise meeting the requirements of § 501 (c) (3) could nevertheless be denied tax-ex-
empt status if certain of its activities violated a law or public policy.
Id. at 596 n.21.
333
 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist points out this confusion by stating:
Another way to read the Court's opinion leads to the conclusion that even though
Congress has set forth some of the requirements - of a § 501(e)(3) organization, it
intended that the IRS additionally require that organizations tneet a higher stand-
ard of public interest, not stated by Congress, but to be determined and defined
by the IRS and the courts.
Id. at 617 (Rehnquist, j., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Powell in his concurring opinion suggests
some concern about the clarity of tire majority's approach. Id, at 606-07 (Powell, J., concurring).
In portions of the majority opinion, the Court implied that the public policy requirement. is
a separate requirement and not subsumed within another requirement. In that event, the public
policy requirement would not impact directly a determination of whether an organization falls
within one of the eight express categories enumerated in 1.R.C. § 501(c)(3), such as charitable,
educational, scientific, etc. Illustrations of the separate requirement interpretation can be found
in the following examples of the language of the majority opinion:
(1) "[Tin qualify for a tax exemption pursuant to I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3), an institution must
show, first that it falls within one of the eight categories expressly set forth in that section, and
second, that its activity is not contrary to settled public policy." Id. at 585.
(2) "[A] n institution must fall within a category specified in [1.R.C. § 501(c) (3)1 and must
demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest." Id. at 592 (citation omitted).
(3) "To be entitled to tax-exempt status under § 501(c) (3), an organization must first fall
within one of the categories specified by Congress, and in addition must serve a valid charitable
purpose." Id. at 592 n.19.
However, in other portions of the opinion, the majority appears to connect the two concepts
of public policy and community benefit as necessary to satisfy one of the eight categories of 1,12..C.
§ 501(c) (3). For example, the majority stales:
(1) "A corollary to the public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in the
law of trusts, that the purpose of a charitable trust. may not be illegal or violate established public
policy." Id. at 591.
(2) "[A] declaration that a given institution is not 'charitable' should be made only where
there can be no doubt that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental public policy." Id.
at 592.
See Colston, supra note 154, at 313-15 (describing legislative history behind public policy
constraint); Note, Bob Jones University v. United States: For Whom Will the Bell Toll?, 29 Sr. Loots
U. L.J. 561,574-75 (1985) (indicating the majority opinion is not a paradigm of clarity).
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pears to indiscriminately and intermittently mix the various stand-
ards and requirements. 334
Regardless of one's reading, the majority opinion in Bob Jones Uni-
versity, which upheld the denial of tax exemption to a religious school
that practiced racial discrimination, certainly is sufficiently broad to
impact not only educational institutions, but also all I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3)
organizations. 335 Viewed in this way, the Supreme Court decision would
broaden the judicially sanctioned standards to include a public policy
element when determining a not-for-profit health care organization's
qualification for tax-exempt status.
2. Public Policy Doctrine and Medicare/Medicaid
Anti-Kickback Rules
In 1972, Congress enacted the first version of the Medicare fraud
and abuse rules, known popularly as the Medicare anti-kickback stat-
ute.ss'' After numerous amendments, 337 the statutes currently prohibit
351 See supra note 333 (presenting select quotations from the majority opinion).
355 See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 `EC. 381, 385, 443-44, 504-05 (1984)
(holding that petitioner did not qualify for tax-exempt status because it operated for a substantial
commercial purpose, it violated the prohibition against private inurement, it violated well-defined
standards of public policy, and it did not provide a public benefit; leaving undecided the issue
of 'whether an organization providing a public benefit and otherwise meeting the requirements
of section 501 (e) (3) could nevertheless be denied tax-exempt slams if certain of its activities
violated a law or public policy"); Canada v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 973, 981 (1984) (citing Bob
Jones University in determination of whether petitioners were entitled to receive charitable con-
tributions to church); see also Note, Applying a Public Benefit Requirement to Tax -Exempt Organi-
zations: Bob ,fones University v. United States, 49 Mo. L. REV. 353, 353 (1984).
"'Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242, 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994)). This original statute was a narrow
prohibition against certain fraudulent behavior, and provided for a criminal misdemeanor sanc-
tion if violated. For a general discussion of these fraud and anti-abuse rules, see Colombo, supra
note 82, at 258-63; Glenn A. Reed & Robert E. DeWitt, Referral Fee Prohibitions, in HEM:11-1 CARE
CORPORATE LAW: FINANCING AND LIABILITY 7-1, 7-14 to 7-40 (Mark A. Hall ed., 1994).
347 In 1977, amendments broadened the prohibited abuses and increased the criminal pen-
alty for violation of the fraud and anti-kickback provision to a felony. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-
fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub, L, No. 95-142, § 4(b), 91 Stat. 1175, 1181 (1977) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994)). Sec supra note 330 for brief description of
penalty under original statute. In 1980, Congress added a scienter requirement; the offender had
to "knowingly and willfully" enter into an arrangement considered fraudulent under the anti-
kickback rules, Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 320a-71)(b) (1994)). The criminal provision provides a
felony charge with commensurate sanctions. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h(b) (1994). Under the proce-
dures filr a civil action, the Office of Inspector General {"OIG") or Health and Human Services
("MS") initiates the case. If the OIG finds the health care provider guilty under the statute, the
offender can be excluded from further participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
However, the health care provider may request a hearing before an FINS administrative law judge.
In such a hearing, the OIG has the burden of proving that the health care provider violated the
statute by a preponderance of the evidence. An adverse decision by the administrative law judge
can he appealed to the NHS Departmental Appeals Board, and court review of this appellate
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a health care provider from knowingly and willfully offering, soliciting,
paying, or receiving remuneration, whether in cash or in kind, in re-
turn for or to induce the referral of a patient for any service for which
Medicare or Medicaid might pay.s"A Congress amended the Medicare
statutes in 1989 and 1993 in an effort to prohibit physician "self re-
ferral.'" Pursuant to the amended provisions, a physician is now also
forbidden from making referrals for certain Medicaid-reimbursed serv-
ices to entities in which the physician has a prohibited financial rela-
tionshipm—that is, a financial interest in clinical laboratory services,
physical and occupational therapy, radiology and diagnostic services,
durable medical equipment, prosthetics, home health services, pre-
scription drugs, and inpatient and outpatient hospital services reim-
bursed by Medicare or Medicaid." 41
The enforcing administrative agency, the Office of Inspector Gen-
eral ("OIG") of Health and Human Services ("HHS") has interpreted
the fraud and anti-kickback laws broadly, so that a violation occurs if a
health care provider intentionally arranges to offer financial incentives
for referrals. However, more than ten safe harbors to the anti-kickback
rules currently exist under HHS regulations. 592 These anti-kickback
level administrative procedure is permitted. However, court review is limited to a determination
of whether HHS's decision was "arbitrary and capricious." See Colombo, supra note 82, at 224
n.68; Reed & DeWitt, supra note 336, at 7-16 to 7-17 & n.9. In 1987, Congress added a civil
penalty provision to supplement the existing criminal sanction. Medicare and Medicaid Patient
and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 3, 101 Stat. 680, 686 (1987) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994)). This amendment enabled the OIC or HI-IS to
expel the guilty health care provider from future participation in Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams. Reed & DeWitt, supra note 336, at 7-16 to 7-17 & n.9. These amendments also author-
ized 1-11-IS to issue regulations creating "safe harbors." Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 13, 101 Stat. 680,
697-98 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 320a-7b(b)). See generally Reed & DeWitt,
supra note 336.
338 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1)-(2) (1988). For further discussion, see supra note 8.
3"D Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, 2236-41
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat.. 312, 59 ►-604 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn), Because these
self-referral provisions were introduced by Representative Fortney "Pete" Stark, the provisions
were referred to as the "Stark Bill."
"DA prohibited "financial relationship" generally includes any ownership, debt or other
investment interest in an entity, including any compensation arrangement. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395nn(g)(3)-(4) (1994).
With respect to the prohibition against physician self-referral, a guilty provider cannot claim
payment for the prohibited self-referred service—and if claimed in violation of the law, it must
he reimbursed to the government. 42 U.S.C, § 1595nn(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Additionally,
the statute provides for a $15,000 penalty per violation for presenting a claim for service that the
person knows or should know violates the law, and a $100,000 penalty for entering into a
prohibited arrangement that the person knows or should know has a principal purpose of
producing illegal referrals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395int (g) (3)-(4).
341 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn.
342 Other safe harbors have been proposed by HES involving investment interests in rural
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safe harbors involve investment interests and joint venture arrange-
ments,343 space and equipment renta1, 344 personal service and manage-
ment contracts,345 sale of a practice (currently permitted only if the sale
is to another practitioner, rather than to a hospital or other entity), 345
referral services,347
 warranties and discounts,'" payments to employ-
ees, 849 group purchasing organizations, 350 and waivers of co-insurance
or deductibles (currently permitted exclusively by hospitals). 35 ' Simi-
larly, several exceptions exist to the physician self-referral rules. 3"
3. Public Policy Doctrine and Anti-Dumping Standards
As previously mentioned in part 11.B.3, 353 during the late 1970s
and early 1980s, there were continuous allegations of "patient dump-
area facilities, investment interests in ambulatory surgical centers, investment interests in group
practices composed exclusively of active investors, practitioner recruitment in rural areas, obstet-
rical malpractice insurance subsidies, referral arrangements to specialty services, and cooperative
hospital services. 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008 (1995) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952) (proposed
Sept. 21, 1993).
543 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)(1), (2) (i) (1994). This safe harbor protects physicians' investment
interests in large, publicly held corporations having in excess of $50 million in net tangible assets,
and in certain joint ventures where no more than 40% of the interests are owned by persons
capable of referring and no more than 40% of the gross revenues are from referrals.
544 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(b)—(c) (1994). A written lease at fair market value must be entered
for at least one year, with the fair market value not determined by referrals or value of business
reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid.
345 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (1994), The health or management services must be delineated
in writing and have a term of at least one year. Compensation must be established in advance,
with none of it determined by Medicare or Medicaid referrals or business generated.
346 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(e) (1)-(2) (1994). The sale must be completed within one year of
execution of the sale agreement; the selling physician must have relocated, retired or not be in
a position to make referrals one year after the sale agreement's date.
147 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(f) (1994). The referral service must not exclude qualified physicians
from participation and must charge fees equally to all participating physicians based only on the
cost of the service.
546 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(g)-(h) (1994). Warranties and discounts offered in exchange for
volume referrals are permitted if both buyer and seller report them on their cost reports or
invoices.
349 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(i) (1994). Payments to bona fide employees are protected; the term
employee is defined by reference to I.R.C. standards that distinguish independent contractors
from employees.
35L1 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(j) (1994). Purchasing agents must enter into written agreements with
the provider and make certain disclosures in certain circumstances.
351 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(k) (1994). The waiver or reduction must be universal for all services,
but not be offered under a price reduction agreement between a hospital and a third-party payer,
and must not later be claimed as a bad debt.
552 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)—(d) (1988 & Stipp. V 1993). The exceptions fall into three cate-
gories generally: exceptions to both the ownership and compensation prohibitions; exceptions
to the ownership prohibitions only; and exceptions to the compensation prohibitions only. See
Colombo, supra note 82, at 226-27; Reed & DeWitt, supra note 336, at 620-2'2.
353 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing patient dumping problem).
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ing" by hospitals—that is, the transfer of indigent patients, generally
the sickest and most costly of patients, to other hospitals, usually public
hospitals, before treatment. To contend with the problem, in 1985,
Congress enacted anti-dumping laws that require all hospitals partici-
pating in Medicare (which includes almost all hospitals) to accept
nonpaying patients in their emergency rooms (if they have emergency
rooms) to the extent of their capabilities, and all hospitals with Medi-
caid agreements to admit Medicaid patients without discrimination. 354
These laws are designed to extend certain limited protections to per-
sons unable to pay for hospitalization and health care without the
assistance of a federal program. The anti-dumping rules require that
a hospital provide patients with a medical screening examination and
stabilize the patient before transfer by appropriate means to another
institution. Sanctions for violation of the statute include, but are not
limited to, civil pecuniary penalties and suspension or termination of
an offending hospital's Medicare provider status. 355
4. Public Policy Doctrine and the IRS
The IRS has clearly signaled that the public policy doctrine dic-
tates that a charitable hospital deserves exemption from tax only if it
complies with the Medicare/Medicaid anti-dumping, fraud, and anti-
kickback rules. 356
 Although in the past IRS and HHS interpretations
occasionally have differed as to acts and arrangements that may be
considered to violate public policy, 357 the two agencies' concerns are
converging, and the agencies are attempting to coordinate enforce-
ment efforts.'"
Evolution of the IRS's attitude is notable with respect to joint
ventures and other arrangements between physicians and hospitals.
35' 4 See supra note 78 (discussing COBRA, Congress's response).
355 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (1)-(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
356 See, e.g., Gen. Courts. Mein. 39,862, supra note 201, at *62; IRS Hospital Audit Guidelines,
Manual Transmittal 7(10)69-78, 1 333.1(5) (Mar. 27, 1992), reprinted in 5 ExEmirr Om:. TAX
REV. 697 (1992) [hereinafter Audit Guidelines; IRS-CPE TEXTBOOK, SUPEa note 92. Field agents
are instructed not only to investigate the denial of treatment to and transfer of patients in an
emergency medical condition or women in active labor, but also to examine illCidelICCS of "radio
triage"—that is, assessing a patient's financial ability by radio contact, visually with an ambulance,
and directing the patient be driven to another institution. Audit Guidelines, supra; see also
IRS-CPE TEXTBOOK, SUpra, note 92.
357
 See. Charles F. MacKelvie & Mary Lynn McGuire, Provider-Physician Arrangements: An
Uneasy Alliance Under Fraud, Abuse, and Inurement, in LEGAL, MEDICINE 1990, at 189, 190-207
(Cyril H. Wecht ed., 1991); Woodhall, supra note 92, at 231-33.
358
 See IRS-CPE TEXTBOOK, supra note 92; Audit Guidelines, supra note 356, at 1 533.4; see
also IRS and HHS to Coordinate Oversight Operation of Tax-Exempt Health Care. Organizations, 2
EXEMPT ORG. TAX Rev., Special Stipp. 1989.
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For example, in the late 1980s, one typical joint venture arrangement
between a not-for-profit hospital or its subsidiary and physicians on the
hospital staff would be structured as a sale of the hospital department's
or service's gross or net revenue stream to a partnership consisting of
the hospital and physicians. The department or service, such as an
outpatient surgical unit, would continue to be owned and operated by
the hospital. However, after the sale, through their partnership inter-
ests, the physicians could personally profit from increased referrals and
patient utilization of the facilities.''9
 For a number of years, the IRS
ruled that such joint ventures and partnership arrangements would
not jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the hospital partner: 3° How-
ever, in 1991, the IRS changed its position.
In late 1991, in GCM 39,862, the IRS reexamined three previously
issued private letter rulings involving a hospital's sale of the net reve-
nue stream from its outpatient surgical unit to a joint venture between
the hospital and physicians on its staff. 36 ' The IRS reconsidered its
position taken in those rulings and, contrary to its earlier position,
determined that such arrangements do jeopardize a hospital's tax-ex-
empt status.362
 This conclusion was based on the violation by the joint
venture arrangements of the three tests of I.R.C. § 501(c) (3): the
prohibition against private inurement, the prohibition against exces-
sive private benefit, and the public policy doctrine. Focusing on the
public policy test, the IRS concentrated on whether the joint venture
arrangements breached the Medicare/Medicaid anti-kickback rules.'"
The IRS first noted that not all physician-hospital joint ventures and
hospital arrangements would violate the Medicare/Medicaid statute."64
359 See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-33-037, supra note 304; Priv. Ur, Rul. 90-29-034 (Apr. 23, 1990);
Priv. Ltr. Rul 89-42-099, supra note 298; I'riv. Ltr. Rul 88-20-093, supra note 298; see also supra
notes 294-305 (describing such partnership arrangements).
3" See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rid. 90-29-034, supra note 359; Priv. Ltr. Rul 89-42-099, supra note
298; Priv. Ltr. Rul 88-20-093, supra note 298.
361 See Gen. Couns. Mem, 39,862, supra note 201 (addressing Priv. Ur. Rul. 89-42-099, supra
note 298; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-20-093, supra note 298; unpublished Priv. Ltr. Rul., supra note 298).
362
 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201.
393
 Id. at *62.
369 The IRS stated that it should care about whether these physician hospital arrangements
do serve an illegitimate purpose fOr several reasons:
First, physicians may be tempted to refer patients for unnecessary services or for
necessary services provided in an unnecessarily costly setting. This overutilization
would drive up the costs of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs without achieving
any public benefit. Payments intended to influence the exercise of judgment with
respect to referrals may easily become an added cost of doing business in the health
care field. Such arrangements may also cause harm to individual patients from their
being subjected to unnecessary procedures or having their treatment facilities
selected based on pecuniary, rather than quality of care, concerns....
Another important reason to be concerned about these arrangements is that the
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After finding that the arrangements questioned in GCM 39,862
did not fall within any of the statutory safe harbors, the IRS determined
that these joint venture arrangements contained abusive and illegal
features that the OIG had highlighted in its Special Fraud Alert Joint
Venture Arrangements. 363
 It enunciated a guiding principle: "Where
participating in a joint venture does not demonstrably further the
hospital's exempt purposes in some legitimate manner, the Service
ought not rule favorably on the arrangement."'" In the memorandum,
the IRS examined the joint ventures to determine whether they fur-
thered the hospital in a legitimate manner and found that they were
"no more than a sham" because of the "total absence of any valid
business purpose or activity." 367
 It concluded: "We believe that engaging
in conduct or arrangements that violate the anti-kickback statute is
inconsistent with continued exemption as a charitable hospital. . . No
matter how economically rewarding, such activities cannot be viewed
as furthering exempt purposes."'"
The IRS has been mindful of the Medicare/Medicaid fraud and
anti-kickback rules in the context of hospitals' purchases of physicians'
practices.'" A potential problem may arise where a not-for-profit hos-
pital purchases a physician's practice or a group practice and the
physician (s) continue practicing medicine. If the form and amount of
the payment made to the physicians suggest an intention to induce or
reward the referral of business, the disguised payment may violate the
anti-kickback rules. 370
More recently, the IRS voiced in Announcement 95-25 37 ' its con-
cern over the Medicare/Medicaid anti-kickback rules in the context of
physician recruitment by hospitals."' It clearly stated its position: when
hospital's entire community may be harmed rather than benefitted. Where physi-
cians receive hidden or disguised payments for referrals, honest competition among
health care providers based on quality or price is undercut.
Id. at *65—*66 (citation omitted).
7165 Id. at *58—*59 (discussing abusive features or OIG Special Fraud Alert-Joint Venture
Arrangements, issued in April 1989).
566 Id. at *76.
367
 Gen. Courts. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201, at *77. IRS also cited concern for the lack of
symmetry in upside opportunities and downside risks kw the physician-investors." Id. at *78—*79.
IRS questioned whether the incentives provided to the physician-investors were actually intended
to include unstated incentives for referral of Medicare and Medicaid business. Id. at *79.
36t1 Id. at *62 (footnote omitted).
3c7 I See IRS- CPE TExTaooK, supra note 92; see also Levine, supra note 277 at. 1060.
37" Such disguised payments could take a variety of forms. For example, disguised referral
fees could be in the form of above-market rates of compensation paid to the physicians or an
option to buy the practice where an actual sale is not contemplated. See IRS-CPE Trxritoox,
supra note 92.
"Supra note 323.
171 For further discussion of the physician recruitment issues, see supra part IV.D.2.
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a hospital is adjudicated guilty of knowingly and willfully violating the
Medicare/Medicaid anti-kickback statute by providing recruitment in-
centives that constitute payments for referrals, the hospital will fail to
be recognized as furthering charitable purposes if such activities are
substantial."'
5. Current Relationship Between the IRS and HHS
The IRS has acknowledged that, although the tax and health laws
are different, the concerns of the IRS and HHS overlap to some extent,
and information on potential violations of the Medicare/Medicaid laws
and HHS regulations should be shared. 374 The significance of GCM
39,862 and Announcement 95-25 extends well beyond the strict scru-
tiny of hospital-physician joint ventures and physician recruitment
practices. They provide a benchmark for the IRS's position on the
prohibitions against private inurement and excessive private benefit. 375
Both pronouncements are a formal recognition that all health care
organizations, including those forming an IDS or hospital network,
must comply with Medicare and Medicaid laws to satisfy the public
policy doctrine. Absent compliance, initial qualification or retention
of tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) would be denied to any
component organization of an IDS or hospital network. 576
F. I.R. C. § 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Tests and Standards
Applied to Health Care Networks
1. In General
In comparison to the declining number of freestanding hospi-
tals,377
 the health care sector continues to experience the formation
373 Ann. 95-25, supra note 323, at 14. Tax-exempt status will be denied or revoked.
374 See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
375 See supra part IV.0—D.
376 TO date, no cases or administrative rulings exist involving health care organizations'
conformance with the public policy test other than with respect to the Medicare/Medicaid
anti-kickback statutes. However, it is conceivable that other public policy concerns might enter
the picture at some point. For example, the media has reported that low-income groups in
Tennessee allege discriminatory practices against them as Medicaid recipients. Steven A. Holmes,
Drug Makers and Black Groups Fight Prescription Controls, N.Y. TuviEs, Nov. 20,1994, § 1, at 32.
These individuals under TennCare, Tennessee's Medicaid program, suggest that TennCare's use
of a restrictive formulary of approved drugs results in denied access to certain drugs that
physicians might deem appropriate to prescribe. Id. They allege that these practices are discrimi-
natory in that more affluent individuals are lug limited in the kind and quality of available
prescription drugs. Id. Moreover, it is suggested that this practice violates Tide VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which bars discrimination in any program receiving federal funds, including
Medicaid. Id.
977 See supra notes 57-58, 80-81,100-03 and accompanying text.
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and growth of horizontal hospital networks and IDSs. 378 This expan-
sion has been the result of many factors, including efforts to reduce
hospital overcapacity, to increase efficiency, and to furnish comprehen-
sive health care benefits to patients under managed care plans. The
degree and type of integration of these assorted networks varies greatly.
Regional networks of horizontally affiliated hospitals joined under
contractual arrangements or joint ventures to offer medical services
are increasingly popular. Vertically integrated IDS models range from
partially integrated systems, such as the management services organi-
zation ('MSO") model to a total integration model—that is, a single
entity IDS composed of merged groups of hospitals, physicians, and
possibly HMOs, offering health care services.37" In some states, such as
Texas, California, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, laws prohibit the cor-
porate practice of medicine, and therefore do not allow hospitals or
other corporations to employ physicians or directly provide physician
services. 3" Yet, even in those states, IDSs have appeared in the form of
the foundation model. Under the foundation model IDS, a hospital
establishes a not-for-profit corporation (the medical foundation). The
medical foundation purchases the medical practice of a group or
groups of physicians, including the medical practice's tangible and
intangible assets. The medical foundation contracts with the physician
group(s) for the delivery of medical services to the foundation's pa-
tient-S. 381
Regardless of the structure of the network and of whether the
structure is achieved by merger or some other form of reorganiza-
tion,382 it is critical to focus on (I) whether an affiliated entity initially
378
 For a definition of "IDS," see infra Glossary. One survey reports that of the 1191 free-
standing hospitals represented, 81% expect the hospitals not to openite independently by 1999.
DELorrrE & TOUCHE, supra note 84, at I, 26. Most anticipate their hospitals to join provider
networks, but without ownership changes. Id. at 1. Seventy-one percent of the hospitals either
currently belong or anticipate developing IDSs, and 66% report that it is "absolutely necessary"
for an acute-care hospital to have sonic limn of PHO. Id. at 17-18,21-22; see also Boisture, supra
note 95, at 272; Richardson, supra note 58, at 907.
s7"
	 a description of the various IDS models, see infra Glossary. See also Gerald M. Griffith
& Brad M. Tomtishen, Exempt Hospital Affiliations: Bond and UBIT Issues, 11 EXEMPT Oat;. TAX
REV. 709 (1995) (discussing regional affiliations of hospitals).
350 See Bromberg, supra note 92, at 336; Richardson, supra note 58, at 907.
951 One practitioner, a former IRS official, has described the foundation model IDS as the
"[p]rogeny of superannuated restrictions on the corporate practice of medicine." Bromberg,
supra note 92, at 336.
'Hl Mergers, acquisitions, and other forms of legal reorganizations entered into for the pur-
pose of consolidating or streamlining the provision of health care services have become common
during the 1990s. Many mergers have occurred in the health industry despite the filet that the
expenses of consolidation can he extraordinarily high. For a discussion of the costs associated
with mergers of health care providers, see jay Greene, The Costs of Hospital Mergers, Mon.
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 3,1992, at 36. It. has been reported that between 1985 and 1992, the number
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seeking tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) qualifies on its own
accord or as an "integral part" of the network, and (2) whether a
consolidation or otherwise reorganized structure of affiliated entities
jeopardizes the existing tax-exempt status of any of the entities. In large
part, that determination hinges on satisfaction of the community bene-
fit standard as well as the prohibitions against private inurement and
excessive private benefit.383
2. Tax Exemption of Foundation in Foundation Model IDS
a. In General
In the formation and operation of a foundation model IDS, 384 a
major focus is whether the corporate medical foundation deserves
of hospital systems increased from 249 to 300, with the number of non-federal acute-care hospitals
declining from 5788 to 5292. See Richardson, supra note 58, at 913 (citing AMERICAN HOSITTAI.
ASSOCIATION DIRECTORY OF MULTMOSPITAI. SYSTEMS (1980-1987) and editions of the AHA
Gunn,. Cm . 1988-1993 (implying these changes resulted from horizontal mergers of hospitals)).
The issue that arises as a result of reorganization processes is whether the existing I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3) status of a hospital or other affiliated entity is threatened by the reorganization.
Numerous private letter rulings and other IRS pronouncements indicate generally that the
changed structure will not jeopardize the existing tax-exempt status of a hospital or other entity
taking part in the reorganization if the new structure enhances the delivery of health care services
and each entity continues to satisfy the requirements of Revenue Ruling 69-545. See, e.g., Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 95-19-057 (Feb. 16, 1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-17-051 (Feb. 2, 1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
95-11-038 (Dec. 20, 1994); Priv. La. Rul. 95-11-036 (Dec. 19, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-11-035,
supra note 205; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-28-044 (Apr. 16, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-25-042 (Mar. 25, 1992);
Priv. Li'. Rul. 91-30-002 (Mar. 19, 1991); Gen. Coons. Mem. 39,326 (Jan. 17, 1985), available in
LEXIS, Fedtax library, GCM file, 1985 IRS GCM LEXIS 6. If the system can show that due to the
reorganization it has a more effective ability or more flexibility to respond to the competitive
health care environment and to community health care needs, the IRS has indicated that the
new structure will be deemed to enhance health care delivery. See, e.g., Priv. La. Rul. 95-19-057,
supra; Priv. hr. Rut. 92-28-044, supra; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-30-002, supra. if as part of the reorgani-
zation a new corporate entity is created, the IRS will undertake an analysis of whether the newly
created corporation satisfies all requirements and standards for tax exemption. For example, if
a new superparent corporation is created, the organization would be required to satisfy the
standards applied by the IRS to such entities. See infra notes 446-55 and accompanying text
(describing the standards applicable to superparents).
583 The determination depends on satisfaction of all I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) tests enumerated in
the text. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text. The IRS has placed considerable
emphasis on scrutinizing these arrangements for purposes of the prohibition against private
inurement. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-26-040 (Apr. 4, 1994) (ruling on Rockford Memorial Health
Services Corp.); Priv. Ltr. Rul. on Harriman Jones Medical (Feb. 3, 1994), avaiable in LEXIS,
Fedtax library, TNT file, 94 TNT 31-103 [hereinafter Harriman Jones Ruling]; Priv. Ltr. Rul.
94-11-043, (Dec. 21, 1993), available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file, 94 TNT 3-128 [herein-
after Billings Clinic Ruling]; Priv. Ltr. Rul. (Aug. 1, 1993), available in 93 TNT 187-178, 8 EarR
799-801 (1993) thereinafter Northwestern Ruling]; Facey Ruling, supra note 205; Friendly Hills
Ruling, supra note 205; IRS-CPE TExmoox, supra note 92; see also supra part IVC (discussing
the private inurement test).
3" The IRS has set forth separate exemption criteria for the fOrmation and operation of a
December 19951	 HEALTH CARE TAX EXEMPTION
	
87
I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) status. In making this determination, the IRS scru-
tinizes the foundation and the system as a whole, including the foun-
dation, affiliated hospitals, clinics, or other health care providers.'"
Compliance with the community benefit test of Revenue Ruling 69-
545, as expanded by IRS rulings and other pronouncements, is essen-
tial."" The IRS recognizes that integration of hospital and physician
services will result naturally from formation of the IDS and will be of
general benefit to the community."r For example, integration of pa-
tient records and information systems helps to eliminate duplication
of tests, procedures, and treatments, which will result in increased
efficiencies, enhancement of a health care organization's financial
health, and a reduction in health care costs to the community. How-
ever, the IRS considers such increased efficiencies and enhancement
of an institution's finances alone as insufficient for satisfaction of the
community benefit standard." 88 Fulfillment of the rules regarding pro-
hibitions against private inurement and excessive private benefit is
crucial, with the IRS largely focusing on the physician composition of
the foundation's governing boards.'
The IRS has set forth separate exemption criteria for the forma-
tion and for the operation of a foundation model IDS."'" As part of its
standards, the IRS has not articulated a requirement that each compo-
nent (e.g., the medical foundation and the hospital) of a foundation
foundation model IDS, See infra notes 390, 398-409 and accompanying text, For a description of
a foundation model 11)5, see infra Glossary.
385 See Bromberg, supra note 92, at 338; Robert S. Bromberg, The Tax-Exempt Clinic, 8 Ex EMPT
ORG, TAX REV. 557, 557 (1993) [hereinafter Bromberg, C/inic]. The criteria for recognizing a
clinic as tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) have not been clearly or fully set. limit by the IRS.
However, in Gen. Cum's. Mein. 38,394 (June 2, 1980), where a clinic was devoted to the provision
of health care services to a community but was not involved in medical education, research and
related activities, the IRS took the position that the governing boards of the clinic could not be
physician controlled, Where a clinic is involved in medical education, research, and related
activities, board control by physicians creates a "clear potential for abuse" but not a per se violation
of rules. See Bromberg, Clinic, supra, at 557; Michael W. Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo,
New Limitations on Physician Participation in Corporate Governance, 65 TAx No'rEs 121, 124
(1994).
"'See supra note 383 (listing some of the pertinent rulings for foundation model IDSs).
387 See IRS-CPE TEx•Boox, supra note 92.
" Id. at 225; see Geisinger II, 30 F.3d 494, 499 (3d Cir. 1994) (where the Third Circuit denied
the HMO, CLIP, status as a "charitable" organization under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) pursuant. to the
integral part doctrine of I.R.C. § 502, and clearly stated that efficiency concerns are outweighed
by "counterveiling policy concerns"); Harriman Jones Ruling, supra note 383,
This IRS position is consistent with its stance in Gen. Courts, Mem. 39,862, which involves
hospital-physician joint ventures. See supra part IV.D.1.
389 See, e.g., I RS-CPE Thx•ritoox, supra note 92. For further discussion of the composition of
governing boards, see infra notes 399, 402 and accompanying text.
89() See I RS-CPE 'ftx -ritooK, .supra note 92.
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model IDS be considered per se a health care provider."' A former IRS
official and current tax practitioner/commentator has expressed the
opinion that a medical foundation in a foundation model IDS should
be considered a health care provider. 392 He acknowledges that the
medical foundation does not directly employ, but rather contracts with
the physicians that treat its patients." Nonetheless, he argues for
provider status based on the underlying reasons for the formation of
a medical foundation—that is, under laws of certain states,394 a non-
profit corporation such as a hospital cannot directly employ physicians
and the medical foundation "is intended to serve as a provider of
medical care and not simply as a facilitator or arranger of care." 395 By
contrast, in specific reference to the Facey Foundation, 396 two other
commentators have characterized the role of the medical foundation
in functional terms that essentially describe it as a facilitator: "[It] .
facilitate [s] through assets purchased and contractual arrangements
with third parties, the delivery of inpatient, outpatient and other nec-
essary services to patients/enrollees of [its related] hospitals and man-
aged care programs."397 As these contrasting views demonstrate, the
debate remains unresolved.
b. Formation
The primary IRS criteria for formation of a foundation model IDS
include:398 (1) a demonstration of fair market valuation purchases of
physicians' assets—that is, proof that the hospital pays no more than
fair market value for the medical group's tangible and intangible
assets; (2) a governing board representative of the community and
89' Although the IRS has not articulated a health care provider requirement, an official IRS
publication defines an IDS as a "health care provider (or one component entity of an affiliated
network of providers) created to integrate the provision of hospital services with professional
medical (e.g., physician) services." IRS-CPE TExTuoox, supra note 92. However, the IRS considers
non-stall model HMOs and MSOs to be arrangers or facilitators of health care rather than health
care providers. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text (discussing provider versus ar-
ranger status with respect to GHP); see infra note 432 and accompanying text (discussing arranger
status of MSO). Because these organizations can be part of an IDS, this IRS definition may not
comport with legal positions that it has taken.
592 Bromberg, supra note 92, at 336.
595 Id.
594 See supra note 380 and accompanying text (listing several states in which the laws limit
nonprofit corporations' employment of physicians).
595 Bromberg, supra note 92, at 336.
596 See Facey Ruling, supra note 205.
597 Michael W. Peregrine & Bernadette M. Broccolo, No IDS" Determination Letter Offers
Promise, Sparks Controversy, 7 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 757, 759 (1993).
398 .,td.
December 1995]	 HEALIH CARE TAX EXEMPTION	 89
composed of no more than twenty percent physicians;'° 9 (3) evidence
that the Medicare and Medicaid fraud and anti-abuse rules are not
violated; (4) proof that the compensation agreement with the medical
group is negotiated at arms-length (preferably by an independent
board without physician representation) and does not provide more
than incidental private benefit; and (5) evidence that any covenant not
to compete is narrow in geographic scope and time duration. Further-
more, the IRS has noted that it is more inclined to recognize a medical
foundation as tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) if it acquires the
medical group's assets outright rather than pursuant to a lease or
license arrangemen t."°
c. Operation
With respect to the operations of a foundation model IDS, the IRS
places primary emphasis on: (I) the maintenance of open medical
staffs by affiliated hospitals (open medical staffs are not required of
affiliated clinics); 401 (2) the formation of the foundation's governing
board, with board membership broadly representing the community
and consisting of no more than twenty percent physicians or other
interested parties; 402 (3) the establishment of fee committees to set
399 Atte,ntism to community representation on the governing board is consistent with the IRS
position in Revenue Ruling 69-545 that the board of trustees of a tax-exempt hospital must reflect
the community in which the hospital is located. See supra part 1V,11.2.c (discussing Revenue Ruling
69-545). The 20% figure has been explained as having its genesis in the IRS's perception of the
normal composition of a community's population.
m he [IRS] has taken the initial position that physicians generally do not make up
more than 20 percent of the population of any community, and therefore, while
they are willing to concede that the physicians can have a 20 percent representation
on the board, they are insistent that other parts of the community be represented
through the 80 percent non-physician portion of the board.
Bromberg, supra note 92, at 337-38.
44)(1 1RS-CPE TEXTBOOK, supra note 92.
4°1 See IRS-CPE TEXTBOOK, supra note 92; Friendly Hills Ruling, supra note 205.
402 See IRS-CPE TEXTBOOK, supra note 92; see also Facey Ruling, supra note 205; Friendly Hills
Ruling, supra note 205. IRS representatives sometimes have referred to the 20% figure as merely
a "safe harbor" and "not an absolute requirement or limitation" on the percentage of physicians
and interested parties that may comprise the governing board. Exempt Organizations: IRS Focuses
on Community Benefit in Integrated Delivery System Rulings, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at D - 12 (Aug.
16, 1993), available in Westlaw, BNA-DTR file (statement of T.J. Sullivan, Special Assistant for
Health Care, Office of the Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organiza-
tions, IRS). At other times, IRS representatives have indicated a more aggressive approach
touching on a 20% restriction. For example, it has been expressed that "[w]e want to make sure
no more than 20% of control goes to physicians or employees of the network." Factors Determining
If Health Systems Are Tax-Exempt Outlined By IRS Official, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-2 (Oct. 24,
1994), available in Westlaw, BNA-DTR tile (statement of T." Sullivan, Special Assistant for Health
Care, Office of the Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations, IRS).
90	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 37:1
payment amounts for medical services, with independent membership
subordinate to the authority of the foundation's governing board; 4°'
(4) the organization of a separate committee to negotiate physician
compensation, with membership void of physician representation;404
(5) the provision of medical education and research; 4°5 (6) a demon-
stration that the system increases accessibility to treatment by Medicare
and Medicaid patients and treats such patients on a nondiscriminatory
basis; 40" and (7) evidence that hospitals or clinics maintain an open
emergency room policy and treat patients regardless of their ability to
pay. 407
In several private letter rulings, the IRS has taken a clear position
that charity care is an essential component of the community benefit
standard to be applied to foundation model IDSs. 408 In comparing
This 20% limit is permissive if viewed in light of the absolute prohibition against private inure-
ment rather than the limitation on private benefit. See supra part 1V.C-D. In other words, the
issue arises as to whether any physician representation violates the private inurement prohibition.
See Gen. Corms. Mem. 39,862, supra note 201; Gen, Coups. Mem. 39,498, supra note 280.
For an explanation of the basis for the 20% figure, see supra note 399 (discussing IRS's
perception of physician composition of a community).
'V05 See IRS-CPE Tityritoou, supra note 92. Like the governing board, the IRS takes the
position that physicians should be limited to a "minority position" on price setting committees.
Makeup of Fee Board Factor in Exempting Health Care Providers, IRS Official Says, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), at G-4 (Apr. 25, 1995), available in Westlaw, BNA-DTR file [hereinafter Makeup of Fee
Board] (statement of Phyllis Haney, senior attorney, Office of Associate Chief Counsel, Employee
Plans and Exempt Organizations, IRS). However, if half of the committee were physicians, there
would he little likelihood of a grant of tax-exempt status. Id.
404 See. Makeup of Fee Board, supra note 403.
Our,
	 IRS-CPE TExmooK, supra note 92 (describing the provision of medical education and
research as a "favorable factor").
4a;
	 IRS-CPE Thx•rtiooK, supra note 92; see also Facey Ruling, supra note 205; Friendly Hills
Ruling, supra note 205.
4157 See IRS-CPE TExmooK, supra note 92; see also Facey Ruling, supra note 205; Friendly Hills
Ruling, supra note 205.
105 1n the Friendly Hills Ruling, the foundation was described as operating a general acute-
care hospital and ten clinic facilities. Friendly Hills Ruling, supra note 205, at 490. The foundation
agreed that the hospital would continue to operate an emergency room open to the public and
to provide emergency care to anyone regardless of ability to pay. Id. at 491. Additionally, the
foundation agreed to treat any person without regard to ability to pay if present at any clinic
location and in need of immediate care. Id. Moreover, indigents receiving emergency room care
and requiring hospitalization would be admitted to the hospital for inpatient care and would
receive at the hospital or clinics all necessary follow-up care free or at discounted rates, depending
on the patient's financial means. Id. Finally, the foundation agreed that the hospital and clinics
would participate in Medicare and Medicaid on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id.
In the Facey Ruling, the foundation agreed to provide $400,000 of charity care annually
during its first two years of operation and at least $400,000 of charity care thereafter. Facey Ruling,
supra note 205, at 830. The foundation also agreed that the medical group with which it had
contracted for medical services would provide a "substantial number" of physicians to serve in
the hospital emergency room as "backup." Id. at 829. Moreover, the foundation agreed to provide
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freestanding hospitals, the IRS has enunciated the rule that in "most
cases, an IDS will have to go well beyond meeting the hospital [open
emergency room and Medicare nondiscrimination factors] standard to
demonstrate sufficient community benefit, especially in its outpatient
or clinic settings."409
3. Tax Exemption of an Affiliated Health Care Provider in a
Foundation Model IDS: The Role of the Integral Part Doctrine
An affiliated not-for-profit health care provider organization, such
as a hospital, clinic, or HMO may seek I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status on a
stand alone basis. 41 " Absent the ability of such an organization to so
qualify, it may pursue tax-exempt status as an integral part of the IDS
or network. 411
 This double attempt for I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status is the
route recently ventured by GHP, a not-for-profit corporation owning
and operating an HMO. 412
After the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court and denied I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3) tax-exempt status to GHP on a stand alone basis in Geisin-
ger 1,415
 GHP sought I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status as an "integral part" of
the Geisinger System of Pennsylvania health care organizations. 4 " Rul-
ing against GHP in Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, ("Geisinger
11"),415
 the Tax Court reviewed its perception of the integral part doc-
trine. Stating that the integral part doctrine is not codified, the court
relied on Treasury Regulation section 1.502-1 (b), cases, and revenue
rulings to define and apply the integral part doctrine to GHP. Essen-
emergency room care without regard to a patient's ability to pay, and the clinic or affiliated
Inispital would treat patients without regard to ability to pay. Id. The foundation also agreed to
participate in Medicare and Medicaid on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id. at 830.
Similar agreements were entered in the Billings Clinic Ruling, .supra note 383, and in the
Harriman Jones Ruling, supra note 383. In each of those rulings, the IRS permitted I.R.C.
§ 501(0(3) treatment.
4011 IRS-CPE TExTuoox, supra note 92.
410 See, e.g., part IV.B.h.2.(I).
411
 The Third Circuit has described the integral part doctrine as "an exception to the general
rule that entitlement to exemption is derived solely from an entity's own characteristics." Geisinger
II, 30 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1994).
412 See Geisinger I, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656 (1991), rev el, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir.), on remand,
Geisinger II, 100 T.C. 394 (1993), aff'd, 30 F,3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994). For a discussion of Geisinger
I, sec supra notes 242-56 and accompanying text.
41A
	 1, 985 F.2d. at 1210.
414
	 II, 30 F.3d at 494. The Geisinger System consists of GHP and eight other
not-for-profit entities that promote health care in 27 counties in northeast and north-central
Pennsylvania. Id. at 496. The system, which is controlled by a parent foundation corporation,
includes two medical centers, a clinic, a detoxification center, two professional liability trusts, and
management personnel who provide administrative services to the system. Id.
415 See Geisinger II, 100 T.C. at 394.
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tially, the Tax Court applied a two-prong test to determine whether an
organization qualifies for exemption under the integral part doctrine.
The Tax Court test asked: (1) whether the organization's activities are
carried on under the supervision or control of an exempt affiliated
organization;416
 and (2) whether the activities could be regularly car-
ried on by the affiliate without constituting an unrelated trade or
business.417
Although the Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding
against GHP in Geisinger II, it took a somewhat different approach to
the integral part doctrine.A"R The court acknowledged that structural
efficiencies of the health care system might be hampered by its inter-
pretation of the doctrine. 419
 Nonetheless, it indicated that a subsidi-
ary may qualify for tax-exempt status as an integral part of its I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3) parent only if:
116 The Tax Court specifically stated: "The parties agree that an organization is entitled to
exemption as an integral part of a tax-exempt affiliate if its activities are carried out under the
supervision or control of an exempt organization and could be carried out by the exempt
organization without constituting an unrelated trade or business." Id. at 402.
417 Id. at 404. Elaborating, the Tax Court expressed the following:
Given the existence of sales to and services performed for persons who are not
patients of the exempt entities within the Geisinger system, we must determine
whether petitioner's overall operations are "substantially related to the exempt
function" of its exempt affiliates. If petitioner's activities are "conducted on a scale
larger than is 'reasonably necessary'" to accomplish the purposes of the exempt
entities, there is no substantial relationship within the meaning of the regulations.
Id. at 405-06.
418 Contrary to GNP's prodding, the Third Circuit flatly refused to accept GNP's position
that pursuant to the integral part doctrine, tax-exempt status should automatically be granted if
GHP were merged with its tax-exempt affiliates, which would continue to retain their exemption.
The Third Circuit stated:
[T]he integral part doctrine does not mean that GHP [the entity seeking tax-ex-
empt status] would be exempt solely because either GMC or the Clinic [affiliated
exempt organizations] could absorb it while retaining its tax-exempt status. While
this is a necessary condition to applying the doctrine, it is not the only condition.
Geisinger II, 30 F.3d at 499.
415 To this end the Third Circuit expressed:
We acknowledge that interpreting the integral part doctrine in the manner GHP
urges might enable entities to choose their organizational structures based on
efficiency concerns rather than perverting those concerns by making tax consid-
erations relevant. In our view, however, there are countervailing policy concerns
which justify determining each entity's tax status based upon its own organizational
structure. It is less complex and more'certain for courts and adMinistrators to assess
an entity's tax status in light of its unique organizational composition and its
association with another entity, and only to have to take into account some hypo-
thetical combination of organizations as a second step in those relatively rare
instances when an organization meets the other precondition of integral part status
we set forth below.
Id. at 499.
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(i) it is not carrying on a trade or business which would be
an unrelated trade or business (that is, unrelated to exempt
activities) if regularly carried on by the parent, and (ii) its
relationship to its parent somehow enhances the subsidiary's
own exempt character to the point that, when the boost
provided by the parent is added to the contributions made
by the subsidiary itself, the subsidiary would be entitled to
Section 501(c) (3) status. 42°
Focusing on whether GHP's affiliation with the Geisinger System
enhanced GHP's exempt nature, the Third Circuit found that by
virtue of the association, GHP did not serve a broader patient base
in the community than if unafaliated. 421 The court concluded that
GHP failed to receive the requisite boost needed to satisfy the
integral part doctrine.422
Under the available alternatives, a non-staff model HMO either
may seek I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status on a stand alone basis or pursuant
to the integral part doctrine. If tax-exempt status is sought on the
former basis, the HMO must satisfy the community benefit standard
on its own accord. However, under current case precedent and IRS
interpretations that have not treated non-staff model HMOs as health
care providers,423
 attainment of that goal appears unlikely. Absent sat-
isfaction of the community benefit test on a stand alone basis, an HMO
affiliated with health care providers would have an opportunity to
420 Geisinger II, 30 F.3d at 501. The first prong of the Third Circuit test is essentially the
second segment under the Tax Court's test.
421 Prior to the Third Circuit decision in Geisinger II, the tax bar, the Tax Court, and the IRS
had focused on whether the subsidiary furthers the parent's tax-exempt purpose. The Third
Circuit's approach appears to approach the question from the opposite direction—that is, does
the subsidiary's affiliation with the parent enhance the subsidiary's tax-exempt purpose? However,
one commentator has pointed out that the Third Circuit's ruling may "simply be another way of
saying that the subsidiary must further the parent's exempt purposes." 1.,aVerne Woods, The Third
Circuit's Integral Part Test in Geisinger Health Plan: Implications for Integrated Delivery Systems, 10
ExEssvr Otte. TAX REV. 1351, 1354 (1994). The commentator elaborated:
Viewed in this light, the second prong of the Third Circuit's test is not novel at all,
but rather a restatement of the first prong, i.e., that the subsidiary's activity must
not be an unrelated trade or business if conducted by the parent. Any activity of
the subsidiary that would not constitute an unrelated business if conducted by the
parent must by definition further the parent's exempt purposes. Under this inter-
pretation, while the Third Circuit formally declined to address the issue of whether
GHP's activities would be an unrelated business if carried on by its exempt affiliates,
it effectively decided that the activities were unrelated by finding that CHI' received
no "boost" from the relationship.
Id. at 1354 (citation omitted).
122 Geisinger	 30 F.3d at 502.
423 See supra notes 238-56 and accompanying text..
94	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 37:1
qualify vicariously if it could satisfy the two rigorous requirements of
the integral part doctrine.
4. Tax Exemption of Management Services Organization ("MSO")
in MSO Model IDS
a. In General
MSO model IDSs are less integrated than foundation model IDSs.
The MSO is organized typically as a separate for-profit or not-for-profit
entity. 424 The IRS does not view an MSO as a health care provider, but
rather as a health care arranger or facilitator. 425 Through funding often
provided by an affiliated hospital, the MSO purchases the tangible
assets of a medical group. The MSO then turns around and under
contract with the hospital and physicians furnishes for their use real
and personal property—facilities, equipment, etc.—as well as adminis-
trative and management services. 426 The medical group continues to
own the medical practice itself (i.e., the intangible assets), and its
physicians directly deliver medical services to patients. 427 Thus, an MSO
is essentially a joint venture between a hospital and a physician group;
as part of its management responsibilities, it may assume an insurance
type function by monitoring finances and physician performances in
the provision of managed care. 428
Although to date, the IRS has not ruled officially on the tax-ex-
empt status of an MSO under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3), it has stated that an
MSO is unlikely to qualify for tax exemption. 429 The IRS would find
424 See Boisture, supra note 95, at 280: Peters, supra note 92, at 28-14. Instead of organizing
the MSO as a separate entity, it may be formed as a division of the hospital. Id.
425 See infra Glossary (describing IDS models); Boisture, supra note 95, at 280; Richardson
supra note 58, at 907; Peters, supra note 92, at 28-14. But ef supra note 391 and accompanying
text (rioting the debate as to health care status versus facilitator status of a medical foundation
in a foundation model IDS).
428 See Boisture, supra note 95, at 280; Richardson, supra note 58, at 907; Peters, supra note
92, at 28-14.
427 If the medical practice is a professional for-profit corporation, it employs the physicians.
428 Peters, supra note 92, at 28-14.
429 See IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL. IN-
STRUCTION PROGRAM TEXTBOOK FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995 [hereinafter IRS-1995 TEXTBOOK] (basing
the position on the prohibition against excessive private benefit by participating physicians and
on the lack of charitable purpose); Paul Streckfus, Report on Our 8th Annual ALI—ABA Course of
Study on Tax Exempt Charitable Organizations, Held on December 2-3, 1993 in Washington, D.C.:
Sullivan Gives Health Care Tax Update, 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 27,27 (1994) (apparently basing
the statement on the IRS position with respect to IPAs); see also infra Glossary (defining IPA). In
Revenue Ruling 86-98,1986-2 C.B. 74, the IRS denied tax-exempt status to an IPA on the basis
that it is a physician owned vehicle used for marketing their professional services and therefore
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support in the Third Circuit decision in Gei singer 1. 43° The court denied
I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) treatment to a non-staff model HMO on the ground
that the HMO was not a health care provider and hence did not satisfy
the community benefit test on a stand alone basis."' Because the IRS
does not consider an MSO to be a health care provider, it would refuse
I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status to an MSO on a stand alone basis." 2
its ptupose primarily benefits its physician owners in violation of the prohibitions against private
inurement and private benefit. See also Peregrine & Broccolo, supra note 381, at 124,
However, there tnay he an argument, albeit weak, For tax-exempt treatment of a university
hospital affiliated not-for-profit MSO. In a recent private letter ruling, the IRS ruled that a
not-for-profit provider based PPO, qualified for E.R.G. § 501(c) (3) treatment. Priv. Ltr. Rul. (Feb.
17, 1995), available in Internal Revenue Service, University Affiliated Health Care Inc. Qualifies for
(c)(3) Exemption, II ExEst•r. ORG . Tax REV. 825, 826 (1995). Participants in the PPO included
a university hospital, clinical practices affiliated with the university hospital, and the physicians
of the hospital and clinical practices. Id. The IRS noted that PPO membership was represented
by two groups: the university hospital and the clinical practices, the former of which had effective
veto power over PPO actions, Id. A similar veto power existed with respect to actions voted on by
the hoard of directors, which is composed of five physicians, two hospital directors, and four
clinical practice presidents. Id, The PPO would negotiate contracts with third-party payers and
providers of medical services, with each such contract negotiated at arms length, and with
compensation based on a fixed amount for each service rendered. Id. The PPO would provide
its own adminisu -ative and operations personnel. Id. The IRS found that the PPO qualified under
the community benefit standard because it would "enhance the ability of the Clinical Practices
to attract a continuum of patients with diverse medical problems to the medical school. The
operation of these clinics contributes to the ability of the hospital and its faculty to teach their
medical students," Id.
This liberal approach is unlike the strict stance that the IRS takes with respect to most
PHOs—that is, the organization will fail to qualify for tax-exempt treatment because the organi-
zation serves the private interests of the participating physicians and lacks a charitable purpose.
See IRS- 1995 TEXTBOOK, supra; Participation in PHO Will Not Jeopardize Tax -Exempt Status, 10
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV, 1323 (1994) [hereinafter PHO Ruling] (reprinting a private letter ruling
that addresses the tax-exempt status of a hospital on formation of a PHO in which the hospital
and physicians each have 50% interests). However, this position is consistent with the rather
liberal IRS rulings and court decisions involving medical faculty practice plans affiliated with
university teaching hospitals. See, e.g., University of Md. Physicians, P.A. v. Commissioner, 41
T.C.M. (CCH) 732 (1981); University of Mass. Medical Sch. Group Practice v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 1299 (1980); B.H.W. Anesthesia Found. Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 681 (1979); see also
Peregine & Broccoli, supra note 385, at 124.
An MSO might be able to qualify for I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) status under the less rigorous
community benefit standard, which does not appear to require health care provider status. See
supra notes 242-56 and accompanying text (discussing Geisinger I and the community benefit
rule with respect to an HMO qualifying for I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) but not (c)(3) tax-exempt status).
43° See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
4S1 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
432 Although not addressed officially by the IRS with respect to IDSs, one might raise the
question of whether any IDS component must qualify as a health care provider for tax exemption
under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). If it is considered essential by the IRS, as seemingly argued in Geisinger
I, with respect to an HMO which was part of an IDS, it appears that an MSO would not be entitled
to qualify for tax-exempt status under 1,R,C, § 501(c) (3). See supra notes 255-56 and accompa-
nying text (discussing health care provider status of stand alone HMOs); infra notes 433-38 and
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b. Integral Part Doctrine
It is unclear whether an MSO might qualify for I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
status under the integral part doctrine. As set forth in the Third
Circuit's decision in Geisinger II, the organization must satisfy a two-
prong test under the doctrine. First, the organization seeking tax-ex-
empt status must not carry on an unrelated trade or business if it were
conducted regularly by the parent organization. The Third Circuit
cited as illustrative of this prong an example in Treasury regulation
section 1.502-1 (b), which describes "a subsidiary organization which
is operated for the sole purpose of furnishing electric power used by
its parent organization, a tax-exempt organization, in carrying out its
educational activities." It appears that a hospital-controlled MSO is
analogous to the electric power subsidiary described in the regula-
tions.4n An MSO functions as a management organization which, un-
der contract, provides management services essential to the contract-
ing hospital and physicians. If a hospital-controlled MSO did not exist
as a separate entity, the hospital would provide these essential manage-
accompanying text (discussing possible impact of integral part doctrine and Third Circuit holding
in Geisinger 11 00 MS0s),
The argument that the IRS considers provider status essential, or at least helpful, for IDS
componen ts to qualify fur tax-exempt status is bolstered by assertions of a former IRS official and
current practitioner and commentator, Robert S. Bromberg. Mr. Bromberg has argued that, at
least in California, the foundation in a foundation model IDS is a provider of health care.
Bromberg, supra note 92, at 336. Mr. Bromberg suggested that provider status is permitted and
was always intended for the foundation under the California Health and Safety Code, § 1206(1).
Id. Mr. Bromberg distinguished the foundation from the MSO on this basis and labeled the MSO
as a -facilitator or arranger." Id. According to Mr. Bromberg, the IRS may view the foundation
as a health care provider. Furthermore, the IRS may have failed to articulate that it actually
requires health care provider status for tax-exempt qualification by IDS components. If so, an
MSO would be unable to qualify.
The IRS might further support its argument by reliance on the rules prohibiting private
inurement and excessive private benefit. An MSO formed by a hospital-physician relationship is
akin to a hospital-physician joint venture. If the MSO were governed by the rules applied to
hospital-physician joint ventures, the MSO could run afoul of the proscription against excessive
private benefit and the prohibition against private inurement. For example, if the MSO were
capitalized by the tax-exempt hospital and were to purchase the assets of affiliated physician
medical practices at other than arms length, fair market value, private benefit and inurement
concerns would be triggered. See also Boisture, supra note 95, at 280-81.
'I" From a recent private letter ruling it appears that, in order not to jeopardize the hospital's
own tax-exempt status, physician ownership of the MSO could not exceed 50%. See PHO Ruling,
supra note 429 (a private letter ruling that addresses the tax-exempt status of a hospital on
formation of a PHO in which the hospital and physicians each have 50% interests). If an MSO
seeks tax-exempt status vicariously through a tax-exempt hospital under the integral part doctrine,
the hospital's own tax-fitvored status must not be. jeopardized. Thus, the MSO would need to he
hospital controlled. The amount of physician control—whether limited to 20% pursuant to IDS
standards—is uncertain. See supra notes 399,402-03 and accompanying text.
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ment services for itself either as part of its overall administrative func-
tions or as a separate division. Consequently, such an MSO appears to
satisfy the "unrelated trade or business prong" of the integral part
doctrine if its activities are conducted on a scale not in excess of that
reasonably required by its affiliates. 4i4
The more problematic second prong of the Third Circuit's inte-
gral part doctrine requires that the subsidiary's relationship to the
parent enhance the subsidiary's exempt charitable character to the
point that, when the boost provided by the parent is added, it trans-
forms the subsidiary from an organization undeserving of tax-favored
treatment into one deserving tax-exempt status. 43' Satisfaction of this
prong is uncertain but appears improbable. Although there are major
differences,436
 an MSO is not totally dissimilar to GHP, the non-staff
model HMO in Geisinger II. While an HMO is more directly related to
the actual delivery of health care services, both organizations provide
management support for health care providers. Like an HMO, an MSO
can assume some degree and form of insurance-type function if it
monitors finances and physician performances in their delivery of
managed health care. 417
 The boost needed, but not received by GHP
in Geisinger II, according to the Third Circuit, would have been an
expansion of GHP's existing patient base—that is, to expand its chari-
table activities, GHP would have been required to service more patients
or a broader and larger community of patients due to its participation
in the IDS. An MSO would need a similar increase in its charitable
functions or activities through its affiliation. It is rather difficult to
conceive of such a boost because an MSO offers largely management
and administrative services to support hospitals and physicians; the
MSO generally has little relationship to the actual delivery of health
care services to the community. Therefore, it supports a charitable
purpose but has no independent charitable purpose of its own that
can be boosted. Thus, it is unlikely that an MSO would qualify for I.R.C.
§ 501 (c) (3) status under the integral part doctrine. 438
434 See Woods, supra note 421, at 1353.
433 Geisinger II, 30 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 1994).
436 A major difference between an HMO and an MSO is that the former integrates manage-
ment and financing functions along with delivering medical care by contracting with physicians,
whereas the latter generally is confined to management and financing functions. See infra
Glossary (describing HMOs and MSOs).
437 See infra Glossary (describing MSOs and HMOs).
433 But see Woods, supra note 421 (corning to the opposite conclusion but appearing to Fail
to closely analyze the MSO under the second prong of the Third Circuit's integral part doctrine
test) .
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c. MSO's Effect on Affiliated Hospital
An entirely different issue is whether the formation of an MSO
would jeopardize the I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) "charitable" organization
status of an affiliated hospital. There is little published guidance from
the IRS on this topic. 43" However, the IRS recently issued a private letter
ruling addressing this issue with respect to a PH0.4" Because both a
PHO and an MSO are generally physician-hospital joint ventures that
share similarities, 44 ' the recent PHO ruling may be indicative of the
IRS position with regard to MSOs. In that ruling, the hospital and
physicians were each fifty percent members in the PHO, with physi-
cian membership established on a per capita basis.442 The PHO was
lbrmed as a limited liability company. Its major purpose was to act as
a vehicle for soliciting and reacting to offers and responses to managed
care bids for medical services, to provide a centralized framework
for credentialing and educating physicians, and to monitor and im-
prove the delivery of health care. 443 The IRS focused primarily on the
prohibitions against private inurement and excessive private benefit
rather than the community benefit standard and utilized the approach
it typically has applied to the foundation model IDSs. 444 It ruled that
439 0n February 17, 1988, the IRS issued an unpublished private letter ruling taking the
position that an MSO did not jeopardize the affiliated hospital's tax-exempt status. See Gerald M.
Griffith, Physician "Control" and Section 501(c)(3) Tax -Exempt Status: When a Minority Interest
Equals a Majority Interest, 10 Ext:myr ORG. TAX REV. 121, 123-24 (1994). That ruling emphasized
the benefits derived by the hospital from the MSO, including an improvement in the hospital's
finances and funds available for um-exempt purpose activities. Id. However, in General Counsel
Memorandum 39,862, supra note 201, the IRS clearly took the position that financial improve-
ments without a further demonstration of providing benefit to the community is not sufficient
for a hospital to qualify for tax exemption. Therefore, it is possible that the February 17, 1988
ruling no longer represents the IRS's position. See Griffith, supra, at 124.
44"
	 Ruling, supra note 429. For a definition of a 1'140, see infra Glossary.
441 Like an MSO, a PHO typically is a separate entity that serves the affiliated hospital and
physicians that created it. Also like an MSO, a PHO may provide management and support
services, but is a facilitator rather than a direct health care provider. The PHO is a centralized
vehicle through which a hospital and physicians can offer and respond to solicitations from
employers, insurers, and other groups for managed health care and can bid to provide managed
health care. For further discussion of PHOs and MSOs, see infra Glossary.
412 PHO Ruling, supra note 429, at 1323.
443
444 See supra part IV.F.2. The IRS cited the following factors as influencing its decision: (1)
the daily responsibility for management, operations, and decision-making functions were vested
in a board of directors and not more than 20% of the board would be composed of medical staff
members, former employees, retired medical staff members or their relatives, eligible parties or
their affiliates; (2) a separate price negotiation committee had exclusive authority to manage fee
schedules and all financial and personnel aspects of managed care contracts; (3) the hospital's
interest in the PHO was proportionate to its share of capital contributed to the PHO; and (4)
physicians received benefits (profits and cash distributions) in proportion to their capital contri-
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the PHO would not adversely affect the hospital's I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)
status.""'`
5. Tax Exemption of Superparent in Hospital Network
Consolidations of hospitals into regional networks of affiliated
hospitals have become increasingly common as a means of providing
a full range of health care services demanded by the public and of
creating hospital efficiencies not available on a local leve1. 4" As part of
these arrangements, a "superparent" or "grandparent," a not-for-profit
parent corporation to all of the affiliated hospitals, might be formed.
The IRS has clearly expressed its position that, with respect to these
"provider networks," each not-for-profit entity, whether hospital or
superparent, must qualify for tax-exempt status by its own right. 447 To
so qualify, a community benefit analysis will be undertaken, and the
superparent supporting organization must demonstrate that it satisfies
the "structural relatedness test"--that is, the particular not-for-profit
entity is an integral part of an organizational structure providing com-
munity benefit. 448
One such affiliated network of hospitals with a superparent, which
sought tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c) (3), was Northwestern
Healthcare Network."' The network involved multiple hospitals and,
in some cases, the hospitals' parent corporations. These entities agreed
to affiliate to form a regional academic and research oriented health
care network. 45° A superparent was formed generally to support or
benefit and carry out the purposes of the hospitals in the network, to
enhance and improve the delivery of high-quality, cost effective health
care services on a regional basis, to promote the education of health
bution so that private benefit served by the PHO was incidental. PHO Ruling, supra note 429.
Interestingly, although not mentioned in the ruling, T,J. Sullivan, Special Assistant for Health
Care, Office of the Assistant Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations, IRS,
has stated that this ruling is based on the integral part theory. Fred Stokeld & Paul Streckfus,
Tax-Exempt PHO Not Your Typical PHO, Says IRS, 67 Mx NOTES 607, 608 (1995).
445 1'110 Ruling, supra note 429, at 1325.
44°' See Griffith & Tom ashen, supra note 374, at 709.
447
 See Exempt Organizations: 501(e)(3) Hospitals Must Guard Exemption in Acquisitions and
Mergers, Official Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at D-13 (Mar. 6, 1995), available in Wesdaw,
BNA-DTR file (comments of Sullivan, Special Assistant for Health Care, Office of the Assistant
Commissioner for Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations, IRS).
448 id. The organization must be a "supporting" organization within the meaning of I.R.C.
§ 509(a) (3) (1994), which the IRS has viewed as an integral part of the system within the meaning
of Revenue Ruling 78141, 1978-1 C.B. 148. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-260-40 (Apr. 4, 1994); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 92-25-042 (Mar. 25, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rid. 91-30-002 (Mar. 19, 1991).
449
 Northwestern Ruling, supra note 383.
4511 id.
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care professionals, and to advance scientific research through the
collaboration of the affiliated hospitals with Northwestern University
and its medical school. 45 ' Specifically, the affiliation was designed to:
(1) coordinate patient care, the result of which would reduce duplica-
tion of services and allow more cost effective delivery; (2) offer more
specialized services to a larger patient base; (3) enhance clinical, re-
search, marketing, planning, financial and managerial services, and
pecuniary and organizational expertise; (4) enhance and improve
strategic planning on a regional basis; (5) enhance access to capital
markets; (6) access technological and medical advances; (7) promote
education of physicians and other health care professionals; and (8)
advance science through research.452 Focusing on these factors, the IRS
essentially weighed whether the superparent, in its own right and as a
supporting organization through its affiliation with the entities in the
network, would supply an essential service to the network, would be
an integral part of the missions of the system, and thereby would
enhance the network and benefit the regional community sufficiently
to warrant I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) status. 453 The IRS reviewed the composi-
tion of the governing boards, the Council of Governors and the Board
of Directors, and found critical that no more than twenty percent of
their representation would be physicians affiliated with the hospitals,
their parent corporations or the network. 454 Based on these features,
the IRS granted tax-exempt status to the superparent. 455
6. Summary
On one level, the criteria for entitlement to tax-exempt status of
component institutions of the new and changed health care structures
have evolved little during the past twenty-five years. The community
benefit standard, the prohibitions against private inurement and ex-
cessive private benefit, and the public policy doctrine continue to
demand that, on balance, without violating federal laws and policies,
a tax-exempt health care organization enhance health care provided
to a broad group rather than benefit a private group of individuals.
Yet, on a more micro-level, the IRS has tightened certain criteria for
determining whether a health care organization in the contemporary
health care environment deserves tax-exempt treatment. The IRS has
451 Id.
452 Id.
45;S Id.
4'54 Northwestern Ruling, supra note 383.
45 '5 Id.
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revived or regenerated its 1956 emphasis on the provision of health
care to the medically indigent;4'5 it now views the provision of charity
care as an essential component of the community benefit standard as
applied to IDSs. 4" To reflect the perceived composition of the commu-
nity, the governing board of a newly structured not-for-profit "charita-
ble" health care organization—a PHO, a medical foundation of an IDS,
etc.—should not include more than twenty percent physicians.'" To
demonstrate compliance with the prohibitions against private inure-
ment and excessive private benefit, separate independent committees
should be formed to negotiate fee structures and compensation ar-
rangements with medical groups affiliated with an IDS. 4"
Since the mid-1960s, health care relationships and structures have
undergone revolutionary transformations. In the same time frame, the
tax exemption standards have evolved little and have been marked by
a conservative, narrow, and slow approach to rethinking those stand-
ards. While this strategy has assured a degree of consistency, the lack
of more radical alterations in the criteria for tax-exempt status may
have hindered the outreach, effectiveness, and efficiency of our health
care system. It is in this light that the following proposal is suggested.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Background
Looking at the dramatic changes in our nation's health care de-
livery system and at the current federal income tax scheme impacting
the health care sector, scholars and commentators have suggested
several core problems: (1) the need to provide quality health care to
the nation's population; 46° (2) the failure of our health care system to
provide those medical services to the medically indigent; 46' (3) the
45'1 See supra part IV.B.2.b.
457 See supra notes 908-11 and accompanying text.
458 See supra notes 399, 402, 444 and accompanying text.
Ir'e See supra note 904 and accompanying text.
469 See Noble, supra note 8.
451
 Public hospitals have the primary burden for caring for the medically indigent. Voluntary
not-for-profit hospitals provide a relatively small share of the health care required for persons
unable to pay, although there is evidence that urban not-for-profit hospitals, and especially
teaching hospitals, provide a significant amount of care to indigenes, especially through emer-
gency room care. IRS Issues Health Care ISP Digest, supra note 87; Richardson, supra note 58, at
912; David S. Salkever Sc Richard Cr. Frank, Health Services, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE Nost-
mom SEcroR? 38, 38-54 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992); Sloan et al,, supra note 195, at 20-36.
For discussion of the provision of uncompensated care by not-for-profit. and for-profit hospitals,
including controversy over the definition of uncompensated care, see generally GRAY, supra note
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perception that not-for-profit hospitals have the responsibility to pro-
vide uncompensated medical care to persons regardless of ability to
pay;'"'2
 and (4) the failure of the IRS to base deservedness for tax-ex-
empt treatment of hospitals on the provision of health care services to
the indigent.46
 This list reflects many rather obvious, but questionable,
assumptions.
A central supposition is that hospitals' provision of free and be-
low-cost health care to the poor is truly eleemosynary. However, such
free and below-cost health care is supported in large part by private
payers, generally private insurers. Under hospitals' differentiated sys-
tems of charging patients for health care, these private payers, per-
ceived as having the ability to pay higher fees, pay sums in excess of
actual health care costs incurred with respect to covered patients. It is
the contention of the author that neither the hospitals nor the private
payers involved in this cross-subsidization system are acting out of
charity in the donative generosity sense of the word. Rather, the behav-
ior of the hospitals and private payers in undertaking these financial
arrangements may be driven to some extent by market forces, and, as
a result is reminiscent of charity only in its broadest legal sense—that
is, the provision of otherwise unavailable medical services to a medi-
cally underserved population. Second, it is assumed that not-for-profit
hospitals have primary responsibility to furnish medical services to the
needy.404
 Perhaps so, but perhaps not. Instead, under an even more
traditional view of social responsibility and of institutions that are in
positions of meeting the needs of medically indigent,''' maybe it is the
responsibility of every health care provider to provide health care to
the poor and medically underserved population." Another underly-
ing assumption is that even in this competitive health care environ-
ment, not-for-profit institutions should not be operated in a business-
58; Lewin et al., supra note 195; Sanders, Does Mission Really Matter?, supra note 195; Sanders,
Measuring Charitable Contributions, supra note 195; Steinwald & Neuhauser, supra note 34;
Arrington & Haddock, supra note 195; Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 195; Thorpe & Phelps,
supra note 195.
462
 See supra note 196 (discussing the perception of persons regarding the provision of charity
care by hospitals).
463 See supra note 193-94 (citing sources proposing alternative means of defining community
benefit),
464
 It appears that the perception extends not only to public hospitals but also to private
not-for-profit hospitals.
465 See supra notes 21-22,31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the early role of proprie-
tary and voluntary hospitals).
466 This view may apply especially at a time when market forces have placed health costs
beyond the means of a substantial proportion of the nation's residents. See supra notes 11-13
and accompanying text (describing the percentage of the nation's population without health
insurance coverage).
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like manner for the purpose of earning a profit. 467 It is the author's
belief that such organizations should be encouraged to use business-
like approaches to attain surplus income as long as the surplusage is
dedicated to the achievement of the organizations' "charitable" mis-
sions.4'8 Additionally, it is assumed that only not-for-profit health care
organizations deserve the tax preferred treatment associated with the
performance of perceived "charitable" activities. This should not be
the case. For-profits should also be entitled to tax benefits if they truly
contribute to "charitable-type" activities.
B. Proposed Tax Regime
The author suggests that we set aside these assumptions and con-
ceive an entirely different federal tax regime. This new tax scheme
would grant some form of tax-favored treatment to for-profit and
not-for-profit health care organizations that engage in the types of
charitable activities and programs that society views as valuable and
worthy of governmental subsidy through tax relief.'" In other words,
for purposes of federal taxes (as opposed to state purposes) health care
organizations would be "neutered"; they would not be viewed through
the for-profit/not-for-profit dichotomy."'" The system would be de-
467 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
465 See generally, Bittker Randert, supra note 120, at 307-15.
469 A major underpinning of traditional tax theory is the existence of munerous general and
specific objectives that the tax system can serve. See Joseph 1'. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income
Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568-69 (1965). In simple terms, the basic general social, equity,
administrative, and economic objectives and criteria of our tax system can be categorized as
follows; (1) raising revenues; (2) assuring fair and simple administrability of taxes; (3) promoting
stability and economic growth while minimizing interference in an efficient economy; (4) assur-
ing neutrality—equal taxation of persons with equal incomes; and (5) developing a tax system
consistent with and for the promotion of the political system and the United States Constitution,
including the creation of special incentives. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public
Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA,
L. REV. 1, 31-108 (1990) (discussing various theories concerning congressional tax legislation);
Nancy E. Shurtz, A Critical View of Traditional Tax Policy Theory: A Pragmatic Alternative, 31 Vim.
L. REV. 1665, 1666 (1986) (suggesting the general purposes that should be served by the tax
system); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Mx Incentives, 64
Tr.x. L. REv. 973, 973-74 (1986) (discussing that the inefficiency of tax incentives is widely treated
as obvious and well established); see also Borris I. Rinker, The Property and Vitality of a Federal
Income Tax Deduction for Private Philanthropy, in TAx ltaPAcrrs ON PHILANTHROPY 145, 153-62
(1972) (justifying tax deduction for philanthropy on grounds that it does not violate tax policy
precept of equity and efficiency); Susan Fergenbaum Thomas jenkinson, Government Incentives
for Historic Preservation, 37 NAT'l. TAX J. 113 (1984). Within certain parameters this approach
would attempt horizontal equity—that is, neutrality—between not-for-profit and for-profit health
care institutions earning equal incomes.
470 Although the author is aware that this stance would result in the abolishment of the
charitable deduction for income, gift, and estate tax purposes, contemporary health care organi-
zations receive relatively little support from donations. See Hall & Colombo, Charitable Status,
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signed to foster the underlying missions of current not-for-profit health
care organizations, which are often stated in terms of charity, quality
of care, and community service. This approach should result not only
in encouraging all health care organizations to conduct charitable
activities and programs, but also in reducing criticisms that the tax
system places not-for-profit health care organizations in a preferred
competitive position as compared with for-profit organizations. 471
1. Tax-Favored "Charitable Activity Expenses"
There are a couple of tax-favored approaches that could be ap-
plied to accomplish these purposes. The new tax system might entitle
health care organizations to either a federal tax deduction or, prefer-
ably,472
 a refundable and recapturable tax credit473 for "charitable activ-
ity expenses." The value of the deduction or tax credit would be
determined on a weighted basis. 474
 Similar to the business expense
deduction, or perhaps as a subset of I.R.C. § 162(a), the term "chari-
supra note 146, at 406 n.350 (citing National Association of Hospital Development, fiscal year
1987-88 figures indicating 1.6% of member hospitals' "total budgets" from cash donations); see
also NONPROFIT ALMANAC 1992-93, at 260, 272-73 (Virginia A. Hodgkinson et al. eds., 4th ed.
1993); Foster, supra note 57, at 351-52 (citing data from American Association of Fundraising
Counsel). It has been said that the primary tax benefits obtained by not-for-profit organizations
are those at the suite level. See Hyman, supra note 18, at 330.
This "neutered" approach would have the side effect of making irrelevant issues of private
inurement and private benefit, which the IRS seems to spend considerable time monitoring.
471 See, e.g., OFFICE OF ADVOC., U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN., ISSUE ALERT: UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION WITH SMALL BUSINESS (1986); OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL FOR ADVOC., U.S. SMALL
BUSINESS ADMIN., UNFAIR COMPETITION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS WITH SMALL. BUSINESS:
AN ISSUE FOR THE 1980's (3d ed. 1984); Hansmann, Unfair Competition, supra note 130, at 605;
Mancino, supra note 34, at 1018.
472 The refundable and recapturable tax credit approach is preferable because, by its very
nature as an offset against tax liability, it would provide a larger financial incentive for a health
care organization than a deduction that serves only to reduce taxable income.
475 A refundable tax credit is one where the credit in excess of the taxpayer's tax liability is
refunded by the Treasury and a recapturable tax credit can be carried back and carried forward
if unused. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 38(c), 39, 55 (1994); see also Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to
Promote Pharmacologic Research, to Encourage Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation and Im-
provement, and to Reduce Product Liability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1058 n.268
(1994).
4'74 Because the health care organization would not be considered tax-exempt under I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3), previous criticisms of the idea of granting business expense deductions to tax-exempt
organizations on the ground that they are not profit-seeking institutions would be unfounded
with respect to the proposal. See, e.g., Bittker & Randert, supra note 120, at 310-13 (proposing
income measurement theory to explain income tax exemption based on the absence of a practical
and traditional accounting method to measure the net income of not-for-profit organizations and
therefore difficult to categorize charitable activity expenses as business expense type deduction).
But see Atkinson, supra note 146, at 611-16 (criticizing the income measurement theory); Hall
& Colombo, Charitable Status, supra note 146, at 385-86 (same); Hansmann, Rationale, supra
note 146, at 59-91 (same).
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table activity expenses" would be defined broadly. The definition might
include "expenses incurred by a health care provider, arranger, or
facilitator organization at cost in the direct or cooperative develop-
ment, production, and carrying on of 'charitable activities." This de-
finition would permit tax-favored treatment to a health care organiza-
tion, whether or not deemed to be a direct provider of health care. 475
By opening entitlement to non-providers of health care, greater par-
ticipation is encouraged by PHOs, MSOs, non-staff HMOs, and other
health care organizations currently deemed by the IRS to be health
care facilitators or arrangers. Through cooperative efforts, health care
provider organizations, facilitators, and arrangers could contribute
vitally to the enhancement of health care. 47 '
2. "Charitable Activity"
As recognized by the Supreme Court in Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization v. Simon, societal needs and concepts of charity
change over time, and thus the definition of the term "charitable
activity" must be fluid and sufficiently flexible to account for these
forces.47
 Like proposals previously set Forth by organizations and aca-
47 See supra notes 255-56, 391, 424-32 arid accompanying text (regarding health care
provider versus arranger or facilitator status).
476 Application of the lax-favored treatment to a non-staff HMO would provide impetus for
the HMO to pay for medical personnel training or medical research that does not directly benefit
their enrollees. HMOs, as cost cutters, have been accused of failing to contribute to the public
good. See Trouble for Teaching Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at A16,
477
 506 F.2d 12713, 1286-89 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The term might be
defined to encompass the considerations and approaches proposed by organizations, academi-
cians and state governments in efforts to upgrade and broaden the IRS's community benefit
standard. For a rendition of these proposals, see supra notes 193-94 and references cited therein.
For example, the term might be defined as follows;
"Charitable activities" by a health care organization shall include the provision of:
(1) inpatient or outpatient emergency or non-emergency health care services (in-
cluding medical laboratory services), prescription medications, and medical devices
(as defined by the federal Food and Drug Administration) at or below cost which
are directly related to the diagnosis, testing, or treatment of a medical illness or
medical condition to persons determined to be at or below the federal poverty line
(as redetermined annually by the federal government pursuant to guidelines devel-
oped in conjunction with Health and Human Services) and to persons unable to
obtain health or hospitalization insurance having a $500 deductible, having a
co-payment requirement in excess of 20% by the insured, and having no waiting
period nor pre-existing condition impediment, through group insurance provided
by his/her employment or the employment of a relative, or through individual
insurance after demonstrating that the individual was rejected for coverage in
writing by three state chartered health insurance companies; (2) planned educa-
tional programs involving aspects of health care advertised and made available to
the urban or rural community or region serviced by the health care organization,
as defined in ILS state articles of incorporation or other state licensing document;
(3) educational training to medical staff physicians, nurses and paramedical per-
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demicians for redefining the community benefit standard under the
current tax regime, 478
 the statutory definition should include—perhaps
through a catch-all provision 479—community- or regional-specific medi-
cal activities and programs that are considered worthy of federal tax
subsidization. The community/regional specificity would account for
location-dependent medical needs and problems. A large urban area
in which reside many medically indigent who do not have their own
primary care physicians but use emergency rooms for most, if not all,
medical care, might require different types of health care programs
to provide its population better access to quality health care than a
wealthy, well-insured suburban area in which, for the most part, resi-
dents have their own physicians. For example, Columbia-Presbyterian
Medical Center in New York City recently started a free shuttle service
to its newly established nearby clinic.48" A person presenting with a
medical problem determined not to be an emergency through a nurse-
conducted preliminary examination is given an option: either con-
tinue to wait for hours until seen by an emergency room physician, or
be shuttled by direct van service to the clinic for faster (and cheaper)
medical care.481
 This program in the New York City setting is valued.
By comparison, the same program in a wealthy suburban area in which
ninety-eight percent of the population have health insurance and
personal physicians might not be valued.
3. Certification Panel
Similar to provisions recently proposed under the Health Security
Act of 1993, 482
 the new tax scheme should incorporate a community-
sonnel; (4) basic science and medical clinical research performed by qualified
employees of the organization (alone or by contract with another health care
organization), health or medical sciences division in the federal, state or local
government, a college, a university, a certified medical school, pharmaceutical
company or biotechnology company; and (5) such other medically related services
or programs determined as furthering a community's or region's medical needs,
access to medical care, and medical goals (with a focus on medical problems of
minorities, the poor, and other medically underserved populations) as established
through inclusion on the calendar year's annually updated community medical
plan by a certification panel, composed of a broad representation of the community
formed in accordance with guidelines compiled by the Internal Revenue Service
and Health and Human Services.
478 See supra note 193.
479 See supra note 977 (providing a catch-all provision in the sample definition),
48° See David Gonzalez, Emergency Room Option: Free Ride to Hospital Clinic, N.Y. Timils, July
16, 1995, § 1, at I.
481 Id.
482 See S. 1757, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposed Health Security Act attempting to
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or region-based certification panel."'" This panel would be responsible
for developing and disseminating to health care organizations commu-
nity/regional medical plans—perhaps a five-year and a ten-year plan
reviewed and updated biannually—to outline the medical needs, avail-
ability of medical care and resources, medical goals of the particular
locale, and determinations of the best means of allocating existing and
potential medical resources to achieve a level of health care considered
sufficient.'1" The panel would judge the worthiness of a health care
organization's particular activities and programs in light of the medi-
cal plans. Activities deemed worthy of "charitable activity" status, and
therefore entitled to some tax-favored treatment, would then be sub-
ject to further scrutiny.
a. Weight Ranges and Allocations
Based on the particular community's or region's medical needs
and plans, the panel would be responsible for determining the weight
to allocate to a particular "charitable activity." The specific weight
would be based on a federally approved and regulated scale assigned
to broad classes of "charitable activities." Each classification would be
assigned a permissible broad range of weights based on general societal
priorities (e.g., eighty to one hundred), with overlapping weights al-
lowed among the categories. Some of the categories might include: (1)
the enhancement of access for minorities and medically underserved
populations to preventive health care services; 48 ' (2) the strengthening
of the quality of health care treatment; (3) the improvement of access
establish at least annually, a requirement that the health care organization, along with community
leaders, assess the health needs of its community and develop a plan to meet. those needs).
483 The guidelines for establishing the certification panel would set forth rules for assuring
that the panel is composed of a broad group of persons representing the community. If the
guidelines limit the physician composition of the panel, they might provide 6w an advisory group
of physicians and nurses that could provide technical assistance and infirm] the panel of com-
munity medical issues observed and requiring attention.
The program might be arranged in a manner similar to the federally inundated certificate-
of-need programs that review and approve substantial capital expenditures and new services
undertaken by health care providers. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 300m-4i (1982 & Stipp. IV 1986),
repealed by Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, Title Vii, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799, 3799
(1986); Robin Ditnieri & Stephen Weiner, The Public interest and Governing Boards of Nonprofit
Health Care Institutions, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1029 (1981).
484 To a large extent, the determination of what constitutes a sufficient level of health care
must be made on a political level, after input by the medical establishment and representatives
of society, such as educate rs, social workers, etc.
485 This category might include not only meeting the needs of certain socio-economic groups
(e.g., prenatal care for poor pregnant women, care for homeless, etc.) but also those of special
age groups (e.g., the elderly, children, etc.).
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for minorities and medically underserved populations to emergency
care services; (4) the encouragement of cooperative clinical research;
(5) the stimulation of cooperative basic science research and medical
technological advancements; 486
 (6) the development or improvement
of training programs for physicians, nurses, and other medical person-
nel; (7) the development and production of innovative community
educational programs; and (8) the enhancement of access to commu-
nity educational programs for minorities and medically underserved
populations.
For argument's sake, the federally approved weight range for the
first five categories might be seventy-five to one hundred; the last three
classifications might be assigned a scale of sixty to eighty-five. After
assigning locally adjusted weight ranges to each broad federal category
and disseminating this information, a certification panel would use
these ranges as initial guidelines to evaluate an institution's particular
charitable activities and programs. Annually, each panel would dissemi-
nate the weights that it has assigned to specific charitable activities and
programs to the health care organizations within its jurisdiction. This
distribution process would permit all health care organizations to make
more informed choices when considering programs and activities to
undertake.
To illustrate, let's return to the previously described Columbia-
Presbyterian clinic and shuttle van program. Let's assume that Colum-
bia-Presbyterian is in the process of considering such a program. The
hospital administrators believe that the plan might fall into the first
broad category of "charitable activity"—the enhancement of access for
minorities and medically underserved populations to preventive health
care services. Based on current national societal values and sentiment,
the federally approved weight range for the classification is known to
be seventy-five to one hundred. The administrators determine from
information disseminated by the New York City certification panel that
the category into which the shuttle program fits is valued most highly,
and because there are no comparable programs in the area, the like-
lihood of a high rating is increased. Columbia-Presbyterian also discov-
ers through data shared by the New York City panel that other "out-
reach" programs have been allocated weights of ninety to ninety-seven.
48 Scientific and medical research have long been regarded in this country as fundamental
to the health care system. Research has been perceived as integral to new innovations that might
conceivably lead to better and/or less expensive treatments, technology, and medications, as well
as advances in preventive medicine. See Crimm, supra note 473, at 1017, 1039, 1078-81; see also
DANIEL. CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS, 162-75 (1990).
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The hospital administrators submit a detailed proposal for the shuttle
program, and on review the certification panel indicates that it ulti-
mately will assign a rate of ninety-eight if certain modifications are
made. Columbia-Presbyterian agrees to make the changes and earns
the ninety-eight weight.
Comparatively, a panel in another location might assign a weight
range of between eighty and ninety to the same broad federal category
and ultimately allocate a weight of eighty-four to the same type of
shuttle program. In both cases, the determinations are based on the
federally approved weight range, the medical plans of the community
or region, and the program's uniqueness in the community. Addition-
ally, certification panels would be able to share information on their
weight ranges, which inevitably would be factored into decisions and
weight allocations.
The next step in the process would convert the assigned weight
into a percentage (e.g., ninety or one hundred percent). The health
care organization would utilize the percentage to calculate the deduc-
tion or tax credit available for expenses incurred and directly related
to the "charitable activity." In other words, the percentage would be
multiplied by the "charitable activity expenses." That figure would be
the deductible expense or amount of tax credit.
b. Report Cards
As another incentive for a health care organization to participate
in the development, production, and carrying on of "charitable activi-
ties," the certification panel would issue "report cards" at the end of
every year or two. Each report card would be organization-specific but
would supply data to enable the health care organization to compare
itself with others. This would be accomplished by tallying and specify-
ing the allocated weights for charitable activities and programs under-
taken by each health care organization within the panel's jurisdiction.
Thereafter, report card results would be compiled and distributed to
the consumers of the community's/region's health care organizations.
Health care organizations earning high marks could utilize the results
as a marketing tool; consumers would be able to use the data to assist
with such medical care choices as selecting an HMO, a hospital for
inpatient care, and the like.487
487 See Health Care Report Cards, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1995, at Al2 (editorial suggesting health
care report cards of health plans in order to permit. public scrutiny of the plans); Milt Freuden-
helm, People Want More Information fur Health Choices, Survey Finds, N.Y. Timm, Sept. 17, 1995,
4 1, at 88 (reporting on the findings of a new survey by Louis Harris and Associates).
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4. Summary
The tax regime proposed by the author to stimulate discussion is
complex, and likely to pose numerous administrative challenges—but,
so is the current system. The proposed system is designed to foster the
underlying missions of current not-for-profit health care organizations,
which are often stated in terms of charity, quality of care, and commu-
nity service. It attempts to provide a broad base of support for improv-
ing health care delivery, quality, access, and research; for training
medical personnel; for providing health care education to communi-
ties' populations; for educating consumers about health care provid-
ers, facilitators and arrangers; and for advancing medical technology.
It promotes cooperative, as well as independent, efforts of health care
organizations for the achievement of these goals. It acknowledges that
health care needs and values for comparable health care activities and
programs may be location-dependent. It is devised to be sufficiently
flexible in its implementation to account for changing societal values
and sentiments, as well as evolving health care structures. Finally, it is
intended to strengthen the ability of independent and affiliated health
care organizations to achieve financial and structural efficiencies.
CONCLUSION
Federal tax laws, and therefore IRS interpretations, have failed to
keep up with the quickly evolving health care environment, perceived
medical needs, and societal values. Scholars, commentators, legislators,
tax administrators, and representatives of interest groups have repeat-
edly discussed this problem, but solutions are still in the making. At
this time, a number of bills await the attention of Congress that, if
enacted, would change the current progressive income tax system to
either a flatter income tax, a flat tax, or a consumption tax system.
While we are in the state of rethinking our federal income tax
system, it is appropriate to once again direct attention to the nation's
health care system, which is affected by our federal income tax system.
The author has reviewed the structural changes in our health care
system, has indicated the response of the IRS to the altered health care
landscape, and has concluded with a new tax proposal designed to
foster the underlying missions of current not-for-profit health care
organizations.
Part I began with a brief statement about the federal tax statutes
that confer tax-exempt treatment on health care organizations. Focus-
ing largely on the past forty years, part II of the article highlighted the
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evolution of the for-profit and not-for-profit dichotomy of our health
care system and its delivery structures. Parts III and IV detailed the
development and application of criteria utilized by the IRS over the
past forty years to determine whether a not-for-profit health care pro-
vider, facilitator, or arranger deserved an initial grant or retention of
tax-exempt status, with special attention directed to qualification under
I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). In particular, it concentrated on the operational
exclusivity requirement, the prohibitions against private inurement
and excessive private benefit, and the public policy doctrine. It ad-
dressed freestanding voluntary hospitals and reviewed the evolution of
the applicable criteria under the community benefit standard. It indi-
cated that among the many factors impacting tax-exempt qualifica-
tion pursuant to that standard, a voluntary hospital has the option of
either providing inpatient charity care to the medically indigent to the
extent of the hospital's financial ability or of making medical care
available on an outpatient basis in its emergency room to medically
indigent without discrimination under Medicare and Medicaid laws.
By contrast, the article pointed out later that IDSs must satisfy a some-
what different community benefit standard. In that context, it noted
that the IRS views charity care as an essential component of the com-
munity benefit standard. HMOs and other health care organizations
were reviewed in light of the various tests and criteria. Concentrating
on- HMOs and MSOs in particular, trends were identified concerning
I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) tax-exempt status for evolving health care structures.
Speculations were set forth that tax-exempt qualification in the future
for such organizations may turn on classification as a health care
provider.
After detailing these trends and noting that the IRS seems to be
taking a rather slow, deliberate, and conservative tack (including the
regeneration of a charity care requirement), it was suggested that the
federal tax system has not kept pace with the swift and dramatic
changes in our health care system's delivery structures. To renew the
impetus to totally rethink the impact that the federal tax system has
on the health care sector, part V presented a proposal for a new tax
plan to foster financial support for the underlying missions of current
not-for-profit health care organizations.
The proposed tax plan attempts to achieve a number of goals that
the current tax system may not be accomplishing. It strives to promote
cooperative and independent efforts of health care providers, facilita-
tors, and arrangers for the achievement of numerous goals: the im-
provement of health care delivery, quality, access, and research; the
stimulation of medical personnel training and medical technological
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advances; and the enhancement of health care education to commu-
nities' populations and of consumer education about health care or-
ganizations. It attempts not to hinder health care organizations' quests
for financial security and efficiency. As conceived, it incorporates flexi-
bility to account for changing societal values and sentiments, as well as
evolving health care structures. Never losing sight of these goals and
attempting to dispel certain assumptions made about our current
health care and federal tax systems, the tax proposal provides an
alternative means of reacting to limitations inherent in the intersection
of those two systems as they now exist.
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GLOSSARY
Dedicated and Ordinary Group Model HMO. See HMO, Dedicated and
Ordinary Group Model.
Diagnostic-Related Groups (DRGs). Diagnostic-related groups were
first introduced in 1975 as a measurement of a hospital's output
based on patient groups by discharge diagnosis. They subsequently
were extended to nonhospital medical care to establish a means of
setting uniform reimbursement. Patients are grouped by homoge-
neous disorders or medical conditions for reimbursement purposes.
There are 467 specific categories and one catchall classification
representing "other" procedures.
Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO). An exclusive provider organi-
zation is a hybrid between a PPO and an HMO. An EPO is a means
of directing enrolled patients to health care providers within a
specific provider network. An enrollee has the choice of paying to
see a physician or to be treated in a hospital outside of the estab-
lished network, or to use the contractual network of physicians with
the EPO assuming full responsibility to pay the providers. Some
PPOs have offered EPO options. The dominant distinction between
an EPO and an HMO is that generally the EPO is not at financial
risk for providing health care services to enrollees.
Foundation Model IDS. See IDS, Foundation Model.
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). HMOs are organizations
that integrate the financing, management, and delivery functions
of medical care by contracting to provide medical services to an
enrolled population on a prepaid basis. Their purpose is to provide
health care at low costs, i.e., a form of managed care. HMOs began
as an alternative form of health care delivery in 1929, but after slow
acceptance, they finally became a focus of health care in the 1970s.
There are basically four models of HMOs: the independent prac-
tice association model, the network model, the staff model, and the
group model. There are two types of group model HMOs, a dedicated
group model and an ordinary group model.
HMO, Dedicated and Ordinary Group Models. In the dedicated group
model, the HMO contracts with the physicians to provide medical
services at the HMO's facilities. Physicians in an ordinary group
model may treat patients who are not members of the HMO.
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HMO, Independent Practice Association Model (IPA). Independent phy-
sicians and groups of physicians, provide their services to HMO
subscribers at their own medical facilities. The IPA contracts with
the HMO on behalf of the physicians.
HMO, Network Model. Two or more independent medical groups
provide services to HMO subscribers at the medical groups' own
facilities. Usually the medical groups contract with more than one
HMO and also maintain a fee-for-service practice.
HMO, Staff Model. Physicians are the direct employees of the HMO
and provide medical services exclusively to HMO-enrolled patients
at the HMO's facility.
Horizontal Networks of Hospitals. Affiliated hospitals that can include
acute-care hospitals as well as specialized hospitals, such as pediat-
ric, psychiatric, and oncology hospitals.
Independent Practice Association Model (IPA) HMO. See HMO, Inde-
pendent Practice Association Model.
Integrated Delivery System (IDS). IDSs are organized primarily for the
purpose of penetrating the managed care business. The health care
industry defines an IDS as a group of affiliated organizations joined
to provide comprehensive managed health care services to patients.
Therefore, it is a network of health care providers, arrangers, and
facilitators which may, but do not necessarily, include a payment
component (e.g., an HMO). By comparison, the IRS defines an EDS
as a "health care provider (or one component entity of an affiliated
network of providers) created to integrate the provision of hospital
services with professional medical (e.g., physician) services."
Various levels of integration exist, but at a minimum, an IDS
delivers hospital, physician and related ancillary services. In its simplest
form, an IDS may be created by a hospital that hires physicians who
thereafter provide medical services as salaried employees. More com-
plex IDSs provide fuller groups of services, such as preventive medi-
cine, rehabilitation, long-term care, hospice care, and mental health
care. Currently, there are three IDS models: the foundation model, the
management services organization (MSO) model, and the total inte-
gration model.
IDS, Foundation Model. In the medical foundation model, a hospital
forms a nonprofit affiliated corporation (a medical foundation)
that generally reports to a tax-exempt parent. (The parent is usually
a corporate member of the foundation and of the hospital.) The
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medical foundation is governed typically by a board of trustees with
hospital, medical group, and community representatives. The medi-
cal foundation is responsible for providing health care services, and
to do so, contracts with one or more physician groups for the
delivery of outpatient medical services to the foundation's patients.
The foundation acquires the tangible and intangible assets of the
physician group, so the medical foundation owns all medical prac-
tice assets and the medical practice itself. The foundation can em-
ploy all nonphysician personnel and supply all administrative and
managerial services necessary to operate a medical practice. This
model is typical of those states, such as California, Wisconsin, Texas,
and Pennsylvania, that restrict the ability of a nonprofit corporation,
such as a hospital, to employ physicians. The foundation model
structure satisfies the technical requirements of those laws by having
the group practice, usually a professional for-profit corporation,
employ the physicians.
IDS, Management Services Organization (MSO) Model. In the MSO
model, a hospital and physician group remain separate but are
bound together by contract. The MSO, generally a nonprofit or
for-profit corporation, is governed by representatives of the hospital
and physician group. Like a medical foundation, an MSO owns
most or all of the tangible assets (e.g., equipment, office facilities,
etc.); however, the MSO leases these assets and management serv-
ices and nonphysician personnel back to the hospital and physician
group pursuant to a management services agreement. Through the
professional services agreement, the group of physicians, who, un-
like in the medical foundation model IDS, continue to own and
operate their medical practice, provide all professional medical
services. Thus, the MSO functions as a management component,
part of which is an insurance function in that the MSO monitors
finances and physicians' performances.
IDS, Total Integration Model. The total integration model is a single
delivery entity that results from the legal merger of the hospital and
physician group or groups. Total integration model IDSs will not be
found in California and other states whose laws prohibit hospitals
from employing physicians.
Managed Competition. Managed Competition is price competition,
with total annual premiums paid for comprehensive health care
services as the focal point.
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Management Services Organization (MSO) Model IDS. See IDS, Manage-
ment Services Organization Model (MSO).
Network Model HMO. See HMO, Network Model.
Physician-Hospital Organization (PHO). A physician-hospital organiza-
tion is usually formed as a limited liability company or as a corpo-
ration. It is analogous to an IPA that includes a hospital and seeks
payer contracts with HMOs and employers. Therefore, a PHO is a
vehicle through which a hospital's medical staff of physicians and
the hospital can offer and respond to solicitations from large em-
ployers, insurers, and other managed care groups, and can bid to
provide health care. Basically, then, a PHO is a collective negotiat-
ing entity that enables physicians and hospitals to contract with
HMOs, large employers, and health insurance companies. A PHO
may also provide management and support services, as does an
MSO. A PHO is a centralized framework for credentialing and
educating physicians and for monitoring health care improvements.
It does not require the integration of financial incentives common
to an IDS. Typically, the physicians and hospital govern the PHO.
The physicians retain autonomy over clinical decisions. The hospi-
tal provides administrative and financial expertise to manage capi-
tated payments.
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO). A preferred provider organi-
zation is a hybrid health care payer system that developed through
the 1970s and 1980s in response to the economic pressures of rising
health care costs, competition for patients resulting from excess
provider capacity, and significant increases in indemnity health
insurance premiums. A PPO is essentially a network of hospitals,
physicians, and other health professionals who, under contract,
provide health care services at an agreed price to a group of
beneficiaries. PPO arrangements then are a form of managed care
that combine features of managed care and indemnity insurance.
The arrangements typically encompass sets of contractual relation-
ships between the PPO and health care providers, and between the
PPO and the beneficiaries. Reimbursement of the physicians and
other health care providers is predetermined on a prospective pric-
ing basis, which reflects a negotiated fee-for-service payment rather
than a capitated payment.
PPOs take on a variety of forms, depending on the sponsor. A
"provider-based" PPO is a group of physicians or hospitals, or both,
that contracts with commercial insurers or self-insured employers for
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the provision of health care to their patient base. A "payer-based" PPO
is owned by the payer or insurer, or both, which negotiates and main-
tains a contract with physicians and hospitals to furnish health care to
beneficiaries/patients. An "employee-owned" PPO is formed and
owned by a group of employees who are neither providers nor payers,
but whose responsibilities are exclusively to manage the ongoing op-
erations of the PPO. In this form of PPO, the payer could be either a
commercial insurer or a self-insured employer. An "entrepreneur-
based" PPO typically provides administrative services, such as organiz-
ing the payment of insurance claims, to a related third party who
secures agreements with both the insurance payer and the physicians
and hospitals.
One of the principal distinctions between PPOs and HMOs is that
the former rarely submits the health care provider to financial risk with
respect to the economic outcome associated with the actual delivery
of the health care services. Moreover, PPOs have permitted the health
care provider to maintain a fee-for-service practice and payment struc-
ture. Finally, PPOs typically give patients the final choice in selecting
their physicians or hospitals.
Prospective Payment System (PPS). A reimbursement system first util-
ized on a large scale by Medicare. It strives to standardize payments
to health care organizations for the provision of medical services.
Payment is fixed and predetermined as based on the diagnostic-re-
lated groups.
Staff Model HMO. See HMO, Staff Model.
Total Integration Model IDS. See IDS, Total Integration Model.
Vertical Integration. In the context of managed care and health care
organizations, physicians, HMOs, hospitals, clinics, and other
health care organizations combine or consolidate, often under a
parent corporation, to offer health care services. Efficiency, price
competition, and full range health care services are common goals
of vertical integration.
